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Yesterday is not a milestone that has been passed, but a daystone on the beaten track 
of the years and irredeemably part of us, within us, heavy and dangerous. We are not 
more weary because of yesterday, we are other, no longer what we were before the 
calamity of yesterday 
 
Samuel Beckett, Proust 
 
 
 
Yes, I don’t know why, but I have never been disappointed, and I often was in the 
early days, without feeling at the same time, or a moment later, an undeniable relief 
 
Samuel Beckett, The Complete Short Stories 
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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the emotion of disappointment in organisations 
and to develop a new line of theorising inspired by psychodynamic theory. The 
current literature casts disappointment as a negative emotion undermining morale, 
depressing expectations and justifying inaction and inertia. This only captures part of 
the complexity of disappointment and leaves unexplored both its impact on the 
organisation and its potential creativity.  
 
The study presents a theoretical framework derived from research that depicts 
disappointment as unfolding in three positions; I am disappointing, I am 
disappointed and I disappoint.  It asserts the importance of disappointment as an 
integrative emotion.  The study identifies a contradiction: that at the same time as 
being seen as ‘of little concern’ to individuals, there is fear within organisations that 
disappointment will undermine stability and destroy positive feelings. The study 
shows how disappointment is connected to, and may help to transform, the dynamics 
of blame in organisations. Such transformation can be based on an ability to 
integrate failure and on a development of the relationship between disappointment 
and learning.  
 
Disappointment represents the loss of the fantasy of stability.  When 
reconceptualised in this way, disappointment results in a reimagining of possibility.  
Fantasy and reality are brought into conscious awareness and tolerated rather than 
extruded.  The imaginary ideal organisation can be seen for what it is: a fantasy that 
can never be realised. The imaginary ideal is mourned and replaced by a more 
realistic entity.  Organisation members’ previous efforts to organise disappointment 
through blame, shame and extrusion is now recognised as a disappointing strategy.  
Understood thus, disappointment is at the very heart of organising as it invites 
consideration of the relationship between fantasy and reality.  This differentiates it 
from other types of social defences which, by their nature defend against thinking 
and learning.   
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1 Summary 
 
 
Aim 
 
The aim of the study is to explore the emotion of disappointment in organisations 
and develop a new line of theorising inspired by psychodynamic theory. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
 
My original contribution to knowledge is the development of a theoretical 
framework, which depicts disappointment in three configurations or positions and 
establishes the potential of disappointment as an integrative emotion within 
organisations. The framework accounts for an apparent contradiction in 
organisational members’ experience of disappointment seen as ‘of little concern’ to 
individuals and yet viewed as capable of undermining stability and destroying 
positive feelings. 
 
Existing literature frames disappointment as a threat to organisational effectiveness, 
as both a response to and an anticipation of failure and as an emotion that needs to be 
managed in order to prevent it from damaging organisational morale and 
performance. This only captures part of the complexity of disappointment and leaves 
unexplored its potential contribution to organisational and individual learning and 
even creativity.  
 
The disappointed self within organisations is constructed as a victim of unfortunate 
external circumstances and the disappointed organisation is one that fails in its 
mission to deliver. Conceptualised as failure, disappointment sustains fantasies of 
stability and satisfaction.  Conceptualised as loss disappointment contests these 
idealisations and asks that we rethink our need for imagined stability (Vince, 2002b) 
and the idea of satisfaction. I believe that the study of disappointment can generate 
insights into learning and change and help to further our understanding of the 
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interplay between emotion and power in organisations. It is this undeveloped aspect 
of disappointment in organisations that my research begins to address.  
 
The study of disappointment 
 
The simplistic psychological act of splitting the world into good and bad as a way of 
managing anxiety creates the problem of what I term the excluded middle.  This 
excluded middle is the territory occupied by disappointment.  Disappointment 
examines the political fantasies of maintaining organisational stability and protecting 
the future, despite managing the daily uncertainties and instabilities of organisational 
life.  Organisational fantasy and securing the future are important elements of 
organisational defence. Those defences contribute to the absence of literature on 
disappointment and the absence of stories told about disappointment as a component 
part of work life.  Disappointment represents the absence of positive and idealised 
outcomes.  Without disappointment, the fantasy of organisational stability and a 
secured future can be maintained.  
 
Yet, disappointment is a common experience in organisational life.  It is the ordinary 
and necessary outcome of daily imperfections metabolised by individuals.  
Disappointment is processed before it is publicly expressed and transformed into the 
more socially acceptable emotions of anger and ambivalence.  It becomes visible in 
non-productive finger pointing and blame.  The study shows how disappointment is 
connected to the dynamics of blame in organisations, although if fully appreciated, it 
could offer a way of moving beyond these dynamics.  Partial failure within an 
organisation could be recognised and turned a basis for organisational learning.   
 
Disappointment alerts us to the political life of organisations, to the ‘way we do 
things’ and the ‘feeling rules’ that govern social interaction (Hochschild, 1983).  It is 
a complex and challenging emotion that contests politics, culture, emotion, the 
hidden life of work, inconsistencies and idealisations.  It is for these reasons that the 
study of disappointment matters. 
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Methodology 
 
The study was guided by an interpretivist epistemology and the principles of 
Grounded Theory as conceptualised by Barney Glaser.  In addition the theoretically 
sensitive lens of psychodynamic theory, particularly object relations theory, was 
applied to an analysis of the data.  Data were collected in three phases: phase one 
consisted of twelve one-to-one interviews with a group of individuals who were 
purposively sampled; phase two consisted of an additional fourteen one-to-one 
interviews with individuals who were theoretically sampled on the basis of emerging 
categories and their properties from phase one; phase three consisted of an in-depth 
study of one organisation over a two-year period.  Data were collected in phase three 
through a process of one-to-one interview, observation and documentary analysis.  
Additional data were collected via a literature preview and an analysis of researcher 
parallel process.  Data were analysed using the Grounded Theory processes of 
coding, constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling and memo writing. 
 
Results 
 
The respondents’ main concern was to maintain stability and protect the future.  
This revealed an unconscious fear that disappointment had the potential to destroy 
the organisation.  The respondents managed their anxiety through a process 
conceptualised as the organisation of disappointment, which had three sub 
categories; an unwanted feeling; appointing blame and reimagining the future.   
 
An unwanted feeling reveals the way in which disappointment is organised as a 
personal and unwanted feeling.  Disappointment is organised in three positions: I am 
disappointing, I am disappointed and I disappoint.  Positions 1 and 2 locate 
disappointment here (I am disappointing) or there (I am disappointed) through the 
process of blame.  Position 3 (I disappoint) suggests a more integrative approach in 
which disappointment is assimilated into day-to-day organisational life as a 
component part of relating.  
 
The appointment of blame describes the process by which organisation members 
distance themselves from previous experiences of disappointment as a way of 
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bringing a new organisation vision to fruition.  Appointing a vision describes this 
process of distancing from the past and revisioning a reidealised future that is stable 
and satisfying.  The appointment of blame can be understood as the systemic 
manifestation of positions 1 and 2. 
 
Reimagining the future describes the collective production and manifestation of 
position 3 (I disappoint).  Reimagining the future describes the hierarchies of 
disappointment, ordinary disappointments that are metabolised into the work life of 
organisation members and the core disappointment, which threatens the very 
existence of the organisation.  Reimagining the future describes the process by which 
a potentially destructive event is transformed into a creative and productive 
experience.  In reimagining the future, organisation members must mourn the fantasy 
of what they imagined they could be and replace the idealisation with an idea of 
what they may be. 
 
Implications for future research 
 
My research highlights key issues and areas for further research.  One insight gained 
from this study is that disappointment is connected to the dynamics of blame in ways 
previously unimagined.   If blame is seen as a legitimate expression of feeling in 
organisations, but disappointment is not, then we need to understand better why 
some emotions and expressive forms dominate in organisations, while others do not 
(Hoggett and Thompson, 2002).  
 
The framework outlined here has emerged from studying the perception of 
individuals and those in one organisation. Further research is needed into other types 
of group settings in order to make a stronger contribution to management practice 
and literature than I have been able to accomplish in this study. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a summary of the thesis. I began by reiterating the aim of the 
study and the contribution to knowledge it makes.  I continued by summarising the 
methodology, describing the importance of disappointment as a research topic, 
outlining the theory the organisation of disappointment and highlighting areas for 
further research.  The following chapter introduces the thesis and outlines its format. 
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2 Overview of thesis 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore disappointment in organisations and to begin 
a process of theory-building in an area of organisation studies where there has been 
little extensive research.  The existing literature on the subject frames 
disappointment as a potential threat to organisational effectiveness, as failure and as 
something that needs to be managed if expectations are not to be damaged.  This, 
however, only captures part of the complexity of disappointment and leaves 
unexplored both the impact of disappointment on the organisation and its potential 
creativity.  
 
Overview of theory 
 
Disappointment organises and disappointment is organised.  Disappointment is seen 
as a ‘negative’ emotion that attacks or undermines what is good.  It is associated 
with failure and by locating messy and unwanted feelings within individuals the 
fantasy of the stable and satisfying organisation is sustained. However, this has 
important political implications for individuals and organisations.  Organisation 
members must manage complex feelings of failure and loss.  At the same time they 
must sustain positive feelings towards the organisation in which these experiences 
are generated. 
 
Disappointment, when conceptualised as failure, represents the fear of destruction.  
Political forces are mobilised to protect the organisation from the perceived loss of 
control associated with disappointment.  However, actions such as the appointment 
of blame or the location of disappointment elsewhere disable the organisation’s 
capacity to learn.  Paradoxically, the future becomes a repetition of the past.  The 
organisation remains stuck in an unproductive cycle, unable to learn from its 
experiences of disappointment.    
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Disappointment represents the loss of the fantasy of stability.  When 
reconceptualised in this way, disappointment results in a reimagining of possibility.  
Fantasy and reality are brought into conscious awareness and tolerated rather than 
extruded.  The imaginary ideal organisation can be seen for what it is – a fantasy that 
can never be realised.  An unrealistic ideal is replaced with a realistic idea.  The 
imaginary ideal organisation is mourned and a more realistic entity takes its place.  
This process allows the organisation to confront its fear of destruction and to create a 
new future to take its place.  Organisation members’ previous efforts to organise 
disappointment, through blame, shame and extrusion, is now recognised as a 
disappointing strategy.  In this way, disappointment is at the very heart of organising.  
It invites consideration of the relationship between fantasy and reality.  This 
differentiates it from other types of social defences, which by their nature defend 
against thinking and learning.   
 
This study has enabled an articulation of different understandings of disappointment 
(Clancy et al., In Press).  In particular, the research has highlighted the creative 
potential of disappointment when reimagined as loss rather than failure.  
Disappointment is an important anxiety against which organisations are defended.  It 
represents potential destruction and the significant feelings that destruction evokes.  
Disappointment is a paradoxical concept.  As a defence against destruction it 
sustains the fantasy that destruction can be eliminated.  In defending against 
destruction, and by rejecting the learning inherent in disappointment, organisations 
ensure the manifestation of destruction.  
 
Methodology and design 
 
My study employs psychodynamic theory to inform the exploration of 
disappointment. It presents a theoretical framework derived from research that 
depicts disappointment as unfolding in three positions, and it asserts the importance 
of disappointment as an integrative emotion within organisations. The study 
identifies a contradiction in organisational members’ experience of disappointment: 
that at the same time as being seen as ‘of little concern’ to individuals, there is fear 
within organisations that disappointment will undermine stability and destroy 
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positive feelings. My work shows how disappointment is connected to, and may help 
to transform, the dynamics of blame in organisations. Such transformation can be 
based on an ability to integrate failure within the organisation and on the 
development of the relationship between disappointment and learning.  
 
My study employed the principles of Glaser’s approach to Grounded Theory, which 
attends to individual stories but only in so far as they demonstrate a latent pattern of 
behaviour observable across a group.  This latent pattern of behaviour can be 
observed and codified, revealing the core concern of respondents (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  The researcher is then encouraged to inquire into the processes employed by 
respondents to resolve their core concern.  Data were collected using one-to-one 
interviews, interviews and observation in one organisation over a two-year period, 
literature previews and reviews and researcher reflection.  Data were analysed using 
the tools of Grounded Theory including constant comparative analysis, coding, 
memoing and theoretical sampling. 
 
The core category can be described as a social process that gives the fullest 
explanation, over time, for the behaviour engaged in by respondents to resolve their 
core concern. Using the principles of Grounded Theory, the organisation of 
disappointment emerged as the core category in this study.   
 
Overview of core category, core concern and subcategories 
 
Previous research alerts us to the potential disruptive force of emotion and outlines 
various strategies for managing feelings at work. We can assume that we are 
predisposed to avoiding uncomfortable feelings, particularly if they occur in a 
context that views emotion as an unwelcome intrusion into the rational task of the 
organisation.  Respondents in this research described disappointment as ‘un-
dramatic’, undeserving of attention and unrelated to their organisational settings.  
This may be an unconscious wish revealing the fear of disappointment’s dramatic 
potential. Whether we can in fact avoid feelings as distinct from redistributing them 
towards other goals is not within the scope of this research to evaluate, but it does 
reveal that disappointment, one amongst many feelings at work, is organised in a 
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structured and finely calibrated way both at a conscious and unconscious level.  The 
overall core category, the organisation of disappointment, reflects this organising 
task.  On a conscious level disappointment is organised by being dismissed as 
unworthy of our attention; it is held responsible for gaps between goals and results 
and it is associated with failure (McGrath, 1995).  Within existing literature we are 
confronted with strategies for managing failure ‘out’ of systems, whereas the results 
from this research reveal the ways in which disappointment is organised ‘within’ 
systems, at conscious and unconscious levels, in the service of minimising the 
perceived threat of this dramatic feeling.  The unconscious distribution of 
disappointment is achieved by locating its dramatic parts in ‘other places’ separate 
from the context in which they originate thus reinforcing the perception that 
disappointment is un-dramatic, and undeserving of attention.  The core category, the 
organisation of disappointment, reveals the active work involved in managing 
disappointment to maintain its status as unimportant (i.e., un-disruptive) while also 
revealing the potential for re-organisation in the service of its more creative potential 
as a tool for reflection and growth. 
 
The respondents’ main concern was to maintain stability and protect the future. The 
unconscious fantasy expressed in the core concern is that disappointment is a 
destructive force, a threat to the survival of the organisation, which must therefore be 
contained and organised in a rational manner.  Disappointment is managed by being 
located within individuals in the organisation so that it can be viewed as ‘personal’ 
rather than organisational.  Respondents dealt with these feelings through a process 
conceptualised as an unwanted feeling in which disappointment is organised in three 
positions: I am disappointing, I am disappointed and I disappoint. Positions 1 and 2 
locate disappointment here (I am disappointing) or there (I am disappointed) through 
the process of blame.  Position 3 (I disappoint) suggests the integration of 
disappointment into the wider organisational system in which it is seen as a 
component part of relating and a process of organisational reflection. Position 3 
points the way to the value of mourning as a creative act in which the fantasy of the 
future can be grieved and a more realistic future can be reimagined.  Position 3 is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8, Reimagining the future. 
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The appointment of blame describes the strategy by which organisation members 
separate themselves from previously disappointing experiences.  Unwanted feelings, 
anxieties and fears are displaced.  Appointing a vision describes the process by 
which individuals free themselves from disappointment as a precondition for 
impending action.  From a re-idealisation of a new organisation/work setting, a 
stable and satisfying structure emerges.  Appointing blame describes the process by 
which earlier negativity is transformed into a renewed vision for the future of an 
alternative organisation. The appointment of blame can be understood as the 
systemic manifestation of positions 1 and 2 and a social defence designed to protect 
organisation members from the anxiety of learning from previous disappointments. 
 
Reimagining the future describes the collective production and systemic 
manifestation of position 3 – I disappoint. Reimagining the future distinguishes 
between ordinary and core disappointments.  Ordinary disappointments represent the 
manageable losses of organisational life and are absorbed into day-to-day organising.  
The core disappointment represents the potential destruction of the organisation and, 
in psychodynamic terms, a significant fear against which the organisation is 
defended.  Reimagining the future describes the process by which a potentially 
destructive event functions as a reflective act by being transformed into a creative 
and productive experience.  In reimagining the future, respondents engage with the 
fantasy of ‘control and coherence’ (Vince, 2002b:1192) in which the future is 
perceived as stable and unchanging yet, paradoxically, it is only in mourning this 
fantasy future that the future becomes real.  
 
The organisation of disappointment meets Glaser’s criteria (1998, 2001) for a core 
category in that it recurred frequently in the data and it also has the explanatory 
power to integrate each of the other sub categories.  Diagram 1 is a visual 
representation of the theory. 
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Diagram 1 The organisation of disappointment 
 
 
 
I propose that it is beneficial for the individual manager and for managers 
collectively within organisations to find ways to tolerate and learn from 
disappointment rather than try to eliminate it from the system, which, inevitably, is a 
disappointing task. Disappointment confronts organisational members with the 
inevitability of imperfection (Schafer, 2003) and thereby presents them with the 
dilemma of how to negotiate imperfection within organisational settings that tend to 
emphasise positive emotion and behaviour as part of an organisation ideal.  
 
Format of thesis 
 
The thesis is presented in three sections.  Section 1 (chapter 3) focuses on the 
substantive literature in the area of emotion, psychoanalysis and organising.  Prior to 
embarking on the study, a preliminary literature preview was undertaken to develop 
and extend researcher’s ‘theoretical sensitivity’ (Glaser, 1978:32) (this is included in 
chapter 6).  In chapter 3.1, I outline the historical and cultural history of emotion by 
tracing the broad trajectory of emotion from ancient philosophy to contemporary 
times.  Chapter 3.2 considers the history of emotion as it relates to organising and 
work.  I present a framework which develops the understanding of emotion 
historically and culturally by conceptualising emotion as a political process 
consisting of two elements, morality and control.  Chapter 3.3 extends this 
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perspective by considering the influence of psychodynamic theory on understandings 
of emotion and organising.  The central concepts of a psychodynamic understanding 
of social relationships are introduced including the political effects of fantasy and 
defences against anxiety.  
 
Section 2 (chapters 4 and 5) outlines the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological considerations underpinning this inquiry (chapter 4).  I discuss 
Glaser’s approach to Grounded Theory and, in chapter 5, I describe how the theory 
was operationalised in the service of generating and analysing data.  I attempt where 
possible to outline the personal and methodological issues raised during the course 
of the study that influenced how I worked with the data and the emergent theory. 
 
In section 3 (chapters 6, 7 and 8) I present and discuss the theory, The organisation 
of disappointment.  The key points emerging from the theory are summarised in 
chapter 9.  Chapter 10 discusses the limitations of the research and applies Glaser’s 
criteria of workability, relevance, modifiability and fit to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of the study. 
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3 Literature review 
 
Introduction 
 
The problem with emotions is that they are ubiquitous.  People use emotion words to 
describe their own and others’ experiences as though we all knew what we were 
talking about (and agreed on the definitions). Emotion researchers use the same 
terminology to describe different phenomena and different terminology to describe 
similar phenomena (Kagan, 1978).  Obviously we are in difficult territory. Debate 
continues as to the nature of emotion and the associated terms used to describe it (see 
(Askhanasy, 2003, Eisenberg, 2000, Zajonc, 1985)).  Emotion has been a subject of 
interest for a considerable amount of time, and still no one definition of emotion 
exists.  The extensive literature on the subject follows no single particular trajectory, 
yet emotion has been discussed, debated and researched from ancient times to the 
present.   
 
Attempting to reach a definition of emotion or a consensus on what it ‘is’ is not 
congruent with the epistemological approach adopted in this research.   Rather than 
seek an objective understanding of the topic, I have adopted an interpretative 
perspective on existing theories of emotion as they relate to new theorising on 
disappointment. Although under-researched in management literature, 
disappointment does not stand alone and separate from other feelings, emotions and 
theories.  In order to gain a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon 
called disappointment (and, more importantly from the perspective of this research, 
the lived experience of the phenomenon), it is necessary to consider the historical, 
cultural and political context in which disappointment occurs.  
 
Overview of literature review chapters 
 
Three broad contexts are presented in the following chapters. In the first, I examine 
the trajectory of emotion from ancient Greek philosophy to contemporary 
neuroscience. To some extent, this is a chronology that traces the historical and 
cultural understanding of emotion. I trace early theorising about emotion as a 
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philosophical concept in ancient times to its scientific and naturalistic 
representations in the nineteenth century and connect the ancient ideas with revisions 
and applications applied today. The central themes emerging in this chapter are 
developed in the following sections: the assumption that emotion is either ‘good’ or 
‘bad’; the distinction between emotion as an individual experience and a social 
experience; emotion as biologically determined as distinct from socially constructed; 
and emotion as conscious manifestation of experience as distinct from information 
about unconscious processes. 
 
The second chapter considers the literature on emotion as it relates to organisations 
and work environments.  The conceptual framework which I present develops the 
historical and cultural understanding of emotion by conceptualising emotion as a 
political process. This political process consists of two elements: morality and 
control.  Drawing on three major developments in organisational theory that have 
influenced our understanding of emotion at work, the politics of emotion builds on 
themes outlined in the first chapter and develops these into a more concise 
understanding of emotion in organisations. I reference job satisfaction and stress in 
particular, as the organisational categories into which good and bad emotions have 
been herded for the purposes of maintaining the fantasy of control.  I also 
conceptualise the politics of positivity, a movement orientated towards the 
elimination of ‘negative’ emotion with its implied moral agenda as to what is 
emotionally acceptable and what is not in work settings.  The politics of positivity 
can be understood as a mechanism by which disappointment is inevitably generated 
systemically through a heightening of the political bias against ‘negative’ emotion, a 
category into which disappointment has been placed.   
 
Extending this perspective on emotion in the third chapter, I consider the influence 
of psychodynamic theory on our understanding of emotion in organisations. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon the work of theorists Sigmund Freud, Melanie 
Klein, and Wilfred Bion.  The central concepts of a psychodynamic understanding of 
social relationships are examined and considered in relation to organisational theory, 
in particular, the political effects of fantasy and social defences against anxiety.  
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My intention in these chapters is not to create another theory of emotion: there are 
many such theories depending on whom you ask and what questions are posed.  
Rather, my purpose is to establish the theoretical and conceptual landscape in which 
the present research into disappointment is undertaken.   
 
A note on terminology 
 
As the terms feelings and emotions are used interchangeably in literature, it is 
helpful at this point, to outline how I use them in this study.  I consider feelings to be 
the inner, subjective experience and emotion the outer, performed experience 
(Fineman, 2000, 2003).  The subjective experience may be mobilised into public 
expression as a result of particular circumstances, for example social context, 
personal history, organisational culture or political context.  An individual’s 
subjective feeling may not translate into an equally observable public emotion; and 
an individual’s subjective feeling and its public display may be the expression of a 
wider systemic experience, which is located within an individual for the purposes of 
managing the emotional climate of the organisation.  The feeling of anxiety, for 
instance, indicates a type of suffering that is rarely displayed publicly in its ‘natural’ 
form.  A wide variety of social defences (Hirschhorn, 1988) exists to manage and 
organise anxiety so that the work of the individual and the group can continue.  
People create rituals and processes to ‘launder’ difficult feelings into more sanitised 
alternatives.  By virtue of this definition, disappointment is a feeling and not an 
emotion, as disappointment is not displayed in its ‘natural’ form in organisations.  
Over the course of my research I found it almost impossible to find examples of 
conscious public displays of disappointment (languaged as such), yet every 
respondent described ‘private’, subjective and personal experiences of 
disappointment.   
 
One respondent from the current study, who works for an equality agency, describes 
a situation he frequently encounters and the complexity of feelings and emotions 
associated with disappointment. 
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Parents of children who have disabilities…who are struggling with 
the school system, and …uncaring school managements or whatever 
it is….who are not responding to the kind of needs that they have. 
And then we certainly see a combination of absolute disappointment 
on the part of the parent for the child, combined with frustration and 
anger and all of those other righteous emotions (Respondent 6) 
 
The political context in which disappointment is generated and experienced 
determines whether the feeling can be exhibited as an emotion or not and in most 
cases the personal feeling is translated into a more culturally accepted emotion such 
as blame or anger thus reinforcing the political issues at play. The complexity is 
reflected in the above example in which the parents who are trying to care for a child 
with a disability are embroiled in the social care system trying to secure resources.  
They clearly feel discriminated against which brings them to the equality agency.  
They are disappointed because the social care (political) system, uncaring and 
unresponsive is, in their eyes, frustrating their attempts to be good parents.  The 
potency of the parents’ attack on the system is a way of defending their good 
parenting from the disappointment they experience in the social services.  In this 
instance, the feelings of disappointment are translated into the public display of 
anger because there is an agency (the equality agency) whose role it is to help them 
fight for services for their child.  The equality agency worker, quoted above, 
identifies with the parents’ potency as a way of defending against his own 
institutional impotence to change an unequal system and his disappointment in his 
role, agency and impact. 
 
While acknowledging that any distinction between feelings and emotions are 
inadequate constructs for the purposes of describing lived experience, I propose to 
use the word feeling for a subjective experience and emotion when describing public, 
exhibited behaviour.  These distinctions make for uncomfortable bedfellows, as they 
reinforce the perpetual polarities at work in any discussion of emotion.  Still, I am 
adopting this terminology because the identification of feelings as ‘personal’ and the 
relationship between personal feeling and publicly displayed emotion is a core 
element of a psychodynamic understanding of groups and organisations.  Difficult 
feelings are managed, translated, mobilised and transformed into different, more 
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acceptable types of behaviour1 and an understanding of this behaviour can generate 
important insights into power, politics and the role of emotion in sustaining and 
contesting those processes.  
 
3.1 Philosophical and scientific perspectives on emotion 
 
Challenges in presenting theories of emotion  
 
What is an emotion? William James asked this question in 1884 in his essay of the 
same title (James, 1884).  James was a medical doctor who turned to philosophy and 
psychology and became a central figure in the American philosophical movement 
known as pragmatism. Conceptually, pragmatism is the grandparent of Grounded 
Theory, a practice of what works, or makes a difference. Throughout, James probed 
the psychological links between consciousness and unconsciousness (see Miller, 
1987). His psychology was holistic and introspective, opposing the atomistic, 
materialist psychology of late nineteenth century science, which admitted ‘facts that 
are only tangible’ (James, 1981:290).  James’s introspective essay on emotion 
questions the assumption of emotional states resulting in a physical response and 
instead proposes that emotional perception is linked to a change in our physical 
states.  For example, James questions the causality of sorrow. Do we cry because we 
are sad or are we sad because we cry? James questions the assumption that tears 
result from sadness and suggests rather that sadness results experientially from 
crying (Solomon, 2003b:65).   
 
James’s inversion of this ancient, unquestioned assumption has not been 
satisfactorily investigated; and although emotion has been considered and theorised 
from ancient times to the present no single unifying theory of it exists. Research on 
emotion exists in philosophy (Aristotle, 384-322 BCE:2011, de Sousa, 1990, de 
Sousa, 2010, Fortenbaugh, 2002, Morse, 2010); the natural sciences (Bell, 1824, 
Darwin, 1898, Richards, 2003, Ritvo, 1992), social psychology (Anderson et al., 
                                                
1 I use the word behaviour here to represent understandings, fantasies, storytelling and the variety of 
conscious and unconscious performances we adopt in group settings. 
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2003, Averill, 1983, Forgas, 1995, 2001, Frijda et al., 1989), neuroscience (Ochsner 
and Feldman Barrett, 2001, Pugh, 2006), as well as psychoanalysis (Breuer and 
Freud, 2000a, Dryden, 1996, Freud, 1958a, 1961b, 1953b, 1953a)  Different schools 
of psychotherapy have contributed to the study of emotion including object relations 
theory (Klein, 1959, 1975a, 1975b, Segal, 1973, Winnicott, 1960, 1968) and 
cognitive and behavioural therapies (Eysenck, 1981, Lazarus, 1984, Skinner, 1966).  
Emotion has been deconstructed (Averill, 1993, 2011, Burr, 1995, Harré, 1986a, 
1986b, Nightingale and Cromby, 1999, Shotter, 1997, Volosinov, 1973), quantified 
(Segerstrom, 2005, van Dijk et al., 1999, Zeelenberg et al., 1998b), cognitised 
(Goleman, 1995, McGrath, 1999, Salovey and Mayer, 1989-90, Whitman, 2009) and 
measured (Judge and Bono, 2000, Moyle and Parkes, 1999, Staw et al., 1986). 
 
There are at least two starting points from which to consider emotion.  The first is 
that emotion is a physiological reaction: a feeling that emerges when our 
circumstances change.  At its most extreme, this perspective views emotion as 
independent of cognition and as a product of natural activity that is immune to social 
factors (Ratner, 1989).  The second is that emotion is a way of ‘thinking’ about and 
processing particular situations that involve desire.  For example, anger is associated 
with a desire for revenge.  This latter perspective informs the philosophical traditions, 
which originated with Plato and Aristotle nearly 3000 years ago (Sturdy, 2003) and 
which forms the basis for the work of contemporary emotion researchers such as 
Nussbaum (2001) and Solomon (Solomon and Stone, 2002, Solomon, 2003a).  This 
relationship between cognitive and physiological understandings of emotion has 
influenced the field of emotion research until very recently. However, cognitive 
approaches to emotion have been criticised for over-intellectualising emotion and for 
viewing emotion as a form of mere ‘information processing’ leaving the role of 
emotion in the social system unexplored (Griffiths, 1997).  There are, however, other 
perspectives on emotion, which attempt to go beyond cognitive and behavioural 
understandings, and indeed, which seek to understand it as a more complex 
phenomenon. A number of these perspectives are outlined in the following section. 
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Perspectives on emotion  
 
Throughout history reason and feeling have been viewed as two disparate and 
unrelated concepts. This dichotomy can be traced back to the Greek philosophers, 
many of whom developed theories of emotion. During Aristotle’s stay in Plato’s 
Academy, for example, an investigation into the emotions was undertaken.  The 
focus of the investigation was on emotions rather than bodily sensations, and an 
attempt was made to describe the relationship between cognition and emotion.  The 
endeavour was complex and did not lead to easy answers, but a primary finding from 
the investigation was the recognition of emotion as a subset of cognition.  Emotions, 
as distinct from bodily functions, were open to persuasion, change and impression. 
Aristotle considered emotions to be complex phenomena involving ‘inter alia 
thoughts or beliefs…The angry man believes that he has been insulted, and the 
frightened man believes that he is threatened with serious harm’ (Fortenbaugh, 
2002:94).  He defined emotion as that ‘which leads one’s condition to become so 
transformed that his judgement is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure 
and pain.  Examples of emotion include anger, fear, pity and the like, as well as their 
opposites’ (Aristotle, 384-322 BCE:2011).   
 
As a result of this investigation into the emotions a dichotomy arose between two 
types of cognitive activity, ‘emotional response and reasoned reflection’ 
(Fortenbaugh, 2002:25).  This emphasis upon reason as superior to feeling was 
further consolidated by the Stoics.  The Stoics’ emphasis was on ‘logical analysis of 
our evaluative judgements’ (Graver, 2007:16).  Emotions were deemed to be a 
product of mental activity, which in turn was considered to be a material artefact.  
The Stoics viewed emotion as an opinion on good or bad: fear, for example, was 
considered an opinion about a future evil; pleasure was an opinion about a present 
good.  Emotion was considered the enemy of action, subservient to rational thought 
and to be avoided where necessary.  The Stoics believed that a life could only be 
happy and meaningful when desire was restricted and the most effective way of 
achieving happiness was to avoid emotion altogether.   Another way of reading 
Stoicism is to view it as a strategy for the management of disappointment.  By 
denying the importance of desire, expectations could be reduced thus minimising the 
likelihood of a disappointing outcome.   
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Natural science and emotion 
 
Emotion became a subject of serious interest to scientific researchers in the 
nineteenth century and the theories they generated have profoundly influenced the 
way we consider emotion today. Natural scientists suggest that we are pre-
programmed to respond to events in particular ways.  Our responses are both 
inherited and genetic and the function of science is to explore and discover the 
chemical pathways that generate emotional responses.  The focus is on the body as 
the ‘site of emotions’ and also on the ‘physiological avenues by which emotions 
have an effect on behaviour’ (Staats and Eifert, 1990:545).  The first and perhaps 
most famous scientist to explore this approach to emotion was Charles Darwin. In 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animal (1898) Darwin described human 
expression as linking human movements and emotional states and suggested that we 
were genetically pre-programmed as to how we responded to emotional events.  He 
created a taxonomy of emotion in man and ‘lower animals’ and described emotion as 
either ‘low’ spirits (anxiety, grief, dejection, despair) or ‘high’ spirits (love, tender 
feelings, joy, devotion).  Emotions were exciting in that they motivated a physical 
action or depressing in that they led to exhaustion or a lack of external physical 
movement.  Darwin also described other experiences which did not neatly fit with 
this categorisation.  ‘The change of colour in the hair from extreme terror or grief – 
the cold sweat and the trembling of muscles from fear’ (1898:190).  This led him to 
conclude that the area required further research.  For Darwin emotions were vestigial 
in that they were reminiscent of more primitive behavior: they located human 
activity in the context of our biological history.  Emotions were signals or symptoms 
and had no intrinsic value in their own right.  For example, by examining the 
emotion of ‘surprise’ and its physical manifestation such as retracted eyelids and 
raised eyebrows, he speculated that this was an evolutionary adaptation of our 
ancestors’ attempts to see objects in darkness. To this day, we react in an instinctual 
manner when an unexpected object appears, even though there may be sufficient 
light (Richards, 2003). 
 
Darwin developed the work of earlier scientists on emotional expression, in 
particular that of Charles Bell (1824).  In building on his work, Darwin mentions 
Bell’s ‘discovery’ of a unique set of muscles in humans employed in the service of 
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facial expression (Darwin, 1898:349).  Bell believed that facial expression was a 
natural method of communication between people as well as between people and 
their God, thus distancing humans from their animal cousins.  Facial expressions 
therefore had a divine purpose (Richards, 2003).  Darwin’s work on the genetic link 
between humans and animals led him to disregard the divine function of the 
emotions and led him to conclude that emotion display had a purely evolutionary 
function.  This led him to respond to Bell rather witheringly in his introduction to 
The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animal, that ‘no one, I presume, would be 
inclined to admit that monkeys have been endowed with special muscles solely for 
exhibiting their hideous grimaces’ (Darwin, 1898:10).  Although Darwin was 
interested in its evolutionary and adaptive function he also wanted to understand the 
impact of emotion as a communicative tool, suggesting that it was important for the 
welfare of mankind.  As successive psychologists and psychoanalysts would also 
conclude, emotions are an important method of communication and bonding 
between mother and child: ‘she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on 
the right path, or frowns disapproval. We readily perceive sympathy in others by 
their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and 
mutual good feeling is thus strengthened’ (Darwin, 1898:365).   
Positive and negative emotion 
 
In ancient times, each virtue was paired with two opposing virtues, one of excess and 
one of deficiency.  While furthering the natural science understanding of emotion, 
Darwin maintained through his taxonomy of emotion the ancient Greek 
understanding of emotion as dichotomous feeling states, such as good and bad. This 
unexamined Darwinian assumption unwittingly provides a pseudo-scientific linkage 
between the ancient world and the managerial world’s belief in scientific thought in 
the twentieth century (Taylor, 1911/2008).  The division of emotion into positive and 
negative has a long history in psychology and appears in most theories of emotion 
through the concept of  polarities and the concept of ‘valence’: our tendency to be 
attracted to, or repelled by a specific event, person or object.  The strong use of the 
concept of valence in American group relations emerges from Lewin’s founding of 
the National Training Laboratories (where the T group was founded).  NTL 
leadership programmes were among the first organisational programmes in the USA 
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used by corporations such as the Center for Creative Leadership in North Carolina.  
Within traditional social psychology valence appears in Osborne’s theory of the 
semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957) in which people are asked to assign 
values to pairs of words in an attempt to understand how they attribute meaning to 
objects, words, experiences (Lewin, 1936).  The concept also appears in Bion’s work 
where he suggests that valence contributes to why and how we take up particular 
roles in groups (Bion, 1961).  
 
There is a tendency to see these polarities as fixed as though there was only one 
positive and one negative pole (love being the opposite of hate for example) rather 
than each being the point of a circle with a circumference describing a universe of 
emotion. This reductionist idea of a dichotomy rather than a continuous idea is 
reified by social science questionnaire development (is it A or B) such as the Likert 
Scale, a continuous measure that is broken up discontinuously.  Solomon and Stone 
(2002) trace the development of this valence notion back to the medieval church 
with its reliance on Aristotle’s rhetoric.  Viewed chronologically, the development of 
social science emerges with the enlightenment transformation of religious thought 
into the university. Departments of philosophy become departments of social science 
and then discrete social science entities. In this transit, the irrational embedding of 
unexamined Aristotelian philosophy as science remained unexamined. This was 
mediated through the late nineteenth century emergence of psycho-physics, the 
earliest formal branch of experimental psychology as it emerged from philosophy.  
This set the standard for dichotomous understandings such as Heider’s Balance 
Theory (1958) and the concept of valence (Bion, 1961, Lewin, 1936, Taylor, 
1911/2008). 
Challenges to the naturalistic view 
 
In contrast to Darwin, one of the earliest challenges to the naturalist view of emotion 
came from Dewey in his essay The Theory of Emotions (1894).  Dewey maintained 
that the naturalist perspective could not be substantiated because psychological 
significance was at the heart of emotion.  If somebody is trembling because they are 
cold (a naturalist reaction) this cannot have the same meaning as somebody who 
trembles because they are afraid (psychological reaction).  Central to Dewey’s view 
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is that emotion and thinking are inter-related.  We cannot think without feeling.  
Dewey demonstrates this view by discussing a rational and irrational response to an 
external conflict.  A rational response is one where an emotional preference for a 
particular course of action is likely to lead to the resolution of the crisis or issue: 
‘reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather 
than a thing opposed to desire’ (Dewey, 1988:135).  An irrational response is one 
where we are stimulated by the intensity of the situation but do not draw on the 
reasonableness of our emotion to choose a solution that is appropriate. Emotion is 
central to the deliberation process and by linking thinking and feeling, Dewey 
dispels the notion that they are unrelated processes. 
 
Skipping forward a century, contemporary neuroscience looks to the brain as the 
primary source of emotion. Research has focused on universal emotional behaviour 
whereas social psychology has tried to understand more complex emotions and the 
reasons why those emotions are experienced (Ochsner and Feldman Barrett, 2001). 
Some researchers view the mind as comparable to a computer, electronically and 
chemically wired to produce particular emotional outputs (Jauregui, 1995).  Others 
view emotion as pre-programmed responses that have served humans well for 
millions of years.  For many neuroscientists, emotions are key to understanding our 
biological and behavioural legacy, thus placing them in a modernist and naturalist 
arena that views emotion and cognition as disparate and unrelated concepts 
(Panksepp, 1998, Rolls, 1999). However, some researchers who are exploring the 
links between emotion and reason are finding scientific evidence to support the view 
that the previously understood separations between these areas are in fact untenable.  
Damasio suggests that minds do more than think.  Our capacity for decision-making 
and rational thinking is influenced and informed by our feelings and emotions. He 
describes the impact of emotion, or the lack thereof, on one patient who functioned 
perfectly except in one area, the capacity to experience feeling:  
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I had before my eyes the coolest, least emotional, intelligent human 
being one might imagine, and yet his practical reason was so impaired 
that it produced, in the wanderings of daily life, a succession of 
mistakes, a perpetual violation of what would be considered socially 
appropriate and personally advantageous (Damasio, 1994:xi).   
 
On the basis of experimentation over the course of twenty years, this experience led 
Damasio to conclude that feelings are essential to the process of reasoning and that 
there is an inter-dependent link between cognition and emotion.  Damasio finds 
supporting evidence for the role of emotion in decision making.  In the midst of a 
crisis, our emotions can lead us to pause for long enough to choose from a variety of 
responses: ‘emotion and feeling, along with the covert physiological machinery that 
underline them, assist us with the daunting task of predicting an uncertain future and 
planning our actions accordingly’ (Damasio, 1994:xiii).   
 
The social construction of emotion: a contemporary philosophical 
view 
 
Social constructionism can be understood as an epistemology: a theory of knowledge 
in which meaning is constructed from social interaction.  Social constructionism is 
considered a postmodernist theory in that it rejects notions of objectivity and 
challenges the idea that there is an external reality: in other words it maintains a 
stance of ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1984:xxiv). Postmodernism 
challenges grand theories and effectively disputes the notion of objectivity.  
Complexity and difference are privileged over simplicity and conformity.  Attempts 
to apply grand theories to society are considered reductionist and evidence of the 
power of dominant beliefs over political and cultural life. In the context of emotion, 
a postmodernist perspective disputes the existence of an externally observable entity 
that is ‘emotion’ and challenges taken-for-granted perspectives on the origin of 
emotions such as personally manifest and experienced states. Writers in this tradition 
(Armon-Jones, 1986, Averill, 1983, Belli et al., 2010, Burr, 1995, Gergen, 1985, 
Mallon and Stich, 2000, Nightingale and Cromby, 1999, Ratner, 1989, Shotter, 1997, 
Volosinov, 1973, Wang and Ahmed, 2003) build on the work of early philosophers 
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and also move the discussion away from cognitive and behavioural interpretations of 
emotion into the social arena.  Once considered a function of individual biology, 
chemistry, genes and drives, emotion from a postmodernist perspective, becomes a 
richer phenomenon that takes account of the social aspects of relating.  Emotion is 
seen as a ‘discursive social construction’ (Belli et al., 2010:250). In other words the 
discussion of emotion moves from the individual, biological and cognitive to the 
social, political and cultural realm.  
 
A social constructionist perspective on emotion attempts to bridge the nature and 
nurture divide by accepting that emotions have a biological base, but this doesn’t 
determine whether emotion will be exhibited or how that emotion will be 
experienced. Social factors play an important role in the second part of this process:  
‘Biology has the abstract function of being a potentiating substratum for emotions 
while culture’s function is to realize this potential into concrete emotions’ (Ratner, 
1989).  Having said that, there is no one social constructionist view, merely a ‘family 
resemblance’ (Burr, 1995).  However, there is a broad series of principles that 
inform how social constructionists theorise emotion. 
 
Social constructionism eschews the idea that emotions are located within individuals 
waiting to be discovered and expressed in public contexts.  Rather, emotions are the 
product of social and moral rules and these ‘rules’ provide the frameworks that 
determine how we experience our emotional selves (Fineman, 2000).  Social 
constructionists see emotion as an inter-personal phenomenon, constructed in 
dialogue and enacted through language.  Rather than residing within individuals, 
emotion is constructed between people through the act of conversation.  Social 
constructionism contests the idea that there are private feelings and performed 
behaviour: all meaning-making occurs in the public realm.  It is not  ‘experience that 
organizes expression, but the other way around – expression organizes experience’ 
(Volosinov, 1973:85 cited in Shotter, 1997:14). 
 
How we talk about how we feel is directly related to the socially negotiated 
conventions or ‘culture’ of the context in which we are situated.  Rather than accept 
particular emotions as a given, social constructionists focus on particular sets of 
behaviours and contexts. For example, laughing children and an angry manager may, 
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on the surface, be described as emotional incidents of happiness and anger, however 
social constructionists caution against such reductionist labelling.  They suggest that 
these behaviours cannot be abstracted from the social, political and moral contexts in 
which they occur.  In the above example of anger for instance, we don’t know if the 
manager is male or female and whether s/he is angry with a peer, a subordinate or a 
superior (in work settings) or a partner, child or parent (in the personal realm).  
Anger is linked with power and entitlement which is linked to wealth, class, gender 
and a range of other social and cultural contexts; likewise, subordinates are not 
supposed to get angry with superiors, nor children with adults (Averill, 2011:13).  
From a social constructionist perspective, critical pieces of information remain 
missing from the above scenario leading us to rash and hasty interpretation.  Our 
rush to definition indicates a willingness to accept at face value certain socially 
agreed rules.   
 
Social constructionists invite us instead to question those ‘rules’ which influence our 
assumptions.  We are asked to attend to how we language particular experiences 
while accepting that language is never neutral.  Language is always embedded within 
particular assumptions and political contexts (Harré, 1986a).  We are also asked to 
consider the social function of emotion.  Emotion (or particular types of behaviour 
that are languaged as ‘emotional’) takes place in a social context and is an inter-
personal phenomenon and, as such, is influenced by that context and can be seen as 
critical information about how the social system functions (Averill, 1993).  Emotion, 
from a social constructionist perspective, involves making evaluative judgements 
about what to feel in a particular context.  This evaluative process distinguishes 
human emotion from the biologically determined responses of animals.  Furthermore, 
some emotions are identified as socially constructed precisely because they are not 
present in the animal kingdom: romantic love, for example, or patriotism and 
contempt, while others such as shame presuppose ‘an ethical notion of right and 
wrong’ (Ratner, 1989), in other words, the violation of an agreed and socially 
constructed ‘rule’ about right and wrong.  Emotion is constructed and contested at 
the same time.  The psychological state of being emotional is ‘constructed in 
different ways in different circumstances, for different purposes’ (Shotter, 1997:21).  
‘It depends…’ then is the answer to the question of how social constructionism 
views emotion. 
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Problems with social constructionism 
 
Unlike Darwin and other naturalist researchers, social constructionists such as Harré 
(1986b, 1986a) and Ratner (1989) refute the idea that there is any similarity in 
emotions across cultures.  They eschew the biological perspective, preferring instead 
to think of emotions as culturally specific.  ‘There can be little doubt that, even if 
there are some universal emotions, the bulk of mankind live within systems of 
thought and feeling that bear little but superficial resemblances to one another’ 
(Harré, 1986b:12). If happiness is experienced in one particular group the happiness 
experienced in another is a different emotion. This presents a number of problems 
for researchers.  If it is the case that emotions are specific and unique to particular 
contexts, how is it possible to theorise about them? Would this mean that each 
emotion, taken in its separate context would warrant individual investigation and 
theorising in situ?  The focus on context over and above content presents another 
difficulty.  Social constructionism sees emotion as only related to the context in 
which that emotion has been generated: as such, emotions are incidental in and of 
themselves but instrumental in informing us about context.  Subjectivity doesn’t 
exist in a social constructionist perspective leaving us with what Billig describes as a 
depopulated psychology (1998).  This view negates emotion as an intra-personal 
experience and also rejects the embodied self preferring instead to focus on the 
exhibited and public expression of that experience.  The inter-personal is privileged 
over the intra-personal.  Social constructionism ‘reifies ‘the social’, implicitly treats 
all bodies as though they were identical, generates methodological errors, and 
furthers an ideological agenda that contradicts its own liberatory premises’ (Cromby, 
2004:800). 
 
However, constructionist theories cannot account for how emotions change as they 
are transferred and shared, or explain why particular emotions are associated with 
particular contexts (Gabriel, 1998). The question of where emotions come from as 
well as their relationship to the personal and social histories of individuals as they 
relate to groups are part of the missing elements in social constructionism 
(Nightingale and Cromby, 1999).  Constructionist theories have also been 
ambivalent about unconscious processes, preferring to believe that we know why we 
are emotional but are often deceiving ourselves about the reasons.   These 
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unexplained aspects of emotion are the arena in which psychoanalysis can offer 
insight.  Psychoanalysis provides a framework for examining the unexplored 
elements of emotion by placing emotions as central ‘driving forces in human affairs’ 
(Gabriel, 1998:297).   
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to explore philosophical and scientific perspectives on emotion 
from ancient Greece to contemporary times. Within this framework I identified a 
number of themes which influence how emotion is understood today. The first was 
the theme of polarisation, which was evident in the categorisation of emotion into 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ on the one hand and the emphasis on emotion as a discrete 
experience separate from other bodily experiences on the other. The ancient 
philosophers and the early natural scientists were to the fore in establishing these 
polarised perspectives on emotion which continue today as evidenced for example, 
in cognitive approaches to interpreting emotion in organisations (Goleman, 1995, 
McGrath, 1999, Miller and Robinson, 2004).   
 
I also identified the emergence of more integrated approaches to emotion evident in 
the work of James and Dewey and contemporary philosophical perspectives as 
evidenced in social constructionism.  These theorists and theories are not all in 
alignment but their perspectives view emotion as operating beyond the bounds of 
discrete categories.  From this perspective emotion is a more complex affair, 
generated in and of social contexts and operating at conscious and unconscious 
levels.  Psychological and physiological experiences are intertwined and inform and 
influence emotional perspectives.  From this vantage point emotion is a source of 
systemic intelligence about the political, cultural and inter-personal context in which 
it is experienced.  This perspective informs the work of psychodynamically 
orientated management theorists such as Kets de Vries and Miller (1984), Gabriel 
(1998), Gabriel and Carr (2002), Gabriel and Griffiths (2002), Hirschhorn (1988) 
and Vince (2001, 2002b, 2010).   
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These historical and philosophical perspectives highlight a number of themes which 
will be considered in the following chapter, for example the contested arena that is 
emotion and the degree to which any discussion about emotion inevitably involves 
themes of conflict and control.  Disappointment presents an additional challenge for 
researchers in that its systemic manifestation in organisations may not, on the surface, 
conform to observable behaviour.  Certainly in the context of this study, 
disappointment was considered personal and unrelated to the world of work and, 
banished to the margins of acceptable emotional display.   
 
As has been stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is no one coherent theory of 
emotion, no one trajectory to follow, and no one agreed perspective on the relevance 
or irrelevance of emotion.  Depending on one’s theoretical or philosophical 
perspective emotion is either central to an understanding of human development or a 
distraction from more important understandings of how social interaction unfolds.  
Eschewing this either/or position, a more integrated approach invites us to consider 
the wider context in which particular emotions are identified as good/bad, or 
useful/unhelpful and to adopt a more sceptical view of the stories presented.  In other 
words, we ought to be sceptical about what on the surface appears to be a singular 
‘truth’.  Such a perspective also eschews the idea that emotion is ‘out there’ as an 
observable object waiting to be discovered or interpreted.  Rather, we are invited to 
see emotion as linked to the context in which it is experienced. History, politics and 
culture play an important role in determining how emotion (and in particular 
disappointment) is viewed in organisations. The following chapter on the politics of 
emotion will examine these perspectives in more detail. 
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3.2 The politics of emotion 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter builds on the framework outlined in the previous chapter by 
conceptualising the literature on emotion in organisations as a political process.  By 
political, I mean the ‘social forces that influence organization as well as the many 
strategic processes that arise or are employed and deployed to maintain, to avoid, or 
to challenge power relations’ (Vince, 2004a:66). Politics concerns itself with the 
power of the ‘a priori’ in interpreting the momentary understanding of ‘truth’ in the 
world (Williams, 1967:69).  Organisational truths, therefore, are always relative: 
momentarily acceptable constructions of the present determined by the interplay of 
circumstance, habit and fantasy. Because fantasies remain imperfectly realised, the 
politics of emotion must continuously reckon with disappointment through toleration 
or avoidance.  
 
Because organisations are emotional arenas (Fineman, 2003) the expression of 
emotion linking values, morals, and judgments both claims power and has a political 
cost. Arenas are sites for competitive contests.  Beyond interpretation, emotion’s 
very articulation  ‘to “make truths” is to make worlds’ (Ahmed, 2003:377).  Emotion 
as a political process therefore encompasses both morality and control.  
 
Overview of the chapter 
 
The organisation as an emotional arena is a place where feelings influence and 
inform how we work and what we do. Feelings abound in personal and professional 
settings and are rarely constrained by the physical structures of work or home. We 
neither return home from work nor return to work from home in a neutral feeling 
state. The management literature is ambivalent about emotion. The research focus 
has been on discrete fields of work performance such as the disruptive impact of 
unregulated employee emotions on managerial productivity goals (Anderson, 2003, 
Dunning et al., 2004, Brown and White, 2011).  While focusing on the impact of 
emotions upon organisational goals, job satisfaction and stress (Fineman, 1996), it is 
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silent about emotion as a barometer of human sentience in contexts where feelings 
are regulated and controlled. Both emphasis and silence draw our attention to the 
political significance and impact of emotion at work. Emotion is critical to the acts 
of organising, sense-making and as a contribution to the social environment of the 
workplace (Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001) where it is a ‘set of core processes 
in organizations’ (Gabriel, 1999b:227). 
 
Viewed in this context, emotion emerges within the arena of organisational and 
management studies as a political issue as contested as it is in the workplace. 
Disappointment in the workplace is therefore multiply challenged.  Not only is 
consideration of emotion seriously discounted in organisations and marginalised in 
the management literature where it is seen as interfering with the agenda of 
productivity, but consideration of disappointment’s full range is pathologised as 
‘negative’. Disappointment as an area of research seems itself, to disappoint.   
 
Emotion at work has been researched from multiple perspectives including: human 
resource management (Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004, Roland Boddy, 2006, 
Steiner, 2004); organisational behaviour (Brown and Brooks, 2002, Cardon et al., 
2005, Carr, 2001, Delquié and Cillo, 2006); critical management studies (Clegg et al., 
2006); sociology (Goodwin et al., 2001, Lively and Heise, 2004, Turner and Stets, 
2006); social psychology (Anderson et al., 2003, Averill, 1983, Forgas, 1995, 2001, 
Frijda et al., 1989), neuropsychology (Damasio, 1994, Dolan, 2000) and psychology 
(Anderson, 2003, Brandstatter and Kriz, 2001, Brief and Weiss, 2002, Haidt, 2001, 
Locke, 1976). The role of emotions in organisations has been the subject of research 
for over eighty years (Weiss and Brief, 2001). The earliest studies, from the 1930s 
and focusing on job satisfaction, influenced the direction of inquiry for the following 
forty years. Rather than examine each of these areas separately, this chapter will 
present emotion research historically, highlighting three sets of seminal studies. 
Through this history, we shall see how the politics of emotion limited the primary 
discussion of emotion in organisations together with other competing, conflicting 
and moral agendas.   
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Historical perspective 
 
‘Classic’ studies into emotion at work include Fisher and Hanna’s The Dissatisfied 
Worker (1931), which links industrial unrest to workers’ ‘emotional maladjustment’ 
bred by dissatisfaction in the thwarted search for happiness and success (1931:vii).  
Describing both major and minor symptoms of maladjustment, the authors include 
both high frequency labour turnover and exhaustion in their suggested remedy in 
mental hygiene programmes (Fisher and Hanna, 1931:236).  Clinical in tone, their 
descriptive emphasis on psychopathology and individual disturbance raises an issue 
still current in emotion research. Fisher and Hanna suggest that, because we are not 
always aware of the reasons underlying our feelings, we blame others as the source 
of our disquiet. This conclusion sits comfortably with contemporary psychodynamic 
research in organisations, particularly in relation to the defensive displacement of 
uncomfortable feelings onto others as a way of managing anxiety (Gabriel and Carr, 
2002, Hirschhorn, 1988, Hirschhorn and Young, 1991, Vince, 2004a, 2010). 
 
Another strand of research generating an equally sophisticated approach to the 
complexity of emotion at work, was conducted by Harvard researchers Elton Mayo 
(1931) and his associates, FJ Roethlisberger and William Dickson (1946) between 
1924 and 1927 at Hawthorne Laboratories, a division of AT&T. Originally 
conceived as a series of experiments determining the impact of lighting levels on 
assembly line productivity, the project expanded into a broader investigation 
involving more than six phases of research (Olson et al., 2004).   
 
Originally, Mayo was interested in the impact of monotony and fatigue on work 
productivity. In one experiment, he and his fellow researchers separated out small 
sub-groups of women workers and changed their working conditions by varying the 
environment through: the number and timing of breaks, group pressure, and working 
hours. Explaining outcomes as he continued experimentation, Mayo noted that most 
interventions resulted in a productivity increase, even when change resulted in a 
restriction of freedoms.  Critically, Mayo recognised that individuals’ relation to 
their place of work itself (physical workplace and fellow workers) was a source of 
job satisfaction, reaching beyond discrete individuals’ psychological issues. He 
discovered that work was a social event.  Once released from oppressive factory 
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floor supervision, workers organised themselves into effective work teams allowing 
increased freedom within the small group as well as increased responsibility for 
work deliverables. Workers even increased socialising with one another outside of 
the work setting. Mayo recognised that this productivity emerged from within the 
interpersonal relations of the team rather than in relation to an external authority.  
Most importantly, Mayo found that productivity increased simply because workers 
were being studied. The interested attention of an authority figure, as distinct from 
the oppressive attention of a supervisor, contributed to workers’ sense of inclusion, 
well-being and job satisfaction. This finding was later termed ‘the Hawthorne Effect’ 
by Henry Landsberger (1958). 
 
Although the Hawthorne Studies have been interpreted in many ways, the emphasis 
upon social aspects of organising has been a focal point in much subsequent 
management literature. However, the same emphasis has been criticised for its 
omission of additional environmental impacts noted in the research (Carey, 1967, 
Franke and Kaul, 1978). While any summary of such an extensive research 
programme can only be reductive, the singular recognition of a relationship between 
social and environmental issues in the workplace as having an important influence 
on work performance is a significant contribution to the understanding of work as a 
complex social process. Mayo went on to criticise industrial psychologists for their 
inadequate appreciation of the relationship between individuals and the social 
organisation of the workplace (Weiss and Brief, 2001), providing underpinning for 
today’s conception of the workplace as a dynamic social system. 
 
Yet, Mayo’s progressive critique was unheeded in mainstream research. Toward the 
end of the 1930s, research into emotion at work became inextricably limited in its 
linkage with job satisfaction. Weiss and Brief (2001) describe the emergent 
paradigm as having four components: (1) narrowing the broader interest in emotion, 
or ‘affect’, to job satisfaction; (2) narrowing research methods to quantitative, 
questionnaire-based inquiry; (3) the exclusion of theory building in favour of ‘fact’ 
presentation thereby excluding a wealth of knowledge without explicit theoretical 
underpinnings; and (4) a focus upon the work environment as the primary site for 
emotion research. Previous research into the personality disposition of the individual, 
as well as workers’ external personal and social environments were dismissed as 
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insignificant research lines from the 1930s onwards until the beginning of the 1980s 
with the work of Hochschild (1983). 
 
This narrower focus upon work productivity had earlier been identified by FW 
Taylor, a mechanical engineer (and one of the first non-academics to enter the field 
of organisational study). Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management 
(1911/2008) was published at a time when increased industrialisation had not yet 
generated increased productivity. Pragmatically, Taylor broke the tasks of work into 
little parts, organised and overseen by a managerial class. It proceeded through 
systematising industrial processes by limiting whole work assignments to discrete 
and specific, individual tasks.  These acts could be accomplished with specifically 
designed tools. Taylor is best known for developing the time-motion study, in which 
individual tasks are broken down to their smallest components and timed.   He was 
one of the first managers to identify incentivisation of workers as a primary approach 
to human resource management. His managerial theory was based on the linkage of 
worker payment to productivity. Still, his theories were controversial among factory 
managers and Taylor was in fact forced to leave the Bethlehem Steel Factory, where 
he worked in 1901. Though his theories are not widely used today, he was one of the 
first managers to identify work as worthy of study and to increase the living standard 
of industrial workers. 
The emergence of a political agenda 
 
Historically, researchers have approached organisations with the clear task of 
increasing productivity. Increased productivity means an increase in profits, the 
contemporary corporate rationale for existence. Therefore, the context in which 
emotion research has been conducted has been defined by managerial agendas. In 
this sense, ‘emotional’ employees have been viewed as unproductive or in need of 
assistance to alleviate derailing barriers to productivity. Management, or at least 
implicit managerial desire, has been directed towards the delivery of the 
organisational fantasy of wholly successful goals.  This fantasy is of the 
continuously new and better: ‘innovation as depending crucially on a passionate 
thirst for the new and disenfranchisement with the old; customer service…as relying 
on emotional rapport and friendly smiles as much as on professional competence and 
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expertise’ (Gabriel and Griffiths, 2002:214).  Not only does productivity demand 
workers’ competence but also their passionate hunger, in line with corporate desire. 
 
Here, the politics of organisational control enlist emotion as its human resource to be 
managed in line with effective vision and mission statements as the containers of 
individual passion.  Contemporary research has herded emotion into specific, limited 
contexts including takeovers, role, organisational change, job satisfaction, stress, 
leadership and work/life balance. Each area reflects individual-level interpretation 
delegating ‘emotion’ work to individuals, as if abstracted from the organisational 
work contexts in which they arise (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995).  The political 
effect is that individuals manage their emotional messiness while the positive 
goodness of emotion aligned with corporate desire becomes an organisational asset. 
Regardless of how the worker feels, the social outcome of feelings must accrue to 
the firm’s benefit by making a contribution to the bottom line.  
 
Emotion itself is a site for morality and control. The types of moral judgments 
commonly seen in the literature on emotion are those that evaluate a person’s 
character ‘and are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a 
culture or subculture’ (Haidt, 2001:817).  Managerial fiat determines what 
constitutes the good, helpful emotion and the bad, unhelpful emotion in the service 
of the organisational goal. Sales staff, for example, are meant to be tactfully 
aggressive, unlike submissive, off-shored, help-desk operators. It is fair to say that 
the issue of morality has not been adequately interrogated in emotion literature. 
Rather, it has been tacitly accepted as an illusory and expedient prop for the 
imagined stability of the organisation (Vince, 2002b). 
 
What does it mean to say that particular emotions are either ‘good’ or ‘bad’? Who 
decides? The literature on emotion is riven with unchallenged moral judgments, 
assuming a ‘common good’, a managerial interpretation of correctness. There is 
always political interest in ascribing the correct narrative to how emotion is 
understood, managed and controlled in organisational systems. 
 
Emotion is identified as inferior to thought and reason in the workplace. This 
positioning is mirrored in the elevation of some emotions relative to others. At its 
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most pernicious, this hierarchy is transformed into the utilitarian employment of 
emotion as a vehicle for advancement, recognition and intelligence (Goleman, 1995).  
Emotion challenges the restrictions of scientific management with its view of 
organisations as rational enterprises engaged in productive, efficient tasks facilitated 
by processes, systems and protocols. Emotion as a disruptor of these ideas is 
relegated to the ‘irrational’ camp, the dark side.  Emotion is the spoiler in the orderly 
world of management as well as its literature2. 
 
The emotional watershed of the 1980s 
 
Until the 1980s, the study of emotion in organisations addressed the instrumental 
value of emotion to the bottom line. The recurrent notions of emotion and value in 
the management literature are attempts to reify fantasy and as containers to be filled 
with the a priori assumptions defining momentary truths.  The continuing question 
about emotion is a forced choice: which emotion is of ‘real’ value, good or bad?  
 
Management literature neatly divides emotion into two categories, the ‘negative’ (e.g. 
anger, anxiety, fear) and the ‘positive’ (e.g. happiness, love, contentment).  The first 
is associated with stress, the second with job satisfaction (Briner, 1999). Stress is 
very often described as a mismatch between the demands of a particular job and the 
capacity of the individual to fulfil the work role. The analysis and quantification of 
stress is often left to external experts to determine, each of whom may have their 
own agendas informing how stress is interpreted.  Stress is ‘bad news’, requiring 
intervention, containment and management. A considerable body of literature exists 
on its identification, management and resolution: for a comprehensive summary of 
the subject see (Fineman, 1995, Hochschild, 1983, Newton, 1995c, 1995b, 1995a, 
Pollack, 1988).  Stress is the all-inclusive emotional ‘bad’, wreaking havoc 
potentially if unmanaged and uncontained. It is rarely understood as: (1) evidence of 
systemic misalignment between expectations and reality; or (2) the capacity of 
                                                
2 See Fineman 1996 for a comprehensive overview of this topic. A significant number of the 
‘emotions’ and behaviours targeted for training by HR professionals such as conflict resolution, anger 
management or working with difficult people ‘emphasized expressions of negative emotion’ 
(Fambrough and Hart, 2008:742). 
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workers to deliver on unrealistic organisational goals; or (3) the capacity of the 
organisation to resource workers for goal delivery requiring different strategies for 
success. Rather, stress is individually felt and the stressed worker requires a 
programme of stress management techniques to become ‘stress fit’ varying from 
direct training to psychological reprogramming (Newton, 1995a:97).  It is arguable 
whether these programmes result in individuals feeling less stressed. However, they 
miss the systemic context in which stress occurs, leaving the individual responsible 
for his own stress levels and their amelioration (Fineman, 1995). 
 
In contrast, job satisfaction is the category into which ‘good’ feelings about work 
have been gathered for the purposes of analysis and intervention. The management 
literature approaches feelings about work and job satisfaction as if they were 
interchangeable subjects, each under the control of managerial influence. Job 
satisfaction is an interesting concept. It does not describe a continuum, inclusive of 
job dissatisfaction. Rather, its range is limited to ‘a pleasurable or positive emotional 
state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences’ (Locke, 
1976:1300).  There has been another conceptual confusion about job satisfaction. 
Initially, it was conceived as entirely affective or emotional (Brief and Weiss, 
2002:283).  More recently, its definition has expanded to the jointly emotional and 
cognitive (Brief, 1998:86).  Beyond this, job satisfaction raises another red flag: the 
distinction between feelings of work and feelings about work. This distinction casts 
feelings of work as reified judgments or thoughts rather than emotional processes. 
Work under this construction is an object to be judged rather than a process to be felt 
(Sandelands, 1988:438).  This distinction further removes job satisfaction from the 
messiness of emotion by addressing the concept as the worker’s cognitive judgment.   
 
A worker’s feelings about how work affects him personally are beyond the scope of 
job satisfaction intervention. Even if feelings about work were allowable within the 
scope of job satisfaction, other dimensions related to feelings would remain 
precluded.  These include the social environment in which work occurs, together 
with its conscious and unconscious feelings, fantasies, anxieties and disappointments. 
Rather, individual interventions meant to increase workers’ job satisfaction are 
problematic: (1) in addressing only the isolated individual; and (2) in failing to 
separate cognitions about work from the feelings generated in and out of work.  It 
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leaves the researcher with the dichotomy that ‘job satisfaction is personal, work 
feeling is social’ (Sandelands and Boudens, 2000:54).  This issue will be explored in 
greater detail in the section on control; for now, the idea I am trying to explore is that 
job satisfaction operates as a political pressure, seeking to manage the emotionally 
inflected cognitions of workers about their work environments. Conceptually, it 
splits workers’ feelings in two. One set of work-related feelings is subject to the 
interests and management of the organisation, a second set is left within the private 
domain of the individual. 
 
Were these twinned sets of feelings to align, there might be a synergy working in 
favour both of the organisation and the worker.  If there is misalignment, if feelings 
engendered by work are not positive, for example, then the individual remains the 
container of ‘bad’ feelings within a work culture disallowing public expression of 
such feelings. This exercise of splitting feelings, a schizoid process as 
psychodynamic theory would call it, requires a substantial effort on the part of the 
individual; and is an effort considered unhealthy in terms of personal psychology. 
Hochschild’s work on emotional labour (1979, 1983, 2009) is particularly pertinent 
here.  
 
Regardless of whether the individual’s felt experiences are the product of the work 
environment or not, if the political environment of the workplace demands a 
particular kind of public face from its employees, it will be increasingly difficult for 
an individual to fit in, either if he has a different set of feelings or if he is incapable 
of acting that role of self-disaffirmation. 
Polarised emotions 
 
The qualitative good/bad judgment about disappointment is generally an indistinct if 
negative, somewhat fuzzy global narrative. It is seen as a failure, both individual and 
organisational, that can ‘insidiously limit significantly aspects of development, 
sometimes blocking them severely’ (Schafer, 2003:13).  Disappointment’s range of 
failure includes pessimism about the future, decision avoidance, lowered 
expectations and lowered productivity (Anderson, 2003, Bell, 1985, Brandstatter and 
Kriz, 2001, Chandler, 2010, Loomes and Sugden, 1986, Miller and Robinson, 2004, 
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Schimmack and Diener, 1997, van Dijk and van der Pligt, 1997, van Dijk et al., 2003, 
Zaleznik, 1967, Zeelenberg et al., 2000b).  More interesting is the question of 
disappointment’s location. While creating negative impacts on organisational 
outcomes, disappointment resides within the individual. The experience of 
disappointment signals misalignment between the fantasy of organisational goal 
actualisation and the realities of imperfect practice. 
 
An example of such misalignment from the present research concerns a worker’s 
‘ownership’ of disappointment generated by the wider organisational issue of ‘desire 
for acquisition’ (Kaplan, 1991:508).  What is poignant here is that while identifying 
with his organisation, its acquisitive goal is not truly the worker’s, but only becomes 
his by virtue of his organisational participation. Very subtly, in acquiescing to the 
production demands of role (Simon, 1945), he has internalised a punitive and 
dismissive perspective affecting even his own performance. 
 
I mean the stupidity of say you work really hard for a multinational 
or whatever company, you increase your profits 15% this year and 
your budgeted target was 10% they don’t say to you – ‘well done, 
you know next year take it easy, do 5%’.  You’ve done 15 this year 
you can do 20, 25 next year…so there’s no incentive…it’s like there 
is an insatiable greed, demand, higher expectations all of the time for 
nothing… (Respondent 20) 
 
The client’s frustrated reflection is upon his own internalisation of an organisation 
ideal of an insatiable, never satisfied system. He judges his performance from this 
harsh, systemic ideal, stuck in the paradox of production that is always insufficient 
(Schwartz, 2004). 
 
Individual disappointment, seen in this systemic light, provides information about its 
owner’s feelings not only about work, but also of work. This is potentially powerful 
information about the lived experiential reality of the organisation’s climate and 
culture. The dichotomous judgment of good/bad is utilitarian only in organisational 
desire to manage the individual or his feelings out of the system.  The potential 
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informational use of disappointment provides ground for future, pragmatic, tactical 
organisational direction in organisational reflection. 
 
When a feeling is labelled ‘bad’, a moral truth is created and a set of expectations 
around what is acceptable is generated. Those who experience disappointment do not 
have their experience mirrored back to them but are left to feel isolated in ownership 
of their ‘personal’ experience. Under this political arrangement the fantasised 
missions, visions, and goals of the organisation remain unchallenged as realistic and 
achievable.  
 
Disappointed individuals don’t measure up. They are disappointing. Their dynamic 
function in the system, its ‘secondary gain’ (Freud, 1960:115) in retaining them, 
might satisfy the fantasy that systemic negativity is ‘contained’ within them, 
reducing potential contamination in order to minimise disruption to productivity. 
Disappointment’s moral role in organisations is to suggest that people should feel 
something else. Just as job satisfaction is only positive and precluding attention to 
job dissatisfaction, disappointment is only negative, precluding attention to what is 
appointed: a fantasy of satisfaction and stability in an optimal emotional climate. 
 
The politics of positivity: emotion and control 
 
The organisational politics of positivity, having cast emotion as good or bad, have 
been reinforced by the cultural orientation, over the last twenty years towards 
positive thinking and self-help.  Released in 2006, the film The Secret (Heriot et al., 
2006) with its subsequently published book (Byrne, 2006) became worldwide 
phenomena, attracting praise on international talk shows such as Oprah (Harpo 
Productions, 2006) and Larry King (CNN Larry King Live, 2006) and prominence 
on DVD and book best-seller lists.  Both film and book present a series of self-
described experts in psychology, philosophy, quantum physics, finance, feng shui 
and personal development.  The contributions describe ‘Laws of Attraction’ which 
place responsibility upon the individual for happiness and success. Together, these 
present a world where ‘if you really, truly believe you can beat the lottery and 
visualise scratching off a winning ticket, you can do exactly that’ (Ressner, 2006).  
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Discovering the secrets of happiness, documenting life lessons learnt, developing 
self-mastery and focusing on ‘what works’ have contributed to the increasing market 
for life-coaching, stress-free living, and happiness (Albom, 1997, Ressner, 2006, 
Robbins, 1991)3.  
 
Oriented to business success, Stephen Covey’s 8th Habit (2004) promises to move us 
from effectiveness to greatness while How to Win Friends and Influence People 
(Carnegie, 2009) remains at the top of best seller lists seventy-five years after its first 
publication. The books still promise to make us more effective communicators, 
leaders, and masters of the personal relationship. Positivity and happiness are 
promoted as insurance against failure; indeed, a positive outlook eradicates entirely 
any excuse for failure (Salerno, 2005:2).  Without excuses for failure, unmet goals 
reflect the individual’s lack of sufficient positivity. Disappointment is identified as a 
personal issue, a failure of the individual to desire and to achieve bigger, better, more. 
Critics of the self-help and positivity movement adopt a less optimistic stance about 
its transformative claims: ‘self help is an enterprise wherein people holding the 
thinnest of credentials diagnose in basically normal people symptoms of inflated or 
invented maladies, so that they may then implement remedies that have never been 
shown to work’ (Salerno, 2005:2).  Hanging over the fantasy of self-help efficacy is 
the question; ‘if all that smiley-faced advice worked, would we need so many of 
these self-help books?’ (Held, 2002:968). 
 
Positivity’s rise in popular culture has been paralleled by increased academic interest 
in positive psychology. Martin Seligman, expanding upon his late 1960s research in 
‘leaned helplessness’, hypothesised that humans learn pessimism when they do not 
control their external environment (Seligman, 1975). Extended periods of learned 
helplessness have adverse effects on physical and psychological health, so much so, 
that individuals break down completely under significant pressure.4  Reversing 
                                                
3 Amazon lists over 124,000 self help books for purchase or download (Amazon, 2011); Google 
returns over 21,000,000 hits in searching for blogs under the term, ‘self-help’ (Google, 2011).   
 
4  Seligman’s work on Learned Helplessness is widely believed to have influenced the USA 
government’s design of interrogation programmes following the 9/11 attacks – ‘The express goal of 
the CIA interrogation program was to induce a state of 'learned helplessness,'" according to a July 
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course in the late 1990s, Seligman, by then President of the American Psychological 
Association, turned toward optimism, challenging the psychology profession to shift 
with him from a pessimistic view of human development to a focus on strength and 
resilience.5 
 
Originating as a response to the perceived focus in traditional psychology upon 
pathology, positive psychology addresses what is ‘good’ in human nature, for 
example happiness, satisfaction, and optimism (Seligman, 1999).  Positive 
psychology is predicated on the belief of an innate, inner sense of positive feeling, 
which can be consciously martialled in the action of turning from pessimism and 
negativity. It ‘embraces the assumption that human beings have an intrinsic desire to 
self-realize’ (Fineman, 2006b:272).  Embedded in this thinking is an assumption that 
positivity means the same thing to everyone, regardless of cultural factors or the 
external environments in which positivity is realised. 
 
Positive psychology claims that conscious choice directly affects the way we feel as 
we think ourselves out of negative situations. It corresponds to the cognitive 
components within the applied clinical research of Aaron Beck, Seligman’s 
behaviourist, psychiatric colleague (Hirtz, 1999) in its rejection of psychoanalysis 
with its emphasis on early childhood causality. Positive psychology places the ‘cure’ 
firmly within our own hands: if we think differently, we will feel differently.  By 
                                                                                                                                     
2009 report by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility’ (Benjamin, 2010). 
Seligman has refuted any association with the interrogation programme.  In an unrelated development 
in 2010 he was awarded a $31million ‘no-bid’ contract to develop resilience training for USA soldiers 
returning from multiple combat tours (Benjamin, 2010, Goodheard, 2010, Leopold, 2011). 
 
5 Seligman was also aware that funding for psychologists under the American system of ‘managed 
care’ was under threat and a move towards provision of psychological services that could be 
described as ‘preventative’ would save money e.g., ‘the public thinks the leading causes of death are 
heart disease cancer, pulmonary disease, diabetes; and they think of these as primarily medical 
problems.  But the fact is, seven out of the top nine causes of death are caused by behaviors.’ Dr 
Susan Bennett Johnson (appointed as co-chair of the American Psychological Association task force 
on prevention by Martin Seligman, who was, at that time president of the association) quoted in (Hirtz, 
1999). 
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default, if we cannot apply our intellect to the project of feeling better, we fail to 
change our psychological state. Implied in this causality is a rejection of the 
psychodynamic understanding that both hurt and reparation must occur within 
interpersonal relationships. Distress, from the perspective of positive psychology, is 
lonely and personal. It suggests personal failure and inadequacy, though the 
attribution of failure and blame lurk in the shadows.  The main contribution of 
positive psychology has been to offer a form of empirically studied and measured 
authority that has yet to withstand criticism from serious emotion scholars (Fineman, 
2006a, 2006b). 
 
The primary criticism of the positivity movement is that it reinforces the unnatural 
and unnecessary split between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ feelings while attributing 
moral primacy to the positive. It fails to recognise that our emotional lives are 
constituted by the interactions and interplay of all components of our emotional 
selves and that it is not possible to study one set of emotional responses as a discrete 
entity. From a psychodynamic perspective, the capacity to hold both positive and 
negative feelings at the same time is a mark of maturity. Klein’s developmental 
positions clearly demonstrate the problematic outcomes of occupying only a positive 
or negative position relative to others. This is what characterises schizoid behaviours. 
Klein eloquently describes the necessity of experiencing ‘negative’ feelings: (1) in 
order to project them onto others as a way of managing relationship complexity; and 
(2) later taking them back as a way of recognising both good and bad in self and 
others (Klein, 1959). This process of internalisation, identification and projection, 
essential to the negotiation of relationships and socialisation, demands the 
integration of ‘bad’ feelings. 
 
Positivity imposes a moral agenda which, while tolerable within popular culture, 
distorts psychological science. It determines what is ‘positive’ by drawing on the 
taxonomies of virtue developed by Greek philosophers. It assumes the self-realising 
desire of all humans; and that an emphasis on positive thought will yield productive 
personal and organisational results. Positivity heightens the political bias against 
negative emotions in the organisation, further driving negative affects into the 
background of organisational theorising. 
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Emotional Intelligence 
 
Until the advent of positive psychology, the focus of researcher attention had been 
on the disruptive impact of emotion in organisations, reinforcing the pseudo-rational 
conviction that if left uncontrolled, emotion was disruptive to organisational life 
(Held, 2002:968).  Positive psychology opened the organisational door to 
recognition of emotion’s potential productivity in the workplace. It ushered in a new 
dimension of organisational thought about emotion, effectively validating the moral 
split between good and bad emotions as scientific and data-driven. Emotions might 
be contained under the control of human cognition if quantified and channelled 
constructively.  Simple inquiry from self-report and the report of others could 
determine the emotional intelligence of workers.  This suggested that some kinds of 
emotional patterns could be effectively martialled to the benefit of organisational 
role demands. Just as certainly, other kinds of emotional patterns would conflict with 
organisational vision and goals, requiring realignment through remediation and 
modification.  Emotional Intelligence (EI) is an example of this approach. 
 
The avatar of Emotional Intelligence was Daniel Goleman, a New York Times 
science reporter in the 1980s and 1990s (Goleman, 1995). EI’s origins were in 
psychological research studies on decision-making.  Salovey and Mayer 
hypothesised that certain individuals displayed ‘an ability to recognise the meanings 
of emotions and their relationships, and to reason and problem-solve on the basis of 
them’ (Mayer et al., 1999:267) and they called this ability, Emotional Intelligence. 
 
In the tradition of psychologist Charles Spearman, who in 1904 ‘discovered’ a 
general intelligence factor ‘g’ through statistical correlation (Spearman, 1904/2011), 
Goleman recognised that Salovey and Mayer’s EI described a general pathway 
underlying skills necessary for organisational success.  These included leadership 
development and increased effectiveness in such areas as ‘development of talent, 
teamwork, employee commitment, morale and health’ (Cherniss, 2001:6).  This 
general pathway was divisible into discrete skill sets. Just as the ‘Five Factor Model’ 
of personality assessment, popular in job satisfaction research and personnel 
assessment featured the various clusters: (1) openness; (2) conscientiousness; (3) 
extraversion; (4) agreeableness and (5) neuroticism (McCrae and John, 1992) 
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Goleman’s EI was composed of multiple dimensions.  EI’s claim was to develop 
leadership effectiveness by showing executives how to manage their own emotions 
and those of others in the workplace through competency development in four broad 
areas: (1) self awareness; (2) self management; (3) social awareness; and (4) 
relationship management.  
 
For Goleman, who had studied psychology at Harvard under David McClelland, the 
correspondence between EI and McClelland’s own work must have been 
immediately apparent. McClelland was both a powerful intellect and entrepreneurial 
influence in American social science. Not only had he developed the clinical 
‘Thematic Apperception Test’ (TAT), but he had also founded the organisational 
consultation firm McBer and Company which later became part of the Hay Group. 
Following his career and ‘discovery’ of EI at the New York Times, Goleman, became 
a member of the Hay Group. 
 
EI bears a remarkable conceptual relationship to McClelland’s motivational theory 
(Boyatzis, 2000) which included an ordered patterning for each individual of 
multiple ‘need’ states including the needs for achievement, affiliation and power. 
Like the elements within EI, each need state motivated different types of behaviours. 
For example, strong N Ach (need achievement) individuals ‘set goals; strive to take 
moderate risks; prefer individual activities; prefer recreational activities during 
which a person can get a score, like golf; prefer occupations with performance data 
clearly available, like sales positions’. Individuals with strong power needs also 
display a typical profile including assertive leadership; gambling; drinking; 
favouring aggressive sports and seeking occupations with direct effect on others, for 
example management.  Affiliative needs reflect an unconscious drive to have close, 
warm friendships including a preference for group activities, sensitivity to others’ 
reactions and collaboration (Boyatzis, 2000:2-3).   
 
The conceptual difference between EI and McClelland’s theory is in the domain of 
consciousness.  Influenced by psychodynamic theories, for McClelland, human 
needs for achievement, affiliation, and power were unconscious. Indeed, the purpose 
of McClelland’s TAT was to facilitate clinical psychological inquiry into this hidden 
area of human aspiration. Emotional intelligence, on the other hand, reflected what 
 55 
was conscious, knowable through behavioural self-report and the observations of 
others. Together with Goleman’s interest in levelling the prestige of psychoanalysis 
through his articles in New York’s newspaper of record (1984a, 1984b, 1985a, 
1985b, 1985c, 1989, 1990), EI must have been a pleasant confirmation of his earlier 
psychology training.  
 
Problems with Emotional Intelligence and the bottom line 
 
EI is problematic in that it promotes a cognitive model of emotion, thereby removing 
the irrationality of ‘feeling’ from consideration.  EI’s privileging of ‘intelligence’ 
associated with cognition and reason, appeals to those who construe emotion as 
irrationally out of control. According to the research psychologists who had 
pioneered EI, Goleman’s popularisation promoted quick-fix methodologies for 
keeping emotion in check (Salovey et al., 2000).  
 
Emotion is promoted by EI as a valuable commodity in that it can be measured, 
managed and taught in the service of organisational goals and aims.  It has been 
promoted as an essential component of leadership, particularly in influencing 
followers to support organisational goals (Ashkanasy and Tse, 2000, Dasborough 
and Ashkanasy, 2002).  Once again a political and moral agenda is at work in 
identifying those who have the ‘appropriate’ competencies to be ‘emotionally 
intelligent’ and those who do not.  ‘The bright and intelligent are more likely to be 
tapped as leadership material’ (Fambrough and Hart, 2008:750). EI promotes a 
version of emotion that is illusory.  The apparent quantitative nature of EI suggests 
scientific rigor and once a quantitative framework is applied to emotion, it becomes 
a commodity like any other and subject to the bottom line.  When numbers count 
‘they can entrap both the willing and the sceptics’ (Fineman, 2004:725). 
 
EI with its promise of emotional democracy, in which everyone is as emotionally 
intelligent as everyone else, is a political project.  It takes no account of the fact that 
some people are more intelligent than others.  Intelligence does not reflect a person’s 
capacity (or choice) to develop particular skills (or not) and EI includes such a wide 
range of characteristics as to render it ‘preposterously all-encompassing’ (Locke, 
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2005:428).  EI, like positive psychology, reinforces the idea that emotions are under 
the cognitive control of individuals. In addition, it assumes conscious awareness of 
feelings.  From a psychodynamic perspective this is a problematic concept as most 
of what passes for rational and conscious behaviour is but a small part of the totality 
(Scheff, 1997).  Psychoanalysis also questions whether it is ever possible to be fully 
aware of what motivates us and argues that much conscious activity is an attempt to 
manage unconscious anxieties (Gabriel, 1999b).    
 
Belonging to individuals, emotional capacity can be built to serve a fruitful 
organisational role better through remediation and intervention.  Successful, 
emotionally intelligent employees are equipped to deal with the vicissitudes of a 
changing commercial environment and stock market volatility.  Paradoxically (or 
conveniently) they are also equipped to deal with the disappointing corporate 
structure which no longer fulfils its ‘psychological contract in the form of providing 
a job for life’ (Landen, 2002:510).  Either way, it is a win-win for the organisation 
and of questionable value to its members.   Landen drawing on Gardner (1993), 
brings our attention to another interesting aspect of EI: the lack of a moral or ethical 
dimension to the concept of intelligence (2002:512).   In reframing emotion as 
intelligence, emotion can be understood as a ‘value free’ resource.  In other words, 
exploiting workers’ emotions in the service of corporate goals is as legitimite an 
enterprise as exploiting their physical labour6.  Seen from this perspective, all the 
messy out-of-control and irrational aspects of emotion can be herded into pre-
determined categories, reframed as competencies and delivered through skills 
training and individual consultation.  This sanitised version of emotion eliminates 
the political agenda which seeks to exploit the subjective feeling self in the service 
of organisational goals.  In proposing a version of emotion that is culturally 
acceptable, EI requires individuals to self-manage their emotions, adapt to socially 
acceptable ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild, 1983) while at the same time denying the 
impact of the wider cultural environment on the felt emotional experience of being at 
work.  ‘Subjectivity has now become not so much a problem for management as a 
resource’ (Landen, 2002:517, Flecker and Hofbauer, 1998).  Paradoxically EI claims 
                                                
6 This theme has been explored extensively by Hochschild in her work on emotional labour and will 
be discussed in the following section (Hochschild, 1983). 
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to benefit inter-personal relationships and by default, the social environment of work 
yet it fails to promote any systemic interventions which address the social 
environment in which work takes place.  
 
EI’s primary success is in repackaging emotion, and the subjective self, as a 
cognitive artefact thus making it palatable to organisational systems that privilege 
rationality.  This, paradoxically, is also its failing.  In removing emotion from the 
equation, EI has reinforced the idea that there is nothing to be learned from ‘negative’ 
emotion, perhaps nothing to learn from emotion at all, unless it is contained, 
managed and quantified in cognitive terms.   EI not only confirms the bias against 
emotion but also reinforces the artificial boundary between reason and feeling 
evident in positive psychology. 
 
Emotional Labour 
 
A significant literature now exists on the management and production of positive 
emotion in organisations both in applied psychology and within sociology. The 
sociological domain is anchored in Hochschild’s paradigm-shifting work on 
emotional labour (1979, 1983, 2009), a term she coined in The Managed Heart 
(1983).  Hochschild differentiates between emotional labour and emotion work.  
Emotional labour is the ‘management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial 
and bodily display; emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has an exchange 
value’ (Hochschild, 1983:7)7 . Emotion work, on the other hand, is primarily 
concerned with the action of managing feelings and emotions in our private lives. 
Emotional labour has been described as the ‘effort, planning and control needed to 
express organisationally desired emotions during interpersonal transactions’ (Morris 
and Feldman, 1996:987).  It has also been considered a type of impression 
management as an effort is being made either to control one’s social image in the 
eyes of others or to influence the interpersonal setting (Grove and Fisk, 1989).    
 
                                                
7 Hochschild does not distinguish between the terms feelings and emotions: the terms are used 
interchangeably in her work see (Hochschild, 1979) 
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Hochschild draws on the work of Konstantin Stanislavski, the father of ‘method 
acting’ in describing two techniques employed by workers to manage their emotions 
in organisational contexts: surface acting and deep acting. Method acting is a 
technique by which an actor draws from his own personal and emotional life in the 
service of bringing a character to life. When method acting is successfully employed, 
the actor is no longer acting, but responding in his role, he and the character having 
become one (Stanislavski, 1936).  The similarity of emotional labour to method 
acting is in the drawing upon our personal experiential history to manipulate our 
feelings. In the process, we convince ourselves that we are really feeling what we 
display. Surface acting involves managing external observable expressions such as 
smiles and frowns we may adopt in the context of emotional compliance. Deep 
acting involves managing or suppressing our feelings in order to conform to an 
expected public display, pulling ‘the two close together either by changing what we 
feel or by changing what we feign’ (Hochschild, 1983:90). 
 
Emotional labour is demanded in the context of ‘feeling rules’, Hochschild’s term 
for the organisation’s prescriptive rules of engagement. These rules govern 
organisational displays of emotion, encoding both the feelings that ‘should’ be felt as 
well as those that are proscribed.  Feeling rules act as a set of cultural norms through 
which an idealised fantasy of social participation is enacted.  Socially negotiated, 
they are not always transparent or easily available for review (Rafaeli and Sutton 
Robert, 1989).  Rather, they can be observed between ‘the pinch of “what do I feel?” 
and “what should I feel?”’ (Hochschild, 1983:55). 
 
Like manipulated political roadmaps for the management of emotion, feeling rules 
act to privilege certain feelings as more valuable and contributive than others. In 
their application, feeling rules require participants’ continuous evaluation of fit 
between a feeling one has about the task and the context in which the task must be 
undertaken, a preoccupation that is in itself laborious.  Hochschild alerts us to the 
degree to which this active self-management of feeling and emotion has become an 
expected component of job performance. Not only are workers required to deliver on 
the work task, but they are also required to deliver an emotional drama that is 
congruent with the organisation’s mission and vision. This required display of 
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emotion has been commodified and commercialised in that it is now an expected part 
of job delivery. 
 
Hochschild’s presentation of emotion in organisations is grim, reflecting the 
suppression and control of emotion as a precondition for workplace participation. 
She equates emotional labour with emotional exploitation which is detrimental to the 
psychological health of workers. Ironically, Hochschild’s description of emotional 
labour is a contemporary example of Seligman’s ‘learned helplessness’ paradigm 
(Seligman, 1975) in which the victimised individual’s tight constraints preclude 
certain self-preservative behaviours, causing stress or work burnout (Hochschild, 
1983).  Yet, Hochschild does suggest that some workers derive emotional benefit 
from ‘acting’, which serves to boost their sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy 
(1983).   
 
Hochschild’s critics argue both that both her view of organisations is authoritarian, 
with the organisation totally in control of workers’ feelings and that there is no room 
in her thesis for emotionally satisfying work experiences. Viewed in this way, 
Hochschild is interpreted as claiming that there is no room for private feelings in 
organisations, because all feeling is ‘transmuted’, and thus no longer the worker’s 
own (Bolton and Boyd, 2003, McClure and Murphy, 2007).  Bolton and Boyd argue 
that emotional labour is therefore a more complex process than that described by 
Hochschild. They present four different types of emotion management, two 
paralleling emotional labour and emotion work and two extending Hochschild’s 
thesis to include ‘presentational’ and ‘philanthropic’ emotion management.  
‘Presentational’ management reflects the worker’s dexterity in adapting to the 
changing political contexts of the workplace such as dealing with different customer 
and managerial challenges. ‘Philanthropic’ emotion management suggests that 
workers choose to gift their work with additional emotional contents, over and above 
those required by the organisation. Rather than cast the worker as victimised by the 
workplace’s emotion rules, each of these processes are under the control of the 
worker rather than management (Bolton and Boyd, 2003). 
 
Critics of Bolton and Boyd suggest that their reading of Hochschild is inaccurate and 
flawed. Retention of ownership over the means of emotion production is contested 
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by (Brook, 2009) who suggests that as soon as labour is commodified, workers have 
as little ownership or control over their emotional production as they do over what 
they physically produce. Brook’s argument affirms that emotional labour is an 
implicit dimension of the worker’s psychological acquiescence in taking up an 
organisational role (Simon, 1945).  Here, the argument for a worker’s generous ‘gifts’ 
such as empathy and sympathy is challenged with all emotion generated by the 
workplace, falling under the sway of feeling rules. 
 
However, emotional labour researchers raise two significant issues. As theorised by 
Hochschild and others (Bolton and Boyd, 2003, Brook, 2009, Hochschild, 1979, 
1983, 2009), emotional labour focuses upon conscious feeling, and its interaction 
with feeling rules and emotion work. Hochschild, in particular, writes from a social 
constructionist perspective, which considers feeling/emotion, whether privately 
experienced or publicly displayed, to be a construct of the social environment. Here, 
it differs significantly from a psychodynamic perspective on emotion, which 
operates from the view that many of our feelings remain out of conscious awareness 
while, at the same time, being expressed publicly as emotions. The public 
performance of these feelings is influenced by feeling rules, social context and the 
unconscious fantasies of group settings. 
 
The second issue, raised but not interrogated by many emotion researchers, is the 
assumption that the organisation is a ‘bad’ entity, while the worker is a ‘good’ entity. 
This poses an implicit opposition between oppressor and victim, congruent with 
Seligman’s learned helplessness experimental set-up. A psychodynamic 
interpretation of emotion presents a more complex and sophisticated understanding 
of the interplay between individual and group process as well as between conscious 
and unconscious process. This nuancing reflects the vicissitudes of mobilisation, 
management and control in work setting and will be developed further in the next 
chapter. 
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Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter built on the scientific and philosophical framework outlined in the 
previous chapter by conceptualising emotion in organisations as a site of control and 
morality. Control and morality emphasise the theme of polarisation identified in the 
previous chapter. Contemporary and historical perspectives on emotion research 
suggest that productivity and the bottom line are the primary lenses through which 
emotion is valued and/or researched.  Within that paradigm the politics of 
organisational control is employed to harness the feelings of individuals in the 
service of mission, vision and value as interpreted by management.  Within this 
framework, disappointment can be understood as morally inferior to other/better 
feelings and emotions and as potentially damaging to the bottom line.  Although 
discounted in management literature and obscured from view in organisational life, 
disappointment can also be understood as a challenging concept.  Management 
literature, when discussion emotion, unquestioningly adopts a moral agenda.  Apart 
from the simplistic division of emotion into good or bad, individuals are 
conceptualised as emotionally intelligent (or not) with the subsequent implication 
that those who do not succeed at managing their own and others’ emotions have 
failed and are disappointing corporate citizens.  Contained within these 
interpretations is an assumption that we know what we feel when we are feeling it 
and are capable of deploying strategies for managing those feelings in a way that 
serves the bottom line.  The following chapter develops these ideas further by 
applying a psychodynamic lens to emotion and organising.  
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3.3 Psychoanalysis, emotion and organising 
 
Introduction  
 
The last chapter detailed the conceptualisation of emotion in organisations as a 
political process in which morality and control play powerful roles in determining 
the appropriate emotional climate.  Positivity is privileged; emotional labour is 
required and managerial tools to control negative emotion are employed in the task 
of protecting the ‘phantastic object’ (Tuckett and Taffler, 2008) that is the idealised 
organisation.  Disappointment, as one of those ‘negative’ emotions, is banished to 
the wilderness as unwelcome, unhelpful and potentially disruptive.  Just as this 
politicisation reduces the scope of emotional experience to acceptable categories, so 
its empirical forms of representation, whether in the reflection of surveys, tests, or 
stories, cannot be understood to convey the whole scope of emotional experience and 
meaning.  
 
Psychoanalysis assumes that such conscious and rationalised expressions are a 
carefully crafted camouflage and offers an alternative set of tools to reveal the 
hidden and latent meanings of behaviour. Psychodynamically informed researchers 
are urged to be cautious and sceptical about what passes for ‘truth’ and to question, 
‘what is ‘truth’ a cover story for?’  When this sceptical curiosity is extended to 
disappointment (and especially to the absence of disappointment from general 
management literature, emotion research, and narrative reports of organisational life), 
numerous questions arise. What does all this positivity conceal? Does 
disappointment represent a challenge to the political order of organisations and if so, 
what challenges, disguised and hidden from view, are represented by 
disappointment? This chapter draws on the illustrative power of psychoanalysis to 
generate insights into the role of emotion as the primary mobilising force in 
organisations. 
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A note on terminology 
 
This research study draws primarily on psychoanalytic and psychodynamic insights 
to inform theory-building about disappointment. These two terms are used inter-
changeably in management literature and, at this point, it is important to outline how 
I use them here.  The term ‘psychoanalysis’ is most prominently associated with the 
work of Freud; subsequent theorists adopted different descriptive terms.  Carl Jung 
practised Analytical Psychology and Melanie Klein developed Object Relations 
Theory.  Both of these are developments of psychoanalysis yet distinctive in their 
own orientation.  I use the terms ‘psychoanalysis’ and ‘psychoanalytic’ when 
referencing clinical material or writers (such as Freud) who draw on their clinical 
practice to inform the study of individuals, groups and organisations.  I also use the 
term when a particular writer adopts it to describe his perspective (for example 
Yiannis Gabriel (1984, 1998, 1999a)).  I use the ‘less treatment oriented’ term 
psychodynamic when referencing writers who apply psychoanalytic theory to the 
study of organisations as it implies the ‘the normality and dynamic nature of these 
processes’ (Carr, 2002:344). 
 
I will not debate either the existence of the unconscious which has been a highly 
contested area of research since Freud first presented his theories on this subject 
(Popper, 2003, Searle, 1992) or the effectiveness of psychoanalysis which has also 
generated considerable debate within academic circles (Borch-Jacobsen and Brick, 
1996, Masson, 1992, 1993).  Rather, I take as given the existence and validity of 
both concepts.  I will endeavour to present theory and data to support my contention 
that a psychoanalytic/psychodynamic understanding of the unconscious is of 
significance in understanding how organisations work. 
 
Finally, I distinguish between the terms ‘phantasy’ and ‘fantasy’ as follows.  
Phantasy refers to unconscious processes that occur in the early stages of a child’s 
development and derive from instincts and drives.  The term is most notably 
associated with the work of Melanie Klein.   
 
In Klein’s concept, phantasy emanates from within and imagines 
what is without, it offers an unconscious commentary on instinctual 
 64 
life and links feelings to objects and creates a new amalgam: the 
world of imagination. Through its ability to phantasize the baby tests 
out, primitively ‘thinks’ about, its experiences of inside and outside 
(Mitchell, 1986:23).  
 
The term fantasy refers to unconscious wishes that may (or may not) come to 
fulfillment.   I use the term fantasy throughout this study unless referencing the work 
of theorists who explicitly use the alternative ‘phantasy’. 
 
As the psychoanalytic movement evolved schisms and splits arose as wthin any 
organisation, with different emergent schools named after the cities and countries in 
which analysts practiced. Each of the early psychoanalytic centres of Vienna, Berlin, 
and Budapest reflected differences in technique and theory.  Schisms, reflecting 
multiple anxieties within the organisational dynamics of psychoanalysis, continued 
within psychoanalytic schools and training institutions in centres such as London, 
New York, Paris, and Chicago (Eisold, 1994, Haynal, 1988).  Psychoanalysis as a 
science evolved in response to the interests of those who followed (and separated 
from) Freud.  
 
It is not my intention to present a comprehensive overview of psychoanalysis, as this 
would be an impossible task within the confines of this study (see Bantas, 2011, 
Bion, 1961, Bollas, 1987, Breuer and Freud, 2000b, Ferenczi and Rank, 2006, Fraher, 
2004, Freud, 1964a, Klein, 1940, Mitchell, 1986, Segal, 1973, Viner, 1996).  Instead, 
key psychoanalytic concepts are presented as they relate to the subject of study and 
which were informed by the data that emerged from it.  These concepts will be 
referenced and used later in the analysis of the data generated.  
 
I draw substantially on Object Relations Theory, a development of psychoanalytic 
theory most notably associated with Melanie Klein. Object Relations Theory 
emphasises interpersonal relationships: the ‘other’ person as the object of the 
individual’s feelings.  Additionally, the work of Wilfred Bion links the study of 
Object Relations to groups. Each of these clinical-theoretical advances extends 
Freud’s core theories toward the individual in organisational work settings.  No 
discussion of psychoanalytic theory can begin without reference to the work of 
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Sigmund Freud from which all other analytic schools evolved, either as a 
development of, or as a reaction to, his work. This chapter begins with an overview 
of the key psychoanalytic concepts developed by Freud and, in particular, those that 
relate to the study of emotion in organisations. This is followed by an overview of 
the major psychoanalytic concepts developed by Klein and Bion.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how these concepts have been applied by 
psychodynamic theorists and researchers to the subject of emotion in organisations. 
 
Sigmund Freud 
 
Psychoanalysis derives from a treatment model and is an applied discipline. From its 
beginnings in the collaborations of Freud and Breuer in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer 
and Freud, 2000b), its organisational form incorporated both interpersonal 
collaboration and intrapersonal exploration.  Its discoveries, such as Freud’s 
recognition of transference within the relationship of Breuer and Anna O, seemed 
initially unbelievable until confirmed within clinical practice. 
 
As the psychoanalytic movement grew, it generated multiple schools of 
interpretation or metapsychology. However, its central focus on clinical treatment 
was reflected in Freud’s pivotal series of six technical papers (Freud, 1964b:85-174).  
These included: The Handling of Dream-Interpretation in Psychoanalysis; The 
Dynamics of Transference; Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-
Analysis; On Beginning the Treatment; Remembering, Repeating, and Working-
Through; and Observations on Transference Love. Within these papers, the 
fundamental psychoanalytic patient rule of free association, together with the 
analyst’s evenly hovering attention were established as organisational participatory 
roles within the work of the therapeutic relationship. Additionally, Freud explained 
several work-related phenomena within psychotherapy. These included the 
‘transference’ wherein one participant projects disclaimed or unrecognised aspects of 
his own fantasy upon the other participant and the difficult path toward recognition 
of previously unconscious materials, requiring the patient’s slow recognition of 
emergent repetitive behavioural patterns. 
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While the path of discovery focused upon the patient, the method remained one of 
engaged interpersonal relationship throughout clinical practice. Ferenczi and Rank 
extended the technical centre of psychoanalysis in their 1925 monograph, The 
Development of Psychoanalysis (2006).  Critically, they emphasised that mere 
interpretation was insufficient for psychological change. Focusing on Breuer and 
Freud’s cathartic technique, they noted that the task of psychoanalysis extended 
beyond intellectual discovery.  Rather, patients could only feel certain in 
unconscious reality ‘when they have experienced—mostly indeed only after they 
have frequently experienced something analogous to it in the actual analytic 
situation—that is, in the present’ (Ferenczi and Rank, 2006:37).  From this 
recognition, the fulcrum of the psychoanalytic discovery of unconscious agency 
moved to its real-time demonstration within the clinical relations between patient 
and analyst through the repetitive patterning of the ‘working through’ cited in 
Freud’s technical papers 8. 
 
The essential work of psychoanalytic discovery emerges from the two participants’ 
particular roles within a collaborative relationship.  Inquiry into its discrete parts is a 
function of the whole relation, including the patient’s defensive incredulity about the 
unconscious process. This can only be surmounted by patient conviction through the 
demonstration of actual experience in real time. 
 
Freud’s importance is as the architect of psychoanalysis, a method for understanding 
human psychology concerned with: (1) the hidden meanings of conscious behaviour; 
and (2) viewing conscious activity as a concealed expression of unconscious activity. 
Freud discovered that neurotic behaviour was goal directed rather than random or 
meaningless.  This distinguished his method from earlier interpretations of 
‘abnormal’ or neurotic behaviour which sought a physiological remedy. 
 
                                                
8 On the collaborative relation: ‘This relation develops of its own accord under the conditions of the 
analysis; the analyst then has the task of noticing its development from slight indications and of 
bringing the patient to a complete reproduction of the relation in the analytic experience’ (Ferenczi 
and Rank, 2006) . 
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Without discounting physiological causes, Freud sought to understand the meaning 
behind ‘abnormal’ behaviour and in doing so attributed importance and meaning to a 
set of behaviours previously misunderstood. Although he did not discover the 
unconscious, he did create a methodology for working with and understanding it.  
Neurotic behaviour could be understood as the physical or conscious manifestation 
of thoughts or feelings too distressing to bring to conscious awareness.  As a result, 
these phenomena were replaced with more acceptable conscious expression. 
 
For Freud, the unconscious is understood as a site of conflicting demands and desires, 
each vying for attention and dominance at any given moment in time.  He 
conceptualised the mind as a tripartite system of Id, Ego and the Superego.  Freud 
invented the word psycho-dynamic to describe the on-going and varying tensions 
between these three sites of psychic activity.   
 
The concept of Id, linked both to our biological past and our present psychological 
survival, reflects Charles Darwin’s influence upon Freud (Ritvo, 1974, 1992) who 
conceived of the Id’s drives (or instincts) as constantly present and concerned with 
primitive activity such as preservation of life, survival and reproduction. Freud 
gathered together these drives and conceptualised them as Eros, or life drives, and 
later gathered a series of negative drives called the death instinct (Todestrieb)9, the 
purpose of which is to return to an inanimate state (Freud, 1955a).  The Id is the 
location of our most primitive drives: greed, sexual desire, violent instincts, and 
fantasies.  The Id demands immediate gratification. Its actions neither conform to 
social expectations nor are they available to immediate consciousness.  
 
The agency of Ego is the psychological orientation attendant upon environmental 
realities. The process of ‘reality-testing’ requires the Ego to respond to the social 
world and its requirements while at the same time trying to reconcile the competing 
demands of the Id and the Superego.  The Ego manages the interaction between itself, 
the Id, the Superego and the external world in an attempt to assimilate them into its 
own organisation (Waelder, 1976) and it is concerned with maintaining a ‘sense of 
                                                
9 The death instinct is frequently referred to as Thanatos, however this term was introduced by one of 
Freud’s students, Wilhelm Stekel (Schwartz, 1987:332-333). 
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unity and integrity, which we each experience as ‘self’’ (Gabriel, 1999a:17).  This 
process of reality-testing and the attempt to achieve a satisfactory outcome is also 
linked to disappointment.  Reality testing involves the comparison of fantasy with 
reality, the process by which we are confronted with the inevitable realisation that 
some desires may never be fulfilled.  The Ego can be understood as the agency that 
disappoints, constantly challenging the Id to reconceptualise desire into a more 
realistic and achievable format and relegating fantasy to its primary task of ensuring 
that we remain desiring subjects. The Ego enacts a continuous juggling act, often 
approaching consciousness as it balances the Id’s desires, the Superego’s demands 
and the constraints of the external world.  If the Ego is not sufficiently diligent in 
managing these various demands, the self is doomed to relive and repeat episodes 
from the past. Freud describes repetition as a form of remembering in which 
unconscious memories are replayed or ‘acted out’ in an attempt to bring them to 
conscious awareness (Freud, 2006).  If the repressed memories cannot be brought to 
consciousness and ‘worked through’, the self is caught in an unproductive pattern of 
repetition.  Transference is one form of repetition in which the past is replayed in the 
present.  This unproductive repetitive behaviour can also be understood as a defence 
against learning or resistance to insight in which the self is unwilling to reality-test 
its experience and risk the loss of its idealisation (the illusion of satisfaction).  This 
inevitably results in unresolved disappointments and in its most pathological state, 
depression. 
 
The Ego’s job is to defend the self from the damaging impact of unwanted desires 
and feelings. It achieves this task though the generation of defence mechanisms.   In 
this sense, the disappointing function of the Ego can be understood as: (1) a 
defensive mechanism oriented towards protection of the self; and (2) a learning tool, 
comparing and contrasting reality and fantasy while challenging the concept of 
satisfaction.  
 
The Superego is the site of inner morality or conscience as popularly understood.  
Conceptualised as harsh and judgemental, the Superego is the site of shame, 
admonishment and guilt.  The Superego observes the ego, ‘criticises it, and punishes 
it’ (Schafer, 1960:167).  These feelings arise when there is a tension between the 
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Ego and the Superego.  The Ego represents ‘what it is possible to be’ and the 
Superego represents ‘what I shouldn’t be’.   
 
The Superego can also be understood as the internalised image of the child’s father 
whose role is essential to the resolution of the Oedipus complex.  This is the 
developmental stage in which the child identifies with the parent of the opposite sex 
and fantasises about returning to the ‘oneness’ and unity of its earliest days.  The 
Father’s ‘no’ interjects the reality principle and establishes the first boundary.  In a 
healthy development the child’s fantasy and identification is translated into a 
‘normal’ sexual attraction towards a partner in adult life.  
 
Another (underdeveloped) interpretation of the role of the Superego is as the 
benevolent and loving aspect of the child’s father who is ‘the advocate of a striving 
towards perfection’ (Freud, 1964a:67) and as maintaining contact with parental care.  
This aspect of the Superego performs an important function in assisting the child to 
transition from intra-personal to inter-personal relating.  The Superego adopts a role-
model task, embodying societal conventions and norms.  By emphasising the 
existence of moral codes of behaviour it reminds the child that he will leave the 
safety of his primary relationship with the mother and require an understanding of 
how society functions and how he is expected to conform to its rules (Schafer, 1960).   
  
These three sites, the Id, the Ego and the Superego are in constant tension.  The Ego 
defends against the overwhelming instincts located in the Id through the generation 
of defence mechanisms such as repression (burying the feeling in the depths of the 
unconscious), reaction-formation (translating the unwelcome instinct into its 
opposite); denial (refusing to acknowledge the existence of external reality) and a 
variety of other mechanisms designed to evacuate unwanted and uncomfortable 
feelings. The Superego (Freud, 1966) interjects a moral commentary on this activity 
and evokes shame and guilt in equal measure which reinforces defence mechanisms, 
pushes unwanted activity further into the recesses of the unconscious and can result 
in neurotic behaviour. 
 
Freud developed a series of techniques to bring the ‘psychic reality’ of repressed 
wishes and desires to consciousness in the therapeutic context (Freud, 1953a).  These 
 70 
include ‘free association’, dream association and the transference relationship. Free 
association is a process in which the patient is invited to speak to the analyst without 
censorship or inhibitory judgment. Dream interpretation makes explicit or manifest 
the dream’s ‘latent’ contents of unconscious repressed wishes and discarded thought 
fragments. Transference is the patient’s unconscious projection of feelings belonging 
to a previous relationship, onto the analyst, or in an organisational setting such as 
church or army, onto a leader (Freud, 1955b). Put another way, transference 
represents the emotional re-living of the past in the present. 
 
Freud and emotion 
 
Freud did not invent a specific theory of emotion. Psychoanalysis, however, 
addresses the individual’s emotional experience under the term ‘affect’, with its 
components including such emotional configurations as love and jealousy (Sherman, 
1983).   Rather, Freud’s conceptualisations both of the unconscious and the 
methodologies he developed for working with it changed the way in which the 
complexity of human emotional life is understood.   
 
Freud challenged the idea that emotions are merely representations of conscious 
experience. Instead, he theorised that emotions are representations of unconscious 
processes. While operating outside of conscious experience, these experiences were 
at least as powerful as those operating consciously. Solomon (2003b) outlines three 
different perspectives on emotion in Freud’s writing. First there is emotion as 
instinct i.e., an emotion is unconscious or out of our awareness.  Second there is 
emotion as instinct and idea i.e., emotion as an unconscious process that is aimed at 
an external object or idea.  In this instance, the emotion becomes unconscious when 
separated from the idea to which it is attached.  This is why we may experience 
emotion without awareness of its cause.  Freud invented the term ‘repression’ to 
account for the accidental forgetting of difficult feelings and ideas. Third there is 
emotion as an ‘affect’, i.e., the emotion is conscious, but the causes of it are 
unconscious.  In this sense, emotions precede our conscious awareness of important 
issues.  This accounts for ‘free flowing’ emotions such as anxiety which occur when 
 71 
the feelings experienced are not attached to any conscious object (Solomon, 
2003b:99).  
 
Freud’s theories were predicated on the view that emotion underlies all human 
activity. He contends that much of what passes for rational behaviour disguises 
needs that are out of our awareness and, more importantly, is a way of managing 
uncomfortable feelings such as guilt and anxiety.  In his essay Delusion and Dreams, 
he writes that ‘we remain on the surface so long as we treat only memories and ideas. 
The only valuable things in psychic life are, rather, the emotions. All psychic powers 
are significant only through their fitness to awaken emotions. Ideas are repressed 
only because they are connected with the liberation of emotions’ (Freud, 1959:159). 
 
Freud and groups 
 
Psychoanalytic theory was first applied to groups by Freud in Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego (1955b).  This book was published after Freud had 
introduced his thinking on the libido (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos). The 
application of psychoanalytic theory to groups extends Freud’s theories from a focus 
on intra-personal psychology to inter-personal relationships, and in particular, to 
large groups which replace our family of origin as sites for identification and 
belonging. The publication of Freud’s thinking on groups is an important 
development in the study of organisations for a number of reasons.  It dispels the 
myth that Freud, and psychoanalysis in general, is only concerned with a psychology 
of the individual (Masson, 1993) and identifies groups as important sites for the 
application of psychoanalytic reasoning. It demonstrates that psychoanalysis, as 
originally conceived, is as applicable to groups and organisations as it is to 
individuals. It identifies the social realm as an important context for the 
psychological development of the individual and, in particular, for the expression of 
emotion. Finally it demonstrates the importance of the individual’s unconscious 
process in influencing the unconscious life of the group.   
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Melanie Klein 
 
Klein was one of a group of British based psychoanalysts who developed Object 
Relations Theory.  Others within this group included Donald Winnicott, W R D 
Fairburn and Michael Balint.  Their work became known as the ‘British School’10. 
The British School theorised that relationships (particularly the first relationship 
between baby and mother) are of primary importance in human development.  In this 
sense the project of Object Relations Theory was to ‘translate psychoanalysis from a 
theory of sexual desire into a theory of emotional nurture’ (Phillips, 1988:10).  
Object Relations Theory suggests that we are relation-seeking rather than pleasure-
seeking and a baby’s energy is directed towards establishing a relationship with the 
other ‘in desire or destructiveness’ (Gomez, 1997:34). To put it another way, 
according to Klein, life and death are competing forces in the early days of 
childhood. 
 
Melanie Klein was originally a Freudian analyst and continued to think of herself as 
a follower of Freud: ‘I’m a Freudian… but not an Anna Freudian’ (Grosskurth, 
1986:455-456). Freud did not consider her work to be a development of 
psychoanalysis, but rather a deviation from it11. Klein was neither a scientist nor 
medically trained. She departed from Freud’s biologically-driven theory for 
interpreting the child’s world by working directly with children and babies. Unlike 
Freud who worked with adults, Klein’s work was informed directly by her contact 
with children. She used Freud’s ideas ‘to listen to the experience of what her patients 
told her’ (Gomez, 1997:33) and, in this sense, was interested in the subjective truth 
of her patients rather than an objective reality. Klein hypothesised that the very 
young baby, as a result of birth and the post birth experience, was negotiating a 
range of persecutory anxieties and experiences and felt ‘every discomfort as though 
it were inflicted on him by hostile forces’ (Klein, 1959:292).  She described a world 
                                                
10 At the same time, similar theories known as ‘Interpersonal Psychoanalysis’ developed in the USA 
led by psychoanalysts Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan. 
 
11 Klein and Anna Freud each had fathers who preferred their other sisters and some speculate that 
this is at the root of the well-documented rivalry, which existed between them.  For further 
information on the dispute see (Bos and Groenendijk, 2007). 
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filled with primitive feelings of rage, discomfort, frustration and pain, which are only 
alleviated by the love of the mother.  
 
There are three defensive mechanisms that are central to Klein’s theory, splitting, 
projection and projective identification. These defence mechanisms may be triggered 
at any point in the adult’s life, usually as a result of strong anxiety.  The earliest 
mechanisms for negotiating difficult emotional states provide a blueprint for how we 
respond to pressures as adults.  Splitting is the separation of good and bad objects 
and feelings: it is an aggressive impulse that banishes integrative desires and 
capabilities. In adults, splitting helps individuals to reject the complexity of and 
contradiction in situations by simplifying them through separation. It also serves as a 
way of creating distinctive boundaries and processes of control around situations that 
seem to provoke anxiety (Ogden, 1986).  Projection takes aspects of one’s internal 
world and projects them onto others with the aim of getting rid of uncomfortable 
inner thoughts and feelings. Projective identification involves projection into another 
person, with the aim of keeping ‘bad’ parts of the self at a safe distance without 
losing them. The other person is influenced by the projection and starts to behave as 
though he is characterised by the projected thoughts and beliefs. Projective 
identification therefore creates a relational ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’, an intricate 
inter-personal dance that is mostly outside of the awareness of those concerned.  
 
The baby as conceptualised by Klein is unconsciously aware of its mother.  The 
primary ‘object’ of its attention is the mother’s breast as a source of comfort and 
security.  When the child feels nurtured and comforted it experiences this external 
object as a ‘good breast’.  If the breast is absent or withheld, the child experiences 
frustration, anger and fear.  It cannot conceive of this absence as belonging to the 
same source of comfort as the ‘good breast’ and as a result, terms this object the ‘bad 
breast’. The presence of this ‘bad breast’ evokes murderous hatred in the baby who 
wants to destroy this object of discomfort and replace it with the good feelings 
contained in the ‘good breast’.   
 
At the same time the baby fears retaliation from the ‘bad breast’ as a result of the 
strong and aggressive feelings it has directed towards it (Klein, 1946). Klein 
conceptualised this process as two developmental positions, i.e., orientations that 
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children adopt in infancy when confronted with a fundamental frustration of their 
desires and sustained experience of loss: the paranoid-schizoid position and the 
depressive position (Klein, 1952/1975).  Each of these positions represents a way of 
relating to objects, as they are experienced in early life, and each may resurface in 
later life when, as adults, we experience loss, separation and anxiety. In the first the 
child has early destructive and aggressive fantasies that psychically attack external 
objects of desire believing them to be bad because the child is unable to tolerate the 
existence of good and bad in one person. This process of ‘splitting’ serves to protect 
the good while attacking the perceived threat from the bad.  Thus, the child comes to 
experience a ‘good breast’ and a ‘bad breast’, a good mother and a bad mother as 
separate entities.  The depressive position is a later stage of development where the 
child recognises the damage done by the attack and experiences guilt and a desire for 
reparation.  In this position, the child is able to integrate the good and bad in others 
and self, leading to a capacity to tolerate ambivalence, which Klein suggests is a 
central feature of development. Movement into the depressive position requires less 
of a role for defences against anxiety.  The bad is less bad, the good is less good 
(Gomez, 1997), and there is an inevitable sense of loss and a desire to repair what 
may have been damaged.  
 
Reparation is a creative act: imagining a different future requires a creative impulse 
in that ‘we have to make up the future until we get there’ (Phillips, 2006:97).  Klein 
links the need for reparation with the creative impulse (Segal, 1991) as a need to 
demonstrate goodness and as a way of sublimating unwanted feelings.  
Disappointment, therefore can be seen as a central feature of the depressive position, 
as an integrative understanding of conflicting emotions. In this sense disappointment 
can move beyond a perceived failure of the self or of the other and indicate a 
willingness to move beyond the primitive simplicities of the schizoid position 
(Jacobson, 1946). 
 
If the developmental positions outlined above cannot be successfully negotiated by 
the child (for example, if the child cannot negotiate the depressive position), he will 
revert to the more primitive survival method of the paranoid-schizoid position in the 
face of anxiety, stress and emotional distress. While these concepts were designed to 
inform therapeutic intervention, they are also integral to everyday experience.  
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For example, when we speak of putting ourselves ‘in another’s shoes’, we are 
indicating an everyday aspect of the experience of projection.  Klein invites us to 
think about emotion as not only as an individual phenomenon but, perhaps more 
potently, as an organisational methodology.  The processes of splitting, projection 
and projective identification help us organise benevolent and persecutory feelings by 
locating them in ourselves or in others.  Klein invites us to consider the possibility 
that what we are feeling may belong to someone else, those feelings having been 
projected into or onto us.  In this way, Klein’s theories are an important contribution 
to the study of organisations, particularly if there exists an organisational fantasy of 
positivity, good news and satisfaction.  Klein offers a way of thinking about the 
management of emotion, particularly emotion that is perceived to be unwelcome and 
unwanted. Klein’s theories emphasise the relationship between baby and mother as 
the primary blueprint for all future relationship development.  Klein’s student and 
patient Wilfred Bion took this theory a stage further by applying it to the study of 
unconscious processes in larger groups.   
 
Wilfred Bion 
 
Wilfred Bion was a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst.  Most notably associated with 
the application of Melanie Klein’s theories to groups, he hypothesised that group 
membership evoked similar ‘psychotic’ reactions to those described by Klein in 
babies in the early months of life.  Bion extended Klein’s work to demonstrate the 
presence of a group unconscious (separate from the unconscious process of 
individual members of the group) which generated similar defences against anxiety 
as those in small babies.   
 
Bion had been a British officer in the First World War. He subsequently trained in 
psychiatry and worked as a psychotherapist at the Tavistock Clinic. Following 
psychoanalysis with Rickman, he joined a reading group of Klein’s students.  His 
interest in Klein’s work led him to undergo an analysis with her.  Bion subsequently 
became curious about how her theories might be applied to group settings.  In 
 76 
particular, he developed her theory of infantile phantasy into a methodology for 
working with the collective unconscious processes in groups. 
 
Bion continued his affiliation with the Tavistock Clinic in London after World War 
II, extending the methodology employed during the war with groups of returning 
soldiers, at the Northfield Hospital.  The purpose of the work at Northfield was to 
ready soldiers for a return to war, and Bion employed psychoanalytic principles as 
his primary technique.  The experiment in group therapy at the Northfield hospital 
lasted six weeks and became known as the First Northfield Experiment.  Bion was 
interested in how the discipline exhibited by soldiers at work could be usefully 
utilised in the service of soldiers’ mental health.   He summarised the characteristics 
of this discipline as the presence of a common enemy which symbolised a common 
danger as well as the presence of a leader who could withstand his soldiers’ good 
will and hostility and in whom the men could place their trust.  The common danger 
for those returning soldiers at Northfield was the ‘existence of a neurosis as a 
disability of the community’ (Bion, 1961:13).  In this sense, Bion shifted emphasis 
from individual diagnosis and remedy to a collective diagnosis which would require 
a collective remedy.  He proposed a treatment plan that would incorporate elements 
of military life including: 
 
one hour’s physical training daily unless a medical certificate 
excluded him; every man must be a member of one or more groups – 
the groups designed to study handicrafts, Army correspondence 
courses, carpentry, map-reading, sand-tabling etc; Any man could 
form a fresh group if he wanted to do so, either because no group 
existed for his particular activity or because, for some reason or 
other, he was not able to join an existing similar group; A man 
feeling unable to attend his group would have to go to the rest-room; 
The rest-room would be in charge of a nursing orderly, and must be 
kept quiet for reading, writing or games such as drafts.. (Bion, 
1961:15-16).   
 
Bion noticed that the groups became self-critical and wondered why their 
membership participated in various activities or not.  The analysis of the ‘here and 
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now’ day-to-day activity of the group became the mechanism by which the group 
experienced its anxieties and restored itself to equilibrium.  The study of the group in 
the ‘here and now’ and its move towards self-reliance became the preferred 
treatment option for restoration of mental health.  
 
Bion presented the theories he generated as a result of this (and other work) in 
Experiences in Groups (1961).  His reflections on the Northfield Experiment (and 
his work with groups at the Tavistock) laid the foundation for the experimental work 
undertaken at the newly constituted Tavistock Clinic and Institute after World War II. 
Following the war the Tavistock Clinic became part of the new National Health 
Service and focused its work on the psychological difficulties experience by soldiers 
presenting with post-traumatic stress (or shell-shock as it was known at the time).  
The Tavistock Institute would apply social science and psychodynamic 
methodologies to the study of society and its wider social problems. 
 
Bion’s central thesis was that two psychological processes were always in operation 
in a group at any moment in time.  The first process was the actual task around 
which the group was organised for example, a group may come together to eliminate 
homelessness or to make a profit.  Bion termed this process the Work (W) Group.  
The work group had a specific task to complete, and was time bound. The second 
process he termed the Basic Assumption (BA) Group and this activity was 
characterised by the shared unconscious assumptions or fantasies of the group, this 
group fantasy being independent from that of the individuals who made up the group.  
In contrast to the W group, the BA group had no finite time span, its work was on-
going, and the assumptions were present in the group from its inception (Bion, 1961). 
The BA group was characterised by strong, uncomfortable feelings, in particular the 
fear that unconscious fantasies of destruction might overwhelm the group.  
Individuals invested significant energy into managing these uncomfortable feelings, 
and this process of managing the BA group could interfere with the work task of the 
group.  The BA group was most evident when the work task required new learning, a 
process that evoked ambivalence in group members.  On the one hand there was the 
possibility of new knowledge and empowerment and, on the other there was the 
implied vulnerability and incompetence this suggested (Vince, 2004b).  These 
competing feelings conspired to interfere with the W group, enhanced the operation 
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of the BA group and reduced the capacity for reflection that ‘there is a hatred of 
having to learn by experience at all’ (Bion, 1961:89).  The operating assumption in 
BA functioning was that ‘people come together as a group for purposes of preserving 
the group’ (Bion, 1961:63), and significant energy was directed into defending the 
group from the unconscious fantasy of its annihilation.  The energy directed towards 
BA functioning was diverted from W activity resulting in impeded functioning in the 
‘external’ world. Group members adhered to organisation and structure, ‘the 
weapons of the W group’ (Bion, 1961:98), to balance the destructive fantasies that 
threatened to engulf the membership. 
 
Bion conceptualised three types of BA groups: Dependency (BaD); Fight/Flight 
(BaF) and Pairing (BaP).  One of the BA groups always operates in tandem with the 
W group during which time the other two BA groups are in abeyance (Bion, 1961).  
When the group is operating in dependency mode, the unconscious assumption in the 
group is of an idealised leader who will save the group from its destructive fantasies.  
Conversely the group assumes that it is unable to act without the presence of this 
figurehead.  The leader is idealised, omnipotent and god-like and his purpose is to 
save the group from their own sense of impotence. The role of leader is assigned and 
acted upon through the processes of projective identification and valency, but the 
leader can never fulfil the unconscious expectation of the group.  In this sense, the 
group operating in dependency mode creates a fantasy of omnipotence that can never 
be satisfied. This dependency can be compared with Klein’s description of the baby 
who fantasises that its distress and discomfort will be relieved by the appearance of 
the ‘good breast’.  Disappointment is a core component of dependency mode.  The 
disappointment of the group in their inability to save themselves is projected onto the 
nominated leader who internalises their expectation and inevitably fails to live up to 
expectation.  When the leader disappoints (which is an inevitable outcome), he is 
scapegoated, expelled and replaced with a new leader who is charged with saving the 
group from the sins of previous administrations.  
 
In fight/flight dependency mode the group is operating on the unconscious 
assumption that it is under attack and its only options are to fight the perceived 
intruder or escape from it by leaving the group.  The group operates as though its 
survival is threatened and it employs strategies for ridding the group of the threat of 
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danger.  This may take the form of scapegoating members who are perceived to be 
too weak to fight or avoiding what is going on by focusing on the past.  Leadership 
of the group in fight/flight mode is challenging as the group is organised around 
avoidance (of being in the room or of what is going on in the present).  Its energy is 
directed towards evacuation.  Leadership attempts will be short-lived and will 
inevitably disappoint in their attempts to mobilise members around the delivery of 
the work task. 
 
In pairing dependency mode the group operates under the unconscious assumption 
that two of its members will join together and procreate to produce a new leader for 
the group. This new leader is perceived to be Messiah-like, and the groups’ hopes 
and positive fantasies are projected onto the yet unborn deity. The group joins in a 
collective collusion to nominate a pair to save the group from extinction.  The pair 
may have a relationship in the conscious world.  For example, two colleagues may 
support each other intellectually or may be seen to have a close working alliance.  
Bion suggested that when the group becomes aware of such a relationship, ‘it seems 
to be a basic assumption, held by both the group and the pair concerned, that the 
relationship is a sexual one’ (Bion, 1961:62).  The deity never arrives, and the group 
is always in a state of waiting. This waiting preserves the fantasy of salvation 
without having to test the fantasy.  In this sense, pairing can be understood as a 
mechanism to avoid the disappointment that reality-testing would entail.  
 
Bion’s three basic assumption groups have been developed by other theorists, most 
notably Turquet, who added a fourth assumption termed ‘Oneness’ (BaO).  When 
operating on this assumption the group members ‘seek to join in a powerful union 
with an omnipotent force unobtainably high, to surrender self for passive 
participation, and thereby to feel existence, well-being, and wholeness’ (Turquet, 
1974:357).  Leaders offering spiritual guidance, consciousness awareness or ‘higher 
causes’ are attractive to a group functioning on this basic assumption.  Lawrence, 
Bain and Gould added a fifth basic assumption MeNess (BaM).  When operating on 
this assumption the group behaves as though there is no group, because if the group 
did exist it would be a source of persecution.  As a result there is no room for 
feelings which are perceived to be dangerous.  ‘It is a culture of selfishness in which 
individuals appear to be only conscious of their own personal boundaries, which they 
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believe have to be protected from any incursion by others’ (Lawrence et al., 1996).  
This fifth basic assumption can also be seen as an aspect of fight/flight enacted by 
individuals but directed internally rather than externally. 
 
The basic assumption groups are opposed to development and learning.  In contrast, 
the work group requires these very concepts in order to survive.  Life and death are 
in constant tension; and this tension links Bion’s theories with Klein, who postulated 
that life/death and love/hate tensions are the primary forces to be managed in order 
to transition successfully to adulthood. 
 
Bion’s theorised that when in BA mode the “group mentality’ is in the paranoid-
schizoid position’ (Bion, 1961:164). In this sense, Bion’s theories link with Klein’s, 
though an important difference is Bion’s application of these theories to a ‘group 
mentality’.  Bion theorised that the group operated as if it had a mind of its own, 
separate from the individual experiences that comprised its membership.  The 
mechanism by which the group operates in the paranoid-schizoid position is through 
projective identification.  There are two elements to projective identification. 
Projection is the mechanism by which unwanted parts of the self are thrust upon 
someone else and identification is the mechanism by which those unwanted parts are 
identified with and acted upon by another as if they were his own.  This mechanism 
requires collusion or agreement by the group (even if that group comprises only two 
people).  Bion suggested that this process was most often seen at work in relation to 
the group leader whose role was defined by his personality which ‘renders him 
peculiarly susceptible to the obliteration of individuality by the basic-assumption 
group’s leadership requirements’ (Bion, 1961:177).  Bion was referencing the 
concept of ‘valency’, a predisposition to volunteering for a particular role in a group.  
 
Bion’s contribution to the understanding of group organisation begins with his 
extension of Klein’s Object Relations Theory and the disruptive role of anxiety in 
fostering organised forms of defensiveness.  The work of defence itself not only 
deflects the group from the organisation’s primary task but also, in its avoidance of 
anxiety, serves to act as a barrier to clear thinking.  Instead of relying on its own 
resources for work, the group fantasy becomes an organised transference around the 
leader (mirroring and extending Freud (1955b)), though unproductively, except in 
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serving the dependencies offering false security from anxiety.  Not only do such acts 
elevate idealisation but in doing so, they increase the potential for disappointment by 
deepening the divide between reality and fantasy. 
 
Psychoanalysis and organising 
 
Psychodynamic theories of organisation emphasise the centrality of unconscious 
processes.  They seek to balance the view of organisations as rational-only entities 
with that of organisations as generative arenas of emotional activity.  This extends 
the view that organisations, in their rational orientation, are free of messy emotional 
contagion (Carr, 2001, Gabriel and Griffiths, 2002, Gould et al., 2006, Hirschhorn, 
1988, Stein, 2005, Vince, 2006).  This perspective includes the search for meaning 
not only within organisations’ complex incomprehensible phenomena (Kets de Vries, 
2004) but extends it to the inter-personal and inter-group practices of daily 
organisational life.  Research into the application of psychodynamic theory in 
organisations is well developed, and several distinct perspectives have started to 
emerge, relying predominantly on works by Freud, Klein, object relations theorists, 
and Lacan and his followers (see for example (Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001, 
Brown and Starkey, 2000, Arnaud, 2007, Gabriel, 1991, Huffington et al., 2004, 
Jarrett and Kellner, 1996, Kets de Vries, 2004, Obholzer and Zagier Roberts, 1994, 
Seel, 2001, Stavrakakis, 2008, Vince, 2001, 2002b)).   
 
The assumptions behind these perspectives as well as the way in which the terms 
psychodynamic, psychoanalytic and object-relations are used, are not always shared. 
The term ‘psychoanalytic’ is usually seen as the most inclusive term, although 
‘orthodox’ Freudians may sometimes seek to exclude certain contended theories and 
traditions from it. The term ‘psychodynamic’ is often reserved for uses of 
psychoanalytic theories in understanding and intervening in group phenomena. The 
term object relations is used to describe the tradition initiated by Melanie Klein, who 
viewed herself as orthodox, but became entangled in numerous arguments with 
Freud’s successors. Her approach, the dominant though not the only one informing 
this paper, emphasises the formative impact of relations with others for the 
development of a person’s mental personality: this at the expense of Freud’s own 
 82 
tendency to emphasise instincts and desires. Objects, in Klein’s conceptualisation, 
are symbolic entities, frequently the products of fantasies; they are invested with 
meanings and qualities and are capable of being integrated with, or separated from, 
the self; they may be split, for example, into good and bad: and they can merge with 
other symbolic entities to generate new objects. Klein’s approach, which dominated 
the British psychoanalytic establishment for the half century after Freud’s death, 
subsequently influenced many authors who sought to explore group and 
organisational phenomena (for a detailed description of the uses of these terms, see 
(Gabriel, 2008:236-240)).  In spite of some enduring differences (which have, over 
time, tended to atrophy), there are core features that set psychoanalytic, 
psychodynamic and object relations perspectives on organisational phenomena apart 
from others.  A number of these features are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Social defences against anxiety 
 
Anxiety is a central feature of psychodynamic theory, understood by Freud to reflect 
the struggle between life and death.  Klein’s further development recognised 
‘persecutory anxiety’ as the result of the child’s struggle with life and death (Klein, 
1948/1975).  Anxiety is one of our earliest emotional experiences and can be 
understood as a survival mechanism, readying the self for defence against external 
danger. Humans expend great energy in both the management of anxiety and its 
containment. 
 
Anxiety can also be understood as representative of two different types of threat: 
external and internal.  Anxiety associated with external danger is termed objective 
anxiety and anxiety associated with internal danger (our fantasies and unconscious 
feelings) is termed neurotic anxiety (Freud, 1963).  The strategies we employ to 
manage external threats (for example, calling the police) will not work when the 
source of our anxiety relates to unresolved childhood trauma or unconscious feelings. 
Ego defences comprised of projection, repression, sublimation and regression are 
employed in the service of protecting us from neurotic anxiety and internal threat.  
Projection, for example, is an effective defence because it requires the creation of an 
‘external’ aggressor to whom difficult feelings can be attributed.  ‘I envy you’ is 
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transformed into ‘you envy me’ thereby justifying anger or the desire for revenge.  
This external aggressor performs an illusory function in diverting attention away 
from neurotic anxiety but fails as a long-term strategy. The act of projection is a 
circular process providing momentary relief from immediate difficulty but delivering 
us back to the same starting point as we realise that the aggressor is within. 
 
Psychodynamic organisational scholars have begun to examine the organisational 
equivalent of individual persecutory anxiety and have generated theories about the 
source of its existence (Diamond, 1991, Hirschhorn, 1988, Kets de Vries, 2004, 
Obholzer, 1994).  Organisations are faced with ‘life and death’ issues on a daily 
basis: mergers, acquisitions, redundancies and bankruptcies evoke similar anxieties 
as those experienced by a young baby as it negotiates the first months of life.  The 
viability of a business model is predicated on the irrational performance of the stock 
market, and this insecurity can evoke ‘annihilation anxiety’ in organisation members 
(Hirschhorn and Young, 1991). Scholars have shown how Klein’s theories of good 
and bad objects manifest in organisational settings as social defences with the 
purpose of externalising personal defences (Hirschhorn, 1988).  Jaques (1955) and 
Menzies (1960, 1970) demonstrated how social defences against anxieties result in 
structural defences such as organisational rituals.  Rituals are designed to insulate 
organisation members from uncomfortable feelings associated with belonging to an 
anxiety-provoking system.  Menzies’ research into nurses’ work practices 
highlighted several processes such as the wearing of uniforms, identifying patients 
by condition rather than name and rotating nurses around wards, each designed to 
depersonalise the workplace and reduce attendant stress related to the nature of the 
work task.  
 
Menzies’ and Jaques’ work is important in highlighting the relationship between 
physical and social structures and their impact on organisational anxiety.  Physical 
structures (such as operational issues, methods of production, management structure) 
are designed to facilitate the delivery of the primary task.  Social and cultural 
structures (such as assumptions, culture) are generated out of the psychological and 
social needs of an organisation’s membership (Menzies, 1960).  Work practices and 
the delivery of the ‘primary task’ are always influenced by the need to manage 
overwhelming anxiety in the organisational system.  What appears, on the surface, to 
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be irrational or illogical behaviour is in fact an encoded method of managing 
difficult emotion generated in the social setting of work and related to the primary 
task of the institution. Social defences or ‘the way we do things here’ (Vince, 
2002a:75) become institutionalised as part of the external reality of the organisation - 
with which new (and old) members must comply (Menzies, 1960).  Social defences 
perpetuate the fantasy of an anxiety-free and emotionally stable organisation while at 
the same time exacerbating the very anxiety they attempt to control. 
 
The political effects of fantasy  
 
The relationship between fantasy and reality is a central feature of a psychodynamic 
approach to organisations. Freud (1955a) viewed humans as driven by unconscious 
and repressed desires, and central to his theories is the concept of loss: of incestuous 
relationships not entered into and pleasures not sought.  He believed that when 
hopes, dreams and desires are unavailable to us in our conscious lives, fantasy serves 
as a way of protecting those dreams from being damaged by reality.  Fantasy can be 
seen as a ‘wish fulfilling idea which comes into play when external reality is 
frustrating’ (Segal, 1991:16).  In organisations, fantasy can serve a similar purpose. 
Organisations build ideas and images of themselves in response to frustrating 
external (and internal) realities. They do this in order to contain, to control, and to 
instruct their members in the cultural norms of the group. Fantasies about good and 
bad or right and wrong in organisations help to generate self-imposed limitations on 
behaviour and action. They also act as triggers of particular emotions, ranging from 
pride to envy and from hope to disappointment.  The possibilities and limitations of 
behaviour within particular organisational contexts form collective and unconscious 
psychostructures that define, redefine and enforce ‘the way we do things here’ 
(Vince, 2002a:75). Therefore, in addition to their material reality, organisations are 
constructed from an ‘architecture of the invisible’ (Isaacs, 1999), a complex 
interplay of fantasies, taken-for-granted assumptions, underlying emotions and 
power relations.  
 
Ideas about ‘the way we do things here’ provide containment for individuals and 
groups, helping them to understand roles, responsibilities and expectations within the 
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organisation. Such containment offers organisational members important knowledge 
about how the organisation works as well as how they can work effectively within it. 
However, containment also restricts the evolution of new knowledge and 
discourages learning and change. Threats to the ‘way we do things here’ are 
managed through individual and social defence mechanisms which protect against 
the fear that something bad will happen. Therefore, ‘the way we do things here’ is at 
the same time both a supportive structure for communicating knowledge about the 
organisation and a restriction inasmuch as it is a defence against difficult emotions 
and the fears and anxieties generated by such emotions. As a result of this paradox 
(that any organisation is both a supportive and a restrictive structure), fantasy is 
inevitably linked to politics and power. This is expressed concisely by Slavoj Žižek 
in his essay on the political effects of fantasy when he suggests that: ‘a shared lie is 
an incomparably stronger bond for a group than the truth’ (1999:99) . The way in 
which espoused organisational values and company mission statements have served 
as ‘shared lies’ offers much practical evidence of this insight.  
 
A contemporary example of this phenomenon appeared in The Irish Times12 during 
September 2011 (O'Toole, 2011).  TalkTalk, the British based broadband company 
suddenly announced its intention to close its operation in the south east of Ireland 
with the resultant loss of 575 jobs.  The Irish Times deputy editor Fintan O’Toole 
examined the company’s corporate social responsibility statement and suggested that 
it was in stark contrast to the company’s treatment of workers. 
 
TalkTalk is all about engagement and communication. Its corporate 
and social responsibility review tells us that ‘employee engagement, 
the extent to which employees are psychologically and emotionally 
attached to their work, positively influences customer satisfaction 
and productivity. Our last survey results registered an engagement 
score of 74 per cent.’ Furthermore, ‘keeping our people informed of 
developments and the company’s progress, whilst enabling them to 
engage in two-way communication, has been a strong feature this 
year at TalkTalk’ 
 
                                                
12 The Irish Times is Ireland’s newspaper of record 
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This is why bullshit isn’t harmless. It’s evil. There are companies 
who really do try to behave responsibly. Why should they bother, 
though, when, as our aptly named friends have shown, TalkTalk is 
so cheap? There’s a whole industry in the corporate newspeak of 
CSR: people, empowerment, community, inclusion, team, 
communication. Its sole point is to dress up disempowerment. 
(O'Toole, 2011) 
 
O’Toole’s article draws our attention to the ‘price of membership’ (Schein, 
1968/1998) to organisations.  In order to fit in and to identify with co-workers, the 
work task and the environment, the worker adopts the organisation’s goals as his 
own. Another way to think about this is that the worker, in order to fit in, joins a new 
moral community in which his own values are exchanged for that of the organisation.  
Contained within this transaction is the fantasy of belonging.  Schwartz describes 
this as the ‘ontological function… the projection of the possibility of a return to 
narcissism, to being the centre of a loving world, to regaining a stable, self-contained 
identity and a sense of Being without self-rejection as its core’ (Schwartz, 1987:330).  
The ontological function gives us a way of understanding why individuals might stay 
in organisations that disclaim particular types of behaviour and emotion and why 
they collude with the fantasy as a way of protecting themselves from both painful 
realities and their own dependencies upon the organisations they serve.  
 
The organisation ideal remains (and must remain) an elusive concept.  Schwartz 
invites us to think about the ‘reality’ of the idealisation: what would the ideal 
organisation look like?  ‘...an organization not only in perfect coexistence with its 
environment, but assured of the permanent continuity of this coexistence.  This 
would imply that the organization would be in total permanent control of its 
environment’ (Schwartz, 1987:332).  On the surface this appears to be an unlikely 
concept, yet organisations continue to promote the ideal through public statements 
(see O’Toole above) and a form of collusion on the part of workers who need to 
believe in the ideal in order to promote their own narcissistic fantasies.  
Relinquishing an attachment to the organisation ideal would mean promoting a 
vision of ‘just good enough’ rather than ‘omnipotent’ and, as we know from 
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management literature, there is little room for ambivalence or negativity when an 
emphasis on positivity and productivity appear inextricably linked. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This review of literature has outlined the theoretical and conceptual landscape in 
which this study of disappointment is situated.  In particular, I have highlighted the 
historical, political and cultural contexts that inform theorising about emotion in 
organisations. The first chapter outlined the philosophical and scientific 
developments that influenced (and influence) how emotion is considered in 
contemporary times.  In particular, I have highlighted the ways in which 
polarisations have become a central feature of theorising emotion.  Polarisation 
relates to emotion as positive or negative, biologically or socially determined, 
conscious or unconsciously manifest.   
 
The theme of polarisation was developed in the second chapter in which emotion 
was conceptualised as a political process.  Emotion has been capitalised in the 
service of managerial goals, herded into categorisations that emphasise positivity and 
promote the fantasy of control.  Emotion has also been imbued with a moral agenda.  
Some emotions are viewed as good (and useful to managerial agendas of 
productivity) and others as bad (unhelpful in maintaining the fantasy of control and 
aligned with poor corporate citizenship). 
 
This present chapter outlined a psychodynamic perspective on emotion and 
organising.  Reality and fantasy exist in a complex political relationship.  The 
fantasies of success and control conceal fear of failure and destruction. Those 
fantasies and fears have profound effects on the emotional life of organisations and 
on the role of individuals within them.  Particular types of emotion are deemed to be 
acceptable while others are extruded.  Moral pronouncements on organisation 
members’ capacity to ‘fit in’ carry authority in determining the emotional climate at 
work.  I introduced the theories of Freud, Klein and Bion to help understand the 
strategies employed to manage these feelings.  In particular I emphasised the 
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importance of social defences such as projection, splitting and projective 
identification.   
 
The literature review has highlighted a number of issues which psychodynamic 
theory can help to explore in more detail.   
 
A paradox exists regarding disappointment in management literature.  On the one 
hand, it is an under-researched topic; on the other, there are highly sophisticated 
strategies employed by managers to ensure that the destructive potential of 
disappointment is appropriately marshalled.  This simultaneous absence and 
presence suggests that disappointment is organised at a conscious and unconscious 
level.    
 
The management of emotion in organisations is a political process involving 
morality and control.  Positivity and the strategies employed to ensure that 
employees are ‘stress-fit’, emotionally intelligent and engaged in emotional labour, 
are now central management themes.  From a psychodynamic perspective, the 
emphasis on positivity is a strategy for the management of ‘negative’ emotion in 
organisations.  In particular it is a strategy for the management of the fantasies 
associated with negative emotion such as chaos, anxiety and destruction. 
 
The emphasis of positivity alerts us to the political effects of fantasy in organisations.  
Fantasy is an important component of change and creativity.  Giving life to ideas and 
dreams born of fantasy results in new products, organisations and innovation.  Group 
fantasies play an important role in the assignation of duties, roles and responsibilities 
and account for how we take up that authority in our places of work.  Fantasy also 
helps to manage overwhelming anxiety generated in social settings.  However, group 
fantasies can become a cauldron of unarticulated feelings and fantasies of 
organisation members.  What we experience as our ‘reality’ in organisations can be 
understood to be the collective fantasy of the group membership.  Likewise our 
individual sense of ourselves can be considered an unconscious ‘taking in’ of the 
wider organisational system.  Learning, change and development in organisations 
can only take place when we are able to change our images of self and other, in other 
words, when reality and fantasy meet and are allowed to influence and inform each 
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other.  Organisations are creative and hopeful places as well as the source of great 
anxiety (Gabriel and Carr, 2002). This raises an important question for 
organisational members: how can we sustain creativity in the face of fears and 
anxieties about destruction?  
 
A psychodynamic understanding of emotion allows us to go beneath the surface of 
social defences to see what is really concealed. I propose that the psychodynamic 
study of disappointment can provide some answers to the questions of how 
organisation members manage paradoxical feelings of failure and loss while 
maintaining a positive outlook as required by managerial agendas.  Such a study can 
also help us understand the defensive mechanisms that have helped to construct 
disappointment as unwanted feelings, an irrational condition, and the avoidance of 
decision-making.  In other words, this study will reveal a different way of looking at 
the organisation of disappointment. The next chapter will set out the philosophical 
and methodological approach adopted to explore these issues. 
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4 Methodology 
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with an exploration of the philosophical assumptions influencing 
the design of research and the selection of a methodology.  Next I describe the 
methodology used in this study and situate it in the wider context of knowledge 
generation. The methodology employed is Grounded Theory, particularly the version 
associated with Barney Glaser (1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2002b, 2002a, 2003, Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).  The chapter will give an overview of the history and 
development of Grounded Theory and describe the differences in approach of the 
originators. Debates surrounding Grounded Theory and new directions in which it is 
developing will also be referenced.  The differences between the various schools of 
Grounded Theory have been extensively debated elsewhere (see Glaser, 1992, Melia, 
1996, Strauss and Corbin, 1998) hence reference within this chapter will be to the 
Glaserian method and to those ideas that help to shed light on this approach. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the relevance of Grounded Theory to the 
study of emotion in organisations and, in particular, to the organisation of 
disappointment. 
 
Philosophical assumptions 
 
Embarking on a research process entails operationalising a set of philosophical 
assumptions about how reality is constructed (ontology) and how we know what we 
know about that reality (epistemology).  These philosophical assumptions influence 
the approach we intend to employ to inquire further into the area of research 
(methodology) and the procedure employed to gather the data (method).  Locating 
oneself and the reader in relation to philosophical paradigms is considered to be an 
important step in the research process (Crotty, 1998).  It creates an explicit link 
between philosophical understandings of knowledge generation and the selection of 
a particular method of inquiry.  Different ontological and epistemological positions 
are compatible with a variety of methodological stances and each and any of these 
positions can be challenged and contested. Establishing clarity regarding the 
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researcher’s position becomes an important starting point.  This is of particular 
importance because of the contested nature of the philosophical underpinnings of 
Grounded Theory. Management research operates on ‘no single agreed ontological 
or epistemological paradigm’ and furthermore is concerned ‘not only with knowing 
what, but goes beyond this to consider questions associated with ‘knowing how’ 
(Tranfield and Starkey, 1998:346).  Furthermore, the lines between and within 
ontology and epistemology are blurred in the literature.  Terms are used 
interchangeably leading to confusion as to how to establish a foothold in this 
philosophical domain. There are also significant differences in how ontological and 
epistemological positions are adapted and applied in positivist and post-positivist 
research contexts.  These are important to consider, particularly in relation to the role 
of researcher as subjective or objective participant in the process of knowledge 
generation. 
 
Ontology 
 
Ontology concerns our assumptions about the nature of reality, and it can be 
characterised as a continuum between realism and relativity.  Realism subscribes to a 
true, objective reality that exists independently of consciousness.  In this domain, 
there is a cause-and-effect relationship between structures and objects.  Relativism is 
the belief that ‘reality’ is subject to many interpretations (Willig, 2001).   
Epistemology refers to the relationship between the knower, the known and 
knowledge.  Epistemological paradigms can be described as a continuum between 
objectivism (the belief that knowledge can be externally and objectively created) and 
subjectivism (the belief that meaning can be subjectively and locally made).  The 
researcher’s assumptions about the nature of reality, knowledge and how they are 
created and interpreted will influence and impact on: (1) the choice of research topic; 
(2) the proposed question or hypothesis to be tested; (3) choice of methodology; (4) 
inductive or deductive reasoning; and (5) engagement with research respondents.  
‘An awareness and consideration of how these relate to the research process is thus 
taken to be able to sharpen and focus our decisions and choices in research work’ 
(May, 2001:9).   
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Realism and relativism 
 
Naïve realism is a positivist ontological position that assumes the existence of a ‘real’ 
reality that is apprehendable (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). The real world exists outside 
of our representations of it.  Evidence of the real world includes feelings, buildings, 
language, pictures etc. Derived from the scientific realism of John Locke (1979) who 
believed that the world only contained that which could be seen as distinct from 
representations of it, naïve realists subscribe to the view that our experience of the 
‘real world’ is through our sense and perception of it. In this paradigm, knowledge 
gained can be taken to be valid and true. Relativists deny the existence of an 
objective reality and subscribe to the view that there are multiple realities influenced 
by local and specific contexts.  A relativist ontological position contests the 
existence of any one interpretation of reality claiming that reality exists as ‘multiple 
mental constructions’ and that no ‘true state of affairs’ exists (Annells, 1996:386).   
 
Realism is regularly associated with an objectivist epistemology (Lincoln and Guba, 
2000) in which it is possible to come to a full understanding of the world through the 
application of scientific process.  However, it is also compatible with a subjectivist 
epistemology.  A world may exist outside of our consciousness but the meaning-
making process does not: ‘the existence of a world without a mind is conceivable.  
Meaning without a mind is not’ (Crotty, 1998:10).  Critical realists subscribe to the 
belief that the ‘social and natural worlds have different realities, but that both forms 
of reality are probabilistically apprehensible, albeit imperfectly’ (Annells, 1996:385). 
The ontological positions of realism and relativism bring forth strong defences from 
writers.  They are strategically deployed to ground a writer’s critique in that the 
aspect of the world which they wish to remain real:  ‘Which aspects of the world are 
to be relativised and which “real-ised” is a choice typically shaped by moral, 
political or pragmatic precepts, not epistemology or ontology’ (Nightingale and 
Cromby, 1999:9).  Edwards et al. (1995) describe two common objections to 
relativism, death and furniture.  Realists thump tables and offer the inevitability of 
death as evidence of the ‘real world’ when challenged by relativists.  Furniture and 
death become the ‘bottom line’ argument for the existence of a reality outside of 
ourselves. Relativists, on the other hand, suggest that it is not the whole table that is 
thumped, merely a piece of it, and, they ask, what of those pieces? Do they in fact 
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constitute a table? Edwards et al. suggest that realism disguises a lot of the ‘on trust’ 
material, for example that a piece of a table in fact represents the whole thing. The 
authors present what they call the ‘relativist’s dilemma’.  Relativists must accept 
everyone’s view as being as valid as everyone else’s (and that includes realists).  
Realists and relativists are both compromised but in different ways: ‘while realists 
shoot themselves in the foot as soon as they represent, relativists do so as soon as 
they argue. To argue for something is to care, to be positioned, which is immediately 
non-relativist’ (Edwards et al., 1995:39).  Crotty (1998) agrees with this position and 
suggests that we are all constructionists.  If this is indeed the case, then the 
implications for research are profound.  If the role of researcher assumes no greater 
importance than that of anyone else, what is the value of research?  The ontological 
position of realism and the epistemological position of constructionism may offer 
some answers in this regard. 
 
Nightingale and Cromby (1999) suggest that  
 
relativism is simultaneously a culturally offered rhetorical resource 
that can be drawn upon to disparage ‘realist’ arguments (as 
unsophisticated, as failures to understand the subtleties or nuances of 
relativists’ claims, and so on) and so avoid the need to take seriously 
the entirely reasonable questions that are being raised (1999:10).   
 
Relativists are placed in the position of always denying the obvious while arguing 
that there is always an argument to support their case (Edwards et al., 1995). Both 
sets of authors contest the either/or polarisation of realism and relativism and suggest 
that ‘we must find ways of talking and writing about the world which, instead of 
questioning its existence, explicitly acknowledge the situatedness of our own texts 
within it’ (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999:10).  ‘Relativism is the quintessentially 
academic position, where all truths are to-be-established’ (Edwards et al., 1995:37).  
Realism and relativism appear to occupy two ends of the ontological spectrum 
offering sometimes contested views of the nature of ‘reality’ but as the authors above 
attest they may have more in common than previously thought.  If we label an 
interpretation as relativist, we are suggesting a representation of reality and not 
necessarily a reproduction or copy of it.  Relativism doesn’t negate realism but 
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contests the singularity of vision often associated with it. But what of the 
epistemological position that allows those competing views of reality to be known?  
 
Epistemology 
 
Objectivism 
 
Objectivism is the epistemological position underpinning a positivist approach to 
research. Epistemological objectivists position the researcher as separate from what 
is being researched, the underlying assumption being that it is possible to be a 
‘neutral’ observer of the social world without influencing or contaminating the site 
of research through the act of research.  An epistemological objectivist stance 
presupposes that it is possible to describe an external reality which in turn, ‘provides 
the only secure foundation for social scientific knowledge’ (Johnson et al., 
2006:136). The research approach to data collection is the testing of hypotheses and 
the determination of the truth or falsehood of a theory.  In this paradigm, ‘the testing 
of theory against irreducible statements of observation is equivalent to a direct 
comparison between theory and the real.  If they fail to correspond then the theory is 
false and therefore may be rejected’ (Hindess, 1977:18).  Positivism can be traced to 
the Age of Reason in seventeenth century Britain: it has evolved and developed into 
a complex philosophical school incorporating as many as twelve different varieties 
of positivism.  These range from Auguste Comte’s desire to employ the methods of 
the natural sciences to the social sciences to the Vienna Circle Logical Positivists’ 
desire to apply the logic of mathematics to the study of philosophy.  In this paradigm 
adherence to observable data subject to empirical verification is of paramount 
importance (Crotty, 1998).  Contemporary interpretations adopt a less rigorous 
attachment to the grand claims of truth and objectivity inherent in positivism, and in 
the twentieth century, a post-positivist perspective began to emerge.   Post-
positivism is concerned with ‘knowing’ and the process by which knowledge is 
constructed.  It adopts a critical realist position.  In other words, ontologically an 
external reality is acknowledged to exist but our knowing of that reality cannot be 
certain.  The epistemological position is one of probability and approximation rather 
than certainty and objectivity.  
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However post-positivism does adhere to the principles of verification.  Popper’s 
theory of falsification (termed the hypothetico-deductive method, in which a theory 
is proven to be ‘provisionally’ true unless it can be falsified) is but one way in which 
the principle of doubt emerges as a component of theory verification in post-
positivism (Locke, 2007, Popper, 2003).  Popper dispensed with the idea of 
induction and offered deduction as an alternative.  If there was no rational place to 
start the process of theory-building, any one place was as good as the next, therefore 
one could ‘deduce a theory and then try to falsify it’ (Locke, 2007:868).   As Locke 
points out, the difficulty with Popper’s rejection of induction is that falsification 
involves gathering evidence, and it is impossible to determine whether that evidence 
is valid or not.  Falsification requires falsification and as such generates the ‘very 
problem that Popper claimed was the fatal weakness of induction’ (2007:869). The 
cultural context in which science operated was challenged by theoretical physicist 
Thomas Kuhn who contended that science was subject to the same cultural, social 
and historical changes as any other discipline (Kuhn, 1966).  He also challenged the 
idea that evolution in science happened in an orderly fashion as had previously been 
assumed by Popper.  Kuhn contended that science evolved in ‘leaps’ leading to 
paradigm shifts providing alternatives to previous understandings (Willig, 2001). 
This questioned some of the fundamental tenants of positivism, for example, the 
existence of an orderly and observable external world subject to objective 
observance by detached researchers as distinct from a researcher as ‘transformative 
intellectual… advocate and activist’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000:170). The research 
approach to data collection in post-positivism is both quantitative and qualitative 
including randomised controlled trials generating ‘nonfalsified hypotheses that are 
probable facts or laws’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). 
 
Subjectivism: constructivism and social constructionism 
 
A subjectivist epistemological stance rejects the existence of an external reality that 
can be described in neutral language.  Constructivism is an epistemological position 
that is broad and inclusive and often used interchangeably used with social 
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constructionism13.  Both are a form of social criticism that express doubt in the 
taken-for-granted world (Gergen, 1985), and both take the view that knowledge is 
created between people and in a social context.  Meaning is therefore constructed 
and not discovered (Crotty, 1998). What binds different forms of constructivism is 
the metaphor of carpentry in which knowledge building is seen as an active process 
of building on previous understanding.  Knowing is seen as active, individual and 
personal (Ernest, 1995:462).  
 
Social constructionism, although similar in its belief in the relational aspect of 
meaning-making, has a more critical edge.  It pays attention to how meaning-making 
is a social act. There is no single definition of social constructionism, but there is a 
set of tenets that combine to create a ‘family resemblance’ (Burr, 1995).   The central 
tenets of social constructionism are: (1) a ‘radical doubt in the taken for granted 
world’ (Gergen, 1985:267).  Our labels and language prevent us from knowing all 
that can be known precisely because of the limitations of that language.  Social 
constructionism asks us to challenge the idea that things are what they are purely 
because we agree that they are so through observation; (2) Knowledge is historically 
specific.  Our relationships and understandings change and evolve over time, hence 
knowledge is not static, fixed or tangible; (3) Social processes sustain knowledge 
generation.  Family, relationships and the media play a role in affirming and 
controlling what we know; and (4) knowledge is a form of social action.  How we 
talk about our world has an impact on how we create and experience it.  Social 
constructionism is concerned with how reality is made through language and how 
language ‘does things’ (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999).  Particular emphasis is 
placed on ‘text’ and acting in and out of particular ‘grammars’.  Meaning is 
constructed between people, i.e., not at the ‘center of our being, but at its boundaries’ 
(Shotter, 1994:7). Constructionism cannot be seen as an exclusively subjectivist 
epistemology in that it subscribes to an external reality, though one that is 
constructed in relationship and contextually situated (Crotty, 1998).  Meaning is 
made when the subjective self engages with the world, not when the subjective self 
                                                
13Constructionism is a term used in sociology.  It refers to meaning-making as a social act.  
Constructivism is a term used in psychology to denote the personal and cognitive processes associated 
with making meaning of the world. 
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discovers it.  Each subjective self will engage with the external world in different 
ways leading to multiple experiences of reality.  In this sense, constructionism can be 
seen to bring objectivism and subjectivism together.  This view is contested, 
however, by some writers who view constructionism as having a subjectivist 
epistemology in which learning is an individual or subjective act (Denzien and 
Lincoln, 2003).  This criticism seems more apt when considering a constructivist 
epistemology rather than a constructionist one, and Crotty suggests reserving the 
term constructivism for ‘epistemological considerations focusing exclusively on the 
meaning making activity of the individual mind and constructionism… for the 
collective generation [and transmission] of meaning’ (Crotty, 1998:58).   
 
The implications for the position of the researcher are significant when considering a 
constructionist epistemological position.  If meaning is constructed through social 
interaction, and each interpretation of meaning is as valid as the next, it is almost 
impossible to consider a research project in which a researcher remains separate 
from the research process.  Constructionism can be considered a ‘challenge to 
traditional knowledge claims’ (Gergen, 1985:271).  If the act of research is a socially 
constructed one, no one version of knowledge can be privileged over another.  This 
calls into question the nature of the research act and how one constructs meaning and 
makes judgements about the validity of the research process and its outcomes 
(Lomborg and Kirkevold, 2003).   
 
Interpretivism 
 
Interpretivism is a theoretical perspective that ‘sees the world as an emergent social 
process, which is created by the individuals concerned’ (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979:28).  Linked to the work of Max Weber, interpretivism is concerned with 
understanding the social world as distinct from a focus on causality found in the 
natural sciences.  It can be understood as a perspective that distinguishes between the 
quantitative and qualitative sciences (Crotty, 1998).  Interpretivism is informed and 
influenced by the epistemological position of constructionism and shares some 
common themes.  Not only is interpretivism concerned with understanding the social 
world, but it is also concerned with how meaning is made of that world.  An 
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understanding of meaning is connected with an interpretation of what people are 
actually doing. There are a range of interpretivist philosophies and Schwandt (2003) 
outlines four different perspectives: (1) Empathic Identification whereby the 
researcher’s task is to understand the subjective experience of the actor, in other 
words it is a form of psychological empathic positioning.  The epistemological 
position is an objectivist one and assumes that it is possible to recreate subjective 
experience from an objective perspective; (2) Phenomenological Sociology attempts 
to understand how we interpret our actions as meaningful and aims to recreate the 
circumstances in which meaning is understood.  This form of interpretivism focuses 
on how reality is created as a social process and in conversation, drawing on ideas 
from constructionism; (3) Language Games are drawn from the work of philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein who posited that the use of language is a game in which there 
are multiple interpretations at work each of which has their own rules and contexts.  
This form of interpretivism aims to explore the system of meanings in which 
meaning is embedded. Schwandt (2003) links the three interpretivist philosophical 
positions as: (a) valuing human action as meaningful; (b) emphasising human 
subjectivity as an important contribution to knowledge creation; and (c) valuing an 
objectivist perspective.  A fourth way of thinking about interpretativism is in terms 
of philosophical hermeneutics in which the objectivist stance of understanding is 
deconstructed.  In other words ‘understanding is interpretation’ (Schwandt, 
2003:301).   
 
This form of interpretivism sees understanding as a dynamic rather than a static 
process in which meaning is made rather than found or discovered. Unlike social 
constructionism, interpretivism (and in particular philosophical hermeneutics) does 
not deny a subjectivist interpretation of reality.  The emphasis is not on finding out 
how meaning or reality are made but, instead, the process of understanding itself 
comes under scrutiny.  The process of understanding also goes further than surface 
interpretations.  ‘This aim derives from the view that in large measure authors’ 
meanings and intentions remain implicit and go unrecognised by the authors 
themselves’ (Crotty, 1998:90). Such a process of understanding has implications for 
the position of the researcher, particularly if the act of interpretation and 
understanding is seen as interlinked and generated in a particular context i.e., the 
research process.   Likewise, there are implications for what constitutes data in such 
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a research process, particularly if an interpretative stance of this nature generates 
understanding by attending to what lurks beneath the surface of the research 
encounter. 
 
What is Grounded Theory? 
 
Grounded Theory is a ‘discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop 
a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously 
grounding the account in empirical observations or data’ (Martin and Turner, 
1986:141). The purpose of a grounded theory study is to experience the problem, 
issue or meaning from the perspective of the research respondents and to develop an 
integrated set of conceptual hypotheses about what is going on. Therefore Grounded 
Theory fits well with a study aimed at the development of a suggestive theory, where 
there is, as yet, no strong theoretical basis from which to develop well-focused 
research questions. Grounded theorists start their research process with data and 
develop theories that are generated from their analysis and conceptualisation of data 
as distinct from ‘…logical deduction from a priori assumptions’ (Annels, 1997).  
Grounded Theory is a set of guidelines that show us ‘how we may proceed’ in our 
examination and theorising (Charmaz, 2006:3). The methodology is ‘an interpretive 
mode of inquiry’ (Goulding, 1998:52) and a complex process that does not lend 
itself to linear organisation or simplistic interpretation (Glaser, 1998:22). It is also an 
iterative methodology requiring movement between data and analysis, requiring the 
constant comparison of codes and categories as theory develops. Considered to be a 
qualitative methodology by some (Annells, 1996, Silverman, 2003) Grounded 
Theory can be used with any kind of data and collection method.  It works with 
categories and is accessible to those trained in quantitative methodologies (Willig, 
2001). One of the main purposes of Grounded Theory is to generate good ideas 
(Glaser, 1978) which, in turn, lead to new theory generation.  A theory, according to 
Strauss and Corbin, is a set of well-developed concepts or relationships that can be 
used to explain rather than describe phenomena (1998).  A theory assists us to 
‘understand the findings of research within a conceptual framework that makes 
‘sense’ of the data’ (May, 2001:29).  
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Theory as conceptualised by Glaser is a useful framework that can be put to work in 
the service of understanding patterns of behaviour.  Grounded theories have ‘grab’ 
and are interesting (Glaser, 1978, Glaser and Strauss, 1967) but, more importantly, 
theory must also adhere to certain criteria.  It must ‘fit’: the theory must relate to the 
data from which it was generated.  If the methodology is adhered to in an appropriate 
way, data are not forced into categories, and the fit occurs naturally.  It must be 
‘relevant’ so that it can be understood by the layperson and used in practice.  Theory 
generated by this methodology is not intended to lie fallow but expected to be useful 
to those working in the relevant field. A Grounded Theory must also assist 
researchers advance theory in their area of practice as well as being practical in the 
field.  A theory must be readily ‘modifiable’ i.e., the theory must be flexible enough 
to change in relation to new data (Glaser, 1978).  Theory as conceptualised by Glaser 
is never ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ as data offers the opportunity to modify or develop an 
existing theory rather than prove or disprove it.  Finally, a theory must have 
‘workability’ inasmuch as the concepts and their relation to each other should 
account for how the respondents’ main concern is resolved.  The theory should 
‘explain relevant behaviour in the substantive area, predict what will happen and 
interpret what is happening in the area of enquiry’ (Glaser, 1978:4). 
 
Grounded Theory can be used to generate two kinds of theories, substantive and 
formal.  The former is developed for a ‘substantive or empirical area of sociological 
inquiry, such as patient care, race relations, professional education, delinquency or 
research organizations’.  Formal theory is developed for a ‘formal, or conceptual 
area of sociological inquiry such as stigma, deviant behaviour, formal organization, 
socialization, status congruency, authority and power, reward systems, or social 
mobility’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:32).  Substantive theory emerges from research 
into specific issues in a particular context and does not try to explain phenomena 
outside of that context.  It is also practical and aims to influence and inform action 
and behaviour in a particular setting.  However, substantive theory can also be 
worked into formal theory (which can be applied across a wide range of contexts) 
through a process of re-writing and extended comparative analysis (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).  Grounded theories are also described as ‘mid-range’ in that they fall 
between the ‘minor working hypotheses’ of everyday life and the ‘all-inclusive 
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grand theories’ and because they are grounded in our observations of everyday life 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:33). 
 
The role of existing theory in a Grounded Theory study 
 
The originators of Grounded Theory are clear about the purpose and function of 
theory, and they outline a methodology for working with data to generate theory.  
But what of the relationship between existing theory and that which the researcher 
seeks to generate using the methodology? Glaser (1992) describes three types of 
literature: (1) non-professional, popular and pure ethnographic descriptions; (2) 
professional literature related to the substantive area under research; and (3) 
professional literature that is unrelated to the substantive area.  He is adamant that 
researchers not undertake a formal literature review in advance of commencing 
working with data and outlined the negative consequences of doing so.  In summary, 
he suggests that a pre-research literature review is ‘inimical to the generating of 
grounded theory’, and the primary purpose of not embarking on a review is to ‘keep 
the researcher as free and as open as possible to discovery and to emergence of 
concepts, problems and interpretations from the data’ (Glaser, 1998:67).   
 
Unsurprisingly, Glaser has been criticised (Mitchell and Cody, 1993, Morse, 2001) 
for his insistence that the researcher proceed without any preconceived theoretical 
assumptions while at the same time adopting theoretical sensitivity to enable theory 
generation.  Morse (2001), for example, suggests that it is an encouragement to 
ignore the work of others, and new grounded theories may not link to previous work 
rendering existing knowledge redundant. Mitchell and Cody suggest that ‘the actual 
role of theory is veiled in obscurity’ (1993:171).  The critiques are based on a literal 
reading of the original text which Glaser subsequently addressed and amplified in 
further publications (1978, 1992). There is also an assumption in the criticism that to 
disregard existing literature (albeit at the beginning of the research process) means 
disregarding what one already knows (as though this were possible).  This is not 
what Glaser advocates.  Glaser’s suggestions about how literature should be used can 
be seen as a contextually (and theoretically) situated response to the dominant 
(quantitative) methodological traditions of the day which Glaser and Strauss were 
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attempting to challenge: they were writing for a positivist audience (Noerager Stern, 
2009).    The originators of the method suggested that researchers could not approach 
data devoid of previous knowledge but that they brought with them their social 
psychology, professional interests, training and curiosities, which would provide 
useful insight into the analysis of data.  Glaser encouraged researchers to read widely 
around the substantive area under study to assist in the generation of hypotheses but 
urged caution about the ‘rich derailments’ (1992:31) offered in literature that 
contained assumptions about what should be found in the data.  The combination of 
openness to ‘what is actually happening’ (Glaser, 1978:3) and an awareness of the 
impact of pre-conceived ideas would therefore enable the researcher to be 
‘theoretically sensitive so that he can conceptualise and formulate a theory as it 
emerges from the data’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:46). ‘The reality of Grounded 
Theory research is always one of trying to achieve a practical middle ground 
between a theory-laden view of the world and an unfettered empiricism’ (Suddaby, 
2006:635). 
 
Emergence of Grounded Theory 
 
In The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967), the authors formalised a methodology for the systematic analysis 
of data in the service of theory generation. The theme of the book was ‘the discovery 
of theory from data systematically obtained from social research’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967:2), and the authors suggested that the development of theory from data ‘is a 
major task confronting sociology today’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:1).  Prior to the 
publication of Discovery there were few published accounts of how to embark on 
qualitative research and the primary way in which qualitative methodologies were 
taught were informal via oral transmission from teacher to student (McCann and 
Clarke, 2003).  During the 1960s, quantitative research methods became the 
dominant form of inquiry (Lillemor, 2006) emphasising theory testing and 
verification. Quantitative methodologies have traditionally been seen as an objective 
and value free way of researching and describing reality.  Frequently associated with 
enumerating and predicting outcomes, they are popularly associated with 
measurement, control of uncertainty and reliability in which the subjective nature of 
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experience is excluded due to an assumption that it is empirically unobservable 
(Johnson et al., 2006, Silverman, 2003).   Qualitative methodologies utilise non-
statistical data collection methods, and they have ‘forged some tentative linkages 
through a shared, yet often tacit, rejection of methodological monism’.  This, 
however, leaves qualitative methodologies open to being defined by what they are 
not (Johnson et al., 2006:132).  They are traditionally seen as a way of understanding 
social phenomena, meaning-making and the experiences of people in their own 
contexts.  Emphasis is placed on the role of the researcher as a contributor to and 
influencer of the subject being researched (Willig, 2001).  Glaser and Strauss 
challenged the prevailing thinking that qualitative methods were a form of ‘pilot’ 
research in the service of more appropriate and formal testing via quantitative 
methods. They also questioned the idea of a conflict between verifying and 
generating theory as two separate processes.  They contended that each was 
dependent on the other and could be undertaken in an holistic and informed way if 
researchers relinquished their attachment to verification as the ‘chief mandate for 
excellent research’.  The authors identified the dilemma for researchers as ‘a desire 
to generate theory and a trained need to verify it’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:2).  
 
Citing the use of qualitative data by theory generators in the 1930s as non-systematic 
and non-rigorous, Glaser and Strauss were equally critical of theories generated 
through qualitative methodologies.  This, they suggested, resulted in publications 
that were descriptive and devoid of any substantive theory.  ‘The effort was to “get 
the story straight” …the work …was either not theoretical enough or the theories 
were too “impressionistic”’ (1967:15).  Consequently the field was left open to 
quantitative researchers who could take qualitatively generated theory and develop, 
test and verify its results further.  Glaser and Strauss argued passionately that 
qualitative methods were a legitimate research approach in their own right and 
challenged the prevailing ideas of quantitative methodologies as the dominant and 
preferred method of inquiry.  Both approaches offered contrasting and useful data 
about a research subject, but not if qualitative methods were only used as a preview 
to more systematic approaches. The growth of qualitative methodologies from the 
1960s onwards aimed to ‘bridge the gap between theoretically ‘uninformed’ 
empirical research and empirically ‘uninformed’ theory by grounding theory in data’ 
(Goulding, 2002:41). Glaser and Strauss’s intention was to offer the sociology 
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researcher a qualitative method for generating empirical and informed theory, 
grounded in data, that had been generated in a systematic manner.  
 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research was based 
on an analysis of the research methodology employed by the two authors (both 
sociologists) into awareness contexts of dying patients in hospitals in San Francisco.  
The results of their research work were published in two volumes Awareness of 
Dying (1965) and Time for Dying (1968). Glaser also attributed the formulation of 
the methodology to the two academic traditions in which he and Strauss had trained 
(1992).  Strauss had attended University of Chicago, home of the ‘Chicago School of 
qualitative research’, which studied human life through fieldwork and participant 
observation.  He studied with Herbert Blumer and Everett Hughes in qualitative 
research and symbolic interactionism.  Symbolic interactionism is a theory of human 
behaviour and an approach to social inquiry in which the socialisation process is 
seen as the primary way in which meaning is made (Goulding, 2002). The researcher 
enters the world of the researched and interprets how people reflexively engage with 
the environment (as distinct from reacting or responding to it).  Symbolic 
interactionism leads one to ‘look at self and meaning as processes’ (Charmaz, 
1990:1161) and reality as a social construct defined by contextual and temporal 
dimensions.   
 
Glaser attended Columbia University, which had a strong tradition of formal 
theorising.  He was influenced by the work of Paul Lazerfield in qualitative maths 
and quantitative research methodology and by the work of Paul Merton in 
sociological theory development. Glaser subsequently studied literature at the 
University of Paris where he trained in ‘explication de texte’ – ‘reading closely line 
by line to ascertain what exactly the author is saying without imputing what was said, 
interpreting it or reifying its meaning’ (Glaser, 1998:24).  Although there are some 
writers who view Grounded Theory as having emerged exclusively from social 
interactionism (Annells, 1996, Goulding, 1998, 2002, Morse, 2001), the 
methodology emerged from the joining of two traditions as can be seen in some of 
the central tenants of the approach such as the interplay between collection and 
analysis of data; the systematic coding of data; the ‘naming of an emergent social 
pattern grounded in research data’ (Glaser, 2002a:4); and the meaning ascribed by 
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people to their experiences as the primary focus of the researcher’s attention (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).  
 
Grounded Theory differs from other qualitative methods in that it isn’t exclusively a 
qualitative method.  Rather, it is an adaptable method that can be utilised with any 
form of data as ‘[I]t transcends specific data collection methods’ (Glaser, 1978:6).  
Some have argued that focus groups, questionnaires and other forms of ‘snippet data’ 
are not as conducive to the Grounded Theory method as they contain few stories 
over a short and discontinuous period of time (Morse, 2001).  The preference 
expressed is for an extended engagement with research respondents so that stories 
can unfold over longer periods.  This gives the researcher a broader view of the 
subject under inquiry. Grounded Theory makes explicit the guidelines for data 
analysis.  This, according to Charmaz is in contrast to other methods which rely on 
implicit methods and the ‘researcher’s intuition and talent’ (1990:1163). 
Notwithstanding the fact that a researcher’s intuition, talent, analytical intellect and 
style are a critical and necessary component of the qualitative research process 
(Patton, 2002), Charmaz highlights the central contribution of Glaser and Strauss 
(and subsequent theorists who have critiqued and developed the method) to 
qualitative research as the creation of a systematised and learnable set of techniques 
with which to generate theory. Unlike other qualitative methods, Grounded Theory 
does not claim to present findings and the traditional distinctions between fact and 
interpretation are blurred through the process of conceptualisation. ‘The most 
important property of conceptualization for GT is that it is abstract of time, place and 
people’ (Glaser, 2002a:6). At the same time, the emergent theory has to be related to 
the context in which it was generated, particularly if what is being generated is a 
substantive theory.  
 
Elements of Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded Theory offers a systematic approach to theory development.  Its purpose is 
to offer a framework in which theory, grounded in the data, can emerge through the 
systematic analysis of that data by the researcher.  Glaser is quite specific about the 
steps involved in data analysis.  At the same time he advocated freedom in the 
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identification and selection of ‘data’ to be used.  The purpose of Grounded Theory is 
to adopt a rigorous approach to analysis in order to maintain theoretical control over 
what is emerging from the data (Glaser, 1998).  There are four processes at the heart 
of Grounded Theory: coding, constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling 
and memoing.  The purpose of these processes is to guide the researcher in the 
analysis of data towards the refinement of theory. In particular, they guide the 
researcher towards the inter-relationship between emergent concepts (Charmaz, 
2000). 
Coding 
 
Coding reveals the relationship between data and theory. The purpose of coding is to 
reveal the underlying pattern of behavior evident in research data.  Glaser identified 
two types of coding: substantive codes and theoretical codes (Glaser, 1978).  
Substantive (or open) codes ‘fracture’ the data, splitting it apart.  This type of coding 
assists in the generation of new ideas.  Substantive coding works towards the 
generation of categories and their properties.  Researchers are encouraged to use 
codes that emerge from the language and descriptions of respondents ‘in vivo’.  
Researchers are dissuaded from importing concepts from other theories as codes 
have to earn their way into the coding process. 
 
Theoretical codes describe the relationship between substantive codes and the 
emerging theory.  The purpose of theoretical coding is to ‘weave the fractured story 
from concepts back into an organized whole theory’ (Glaser, 1998:163).  In other 
words, substantive coding focuses on the small detail of respondents’ stories: coding 
and naming particular activity in its context.  Theoretical coding conceptualises the 
broader story of how those codes and those stories fit together to reveal a hidden 
pattern of relating.  From Glaser’s perspective, the important issue was that 
substantive and theoretical codes should emerge from an analysis of the data and not 
be superimposed from an external methodology.   His intention was to reveal what 
was important for respondents rather than any agenda a researcher might have14. 
                                                
14 Glaser was critical of Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 6Cs coding paradigm consisting of cause, 
context, contingencies, consequences, covariances and condition considering them as imposed on text 
rather than emerging from it. 
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The purpose of coding is to identify the core category which is the highest level of 
categorisation.  The core category has explanatory power in that it occurs frequently 
and accounts for most of the behaviour (and the variation in behaviour) in relation to 
the research subject.  The core category emerges from the data and can be traced 
back through the various levels of analysis.  Categories have properties which are 
descriptive elements of categories (Glaser, 1998). Like categories, properties emerge 
from an analysis of the data.   
Constant comparative analysis 
 
Constant comparative analysis begins as soon as the first data have been collected 
and analysed.  Each piece of data is coded and its properties noted.  As new data 
emerges the existing codes and properties are revisited, compared and contrasted.  
The purpose of constant comparative analysis is to highlight similarities and 
differences in meaning emerging from data analysis.  Constant comparative analysis 
challenges the researcher to consider fit and workability as ongoing features of the 
emerging theory.  As theory development progresses constant comparative analysis 
facilitates the researcher in asking a number of important questions, for example, 
whether saturation has been reached.  In other words, is new material emerging from 
research or is the researcher encountering recurring similar data?  Is this process of 
constant comparative analysis assisting the researcher in defining the core concept 
more clearly?  New and different stories may emerge but constant comparative 
analysis of categories and their properties assist the researcher in focusing the core 
concept to ensure that it has earned its way into the theory (Glaser, 1998).   
 
The primary function of constant comparative analysis is theory generation.  This 
distinguishes the process from other comparative processes in qualitative research in 
which theory-building is secondary to verification of results and extending or 
qualifying existing theories.  Comparative analysis within Grounded Theory is ‘not 
used just to prove something as fact but is used to identify the properties and 
indicators of a category and help theory reduction by delimiting the theory’s 
boundaries of applicability’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
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Theoretical sampling 
 
Theoretical sampling helps the researcher to consider where to go next in terms of 
theory-building.  Its purpose is to help the researcher develop the emerging theory by 
extending the boundaries of data collection.  By developing these boundaries, the 
categories and their properties are extended until such time as ‘saturation’ has been 
reached, i.e., until no new properties emerge. In the case of this study, theoretical 
sampling was used to extend the initial finding that disappointment was organised 
and understood as a personal phenomenon by focusing on the systemic manifestation 
of disappointment in one organisational context.  ‘Initial sampling ...is where you 
start, whereas theoretical sampling directs you where to go’ (Charmaz, 2006:100). 
Memoing 
 
Memos are the writing up of ideas as they occur to the researcher during the process 
of data analysis.  Their purpose is to capture emerging theory, conceptual ideas and 
insights as the analytical process unfolds.  Memos capture the researcher’s insights 
from the moment from which data analysis commences, and they facilitate the 
constant comparison of codes, properties and ideas which form the heart of grounded 
theorising.  Memos are also useful for identifying the increasing abstraction of ideas, 
assisting the researcher to move away from descriptive analysis to more abstract 
connections.   They are the connection between ‘data collection and writing drafts of 
papers’ (Charmaz, 2006:72).  These four techniques of coding, constant comparative 
analysis, theoretical sampling and memoing are deployed simultaneously as the 
researcher analyses data and creates conceptual links between individual stories in an 
effort to develop the emerging theory.  
 
Critiques of Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded Theory was developed as a third way, i.e., as a middle ground, if you will, 
between the various philosophical traditions. This, however, has not exempted 
Grounded Theory from criticism that it in fact inhabits one end of the philosophical 
spectrum.  The originators of Grounded Theory never explicitly outlined their 
ontological and epistemological positions, but each has been identified with different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions.  No overview of Grounded Theory is 
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complete without reference to the inevitable schism between the originators.   
Having developed a methodology, influenced by different theoretical trainings and 
through their collaboration as sociologists, Glaser and Strauss parted intellectual 
company over differences in their approach to using the methodology. For an 
overview of this incident see (Glaser, 1992, Melia, 1996, Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
Glaser has been accused of being objectivist in orientation (Annells, 1996, 1997, 
Charmaz, 2000, 2001, McCann and Clarke, 2003) on account of his insistence on the 
discovery of an external reality that can be observed and because he assumes that the 
emergence of the problem, the theory and the reality occurs without any intervention 
by the researcher (Annels, 1997) ‘like wondrous gifts waiting to be opened’ 
(Charmaz, 2000:522).  He has also been criticised for his suggestion that theory 
emerges from data (as though theory existed separate from the researcher whose role 
it is to curate data and conceptualise results) and the claim that entering the field of 
research with no preconceived ideas facilitates the emergence of the problem as the 
research project unfolds.  
 
Strauss and Corbin are associated with a social constructionist ontology in which 
there is more than one version of reality which can be interpreted in various ways 
(McCann and Clarke, 2003). Strauss and Corbin’s approach is also considered to be 
more subjective as the role of the researcher is made more explicit:  ‘The researcher 
and the researched cocreate, or develop, the research product, rather than it emerging 
from the data’ (Annels, 1997:124).  However, other critics have said that Glaser’s 
approach emphasises the ‘interpretative, contextual and emergent nature of theory 
development’ (Goulding, 1999:7).  This suggests an interplay between researcher 
and researched while ‘Strauss appeared to have become somewhat dogmatic 
regarding highly complex and systematic coding techniques’ (1999:7).  The 
suggestion here is the imposition of an external or objective process of engagement 
with data. Interestingly, both of the founders addressed the issue of positivism by 
maintaining that the discovery of theory was not the same as the discovery of reality.  
Glaser in particular is at pains to point out that positivist traditions of verification 
cannot be applied to Grounded Theory because the theory only applies to the context 
in which it is generated.  Any attempt to reproduce the research project will fail or 
will lead to the emergence of different theories.   
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Charmaz’s critiques have led her to develop an interpretivist version of Grounded 
Theory in which she stresses the ‘active stance and approach of the researcher’ 
(1990:1162).  Her criticism of ‘objectivist’ Grounded Theory is that both the 
researcher’s and respondents’ voices go unheard in a traditional reading of the 
methodology.  As such it assumes a realist ontology and an objectivist epistemology 
position.  Charmaz suggests that the original authors (in their collaboration and 
separately) write as distanced experts and engage in ‘silent authorship’ (2000:513).  
She argues for a more flexible reading of Grounded Theory in which analysis 
emerges from the interaction between the researcher and the data: ‘The grounded 
theorist’s analysis tells a story …the researcher composes the story (2000:522)’.  In 
this sense Charmaz wants to move constructivist Grounded Theory more into the 
realm of interpretivism and away from its perceived objectivist roots.  Charmaz also 
criticises Grounded Theory for the absence of respondents’ voices (2000, 2003). 
However, Grounded Theory does not claim to faithfully represent individuals’ 
stories.  Fragments of data may be used to support and substantiate theory but the 
method is concerned with conceptualisation of data at a higher level than any one 
story.   Data are coded and abstracted into themes.  It is through the analysis and 
constant conceptualisation of the emergent themes that a theory is developed.  For 
example, it is the organisation of ideas (and the subsequent further sampling of 
respondents on the basis of those themes) that is at the heart of developing a 
Grounded Theory (Glaser, 2001). Data and structure are interwoven keeping the 
psychosocial process discoverable (Morse, 2001).  This challenges the researcher to 
keep the link between both explicit so that the ‘process and its structure can be 
readily identified’ (Morse, 2001:4). While referring to Charmaz’s article as 
‘excellent’, Glaser responded to her criticisms by writing a paper addressing many of 
her points in turn (2002b).   
 
He argued that faithfully representing the researcher’s and respondents’ voices was 
not the point of Grounded Theory as this merely generated description as distinct 
from a higher-level conceptual analysis.  It was through the constant comparative 
method that this higher-level abstraction would emerge. Glaser also rejected 
Charmaz’s claims that the researcher composes the story ‘Again, absolutely NO, the 
GT researcher does not "compose" the "story." GT is not description, and the 
unfolding is emergent from the careful tedium of the constant comparative method 
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and theoretical sampling - fundamental GT procedures’ (2002b:3).  In relation to the 
issue of ‘reality’ (a contested concept in objectivist and constructionist circles), 
Glaser argued that ‘conceptual reality DOES EXIST. For example, client control is 
real; cautionary control is real; social structural covering is real. These processes and 
a myriad of others discovered in GT research, impinge on us every day’ (2002b:6).  
In this sense, Glaser was arguing less for an objective reality as understood by 
positivists than for an attention to patterns of behaviour which could be 
conceptualised as distinct from being described. 
Other directions: post-modern Grounded Theory 
 
MacDonald and Schreiber argue that Glaser and Strauss’s version of Grounded 
Theory belongs to the modernist tradition which is characterised by three features: a 
quest for respectability; a realist ontology; and a focus on the common (hu)man’ 
(2001:37). They contend that the world (and the modern intellectual landscape) has 
changed considerably since the method was developed and argue for a more 
contemporary version of Grounded Theory which they term ‘post-modern Grounded 
Theory’.  Postmodernism challenges the idea of ‘grand narratives’ and adopts a 
contested view of ‘reality’.  Ideological authorities are also contested leaving people 
confused as to how to make decisions about ‘good and bad, justice and injustice, in a 
world without signposts’ (MacDonald and Schreiber, 2001:39).  The authors posit 
the questions: is Grounded Theory a ‘canon that represents an enshrined truth?’ or ‘is 
it evolving?’ (2001:50).  The authors suggest that Grounded Theory needs to be 
more relevant and engage with the concerns of postmodernism.  They identify some 
of their concerns: the conservative nature of the method; the attachment to ‘jargon’ 
which increasingly defines the Grounded Theory method rather than describes it; the 
absence of ‘difference’ as the higher levels of abstraction are reached in developing a 
theory; and the attachment to the status quo, i.e., an emphasis on researching ‘what 
is’.   
Grounded Theory and situational analysis 
 
Clarke advocates for ‘pushing Grounded Theory more fully around the post-modern 
turn’ (2005:2).  She suggests that Grounded Theory is already a post-modernist 
methodology but has identified a number of gaps which, if addressed, could more 
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fully include post-modern concerns.  Her critique of Grounded Theory15 includes its 
absence of reflexivity.  There is a ‘historical pretence that the researcher can/should 
be invisible’(2005:12).  She queries how it is possible to be present as researcher 
without falling into the trap of acting out of biases.  Like other writers (MacDonald 
and Schreiber, 2001), she is concerned that the notion of ‘difference’ is not 
sufficiently addressed in the methodology and wonders ‘who/what is omitted’ either 
overtly or covertly.  Clarke is critical of the oversimplification of grounded theories 
which she attributes to a desire for ‘coherence and commonalities’ (2005:15).  She 
also suggests that there is a search for objectivity and purity on the part of some 
positivist grounded theorists who believe this to be both achievable and desirable.  
She advocates complicating theories and presenting the complexity of the material 
including the anxieties of working with data.  Omission of these issues makes it 
difficult to push Grounded Theory fully around the final post-modernist turn.  Clarke 
advocates for a ‘symbolic interactionist Grounded Theory/situational analysis 
theory/methods package’ (Clarke, 2009:197) where the broader social context in 
which the research takes place replaces inquiry into social process. Clarke outlines 
six strategies for accomplishing that task including: (1) acknowledging the 
situatedness of all knowledge and knowledge producers; (2) using the situation as 
the research site; (3) embracing complexity and difference; (4) focusing on analysis 
rather than formal theory; (5) doing situational analyses throughout the research 
process; and (6) using an understanding of discourses to amplify the research 
(2009:19).  Situational analysis brings in the wider political and cultural discussion 
that surrounds the research site rather than focusing on geographical or physical 
boundaries.  Relationships between the various parts of the situation/site form the 
basis of the analysis of data and assist in selecting which stories to focus on.   
Grounded Theory doesn’t explicitly exclude reflexivity, nor does it exclude any of 
Clarke’s suggestions (see above). In fact, one of the reasons I opted for this 
methodology was the freedom it offered to include researcher reflexivity and the role 
of researcher as part of the data collection process.  Perhaps what Clarke is referring 
to is the absence of a ‘rule’ that researcher reflexivity should be included in the 
methodology.  If this is the case then the argument is for a more constricted or ‘rule-
                                                
15 Clarke was a student of Strauss and her development of Grounded Theory builds on Strauss’s 
version of the method. 
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bound’ form of Grounded Theory rather than the flexibility and openness Glaser’s 
method seems to afford. 
 
Philosophical and methodological contexts for this study 
 
The choice of a philosophical position is not about deciding on a label that ‘best suits 
us’, but rather about exploring the question of how one wishes to ‘live the life of a 
social inquirer’ (Schwandt, 2003:320). The philosophical position adopted for this 
research is an interpretive one.  The ontological position is that of relativism, the 
epistemological position that of subjectivism. I subscribe to the view that meaning is 
made not found and the process of understanding that meaning-making process as 
experienced by research participants and between them and me is the nature of this 
inquiry.  However, I also subscribe to the view that there are ‘external’ constructs to 
which it is possible to subscribe. For example I subscribe to the following: (1) the 
existence of an unconscious; (2) the idea that organisations (in so far as they can be 
said to ‘exist’) are emotional arenas; and (3) that disappointment is a tangible 
phenomenon.  I have set about researching the above in this study, and where I differ 
from previous researchers into disappointment is in how meaning is made of that 
phenomenon.   
 
My ontological position therefore is that reality can only be partly known because it 
is always evolving at a conscious and unconscious level.  I believe that the meaning 
is socially constructed (Campbell, 2000) at an individual and group level as well as 
at a conscious and unconscious level. Meaning will differ depending on the 
circumstances in which the phenomenon is experienced. A psychodynamic 
perspective would argue that individuals perform tasks on behalf of the wider system 
and we are always ‘trading in assumptions’ about what is real and what is not. 
(Phillips, 2007).  At the same time, as researcher, my empathic understanding shapes 
my emergent view: my epistemological position is therefore influenced by 
subjectivism and, as such, I am contributing to the creation of reality in this study 
and am a respondent rather than an objective or ‘outside’ researcher.  The 
implications for the research design are that my role as researcher must be a 
reflective and reflexive one. I must remain aware of how I contribute to and 
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influence the evolution of the research process and how, in turn it contributes to and 
influences my role as researcher.  The implications for the selection of a 
methodology congruent with an interpretative stance are also significant.   
 
As discussed above, an interpretative position attends to the processes of 
understanding as well as those of meaning-making. A methodology that can 
accommodate a degree of uncertainty, discovery, researcher reflection and a creative 
interpretation of what constitutes data is congruent with the philosophical position 
adopted.  The choice of a methodology to research the organisation of 
disappointment is Grounded Theory, in particular the version associated with Glaser 
(1965).  That choice was based on a consideration of a number of factors. 
 
This study commenced with an attempt to understand the organisation of 
disappointment. To that extent, the project began with a series of curiosities rather 
than a set of hypotheses to be tested.  In other words, ‘the attribution or eliciting of 
meaning [was] the core of the work’ (Anderson, 2006:329).  Grounded Theory is a 
useful methodology when there is no hypothesis to be tested and when the subject of 
study is under-researched.   
  
I was aware that as a psychodynamically informed researcher, I would not 
necessarily accept experience at face value.  I am interested in unconscious processes 
and what goes on beneath the surface.  Grounded Theory’s purpose of attending to 
latent patterns of behaviour seemed congruent with that position.   Both processes 
are curious about organising principles which may obscure (and protect) patterns of 
behaviour.  Both processes see value in complexity and eschew simple answers.  
Keeping multiple perspectives open while adopting a curiosity about the meaning of 
that complexity once again, seemed congruent with an inquiry into an under-
researched area. Glaser suggests that the researcher must use himself as a research 
instrument to understand and be sensitive to the emergent data (Glaser, 1992). I 
interpreted this to mean that my experience as a psychotherapist and consultant 
influenced by psychodynamic theory could sit comfortably with this methodology 
i.e., that by adopting a reflective and reflexive position I could productively use my 
experience to be sensitive to the emerging theory.  
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The focus of psychodynamic inquiry is the nature of the relationship between 
therapist and client (or researcher and respondent) and the meaning-making 
processes arising from that interaction.  I was curious to explore countertransference 
as a data source. By countertransference I mean the researcher’s resonance with 
experience of which their respondent may be unaware.  The process of interpreting 
data requires researchers to bring their own experiences to bear (Lee, 1999).  In this 
sense, countertransference alerts us to how we are each used in relationships to 
perform tasks on behalf of others.  The dictum ‘all is data’ (Glaser, 2001:145) 
seemed to offer the context in which this type of material could be accommodated 
into the research process.   
 
Finally, Grounded Theory also offered a methodology for working with complex 
layers of data through coding, constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling 
and memoing. Aligned with the creative interpretation of ‘data’, this structure made 
the methodology attractive.  An assumption underpinning Grounded Theory is that 
‘social phenomena are complex’ (Lee, 1999:45).  The Grounded Theory approach 
facilitated bringing the ‘general features’ of disappointment in organisations into 
sharper focus in order to be clearer about the development of the research. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out the philosophical underpinnings of my study and, in particular, 
the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices influencing it.  The 
history and evolution of Grounded Theory was explored including critiques of it and 
new developments.  I also outlined those elements of Glaser’s approach to Grounded 
Theory which are utilised in this study. Finally, I outlined the rationale for the choice 
of Grounded Theory as the appropriate methodology for my study of disappointment.  
The next chapter will discuss how the methodology was put into practice in the 
service of theory generation. 
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5 Doing Grounded Theory 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an account of how Grounded Theory was operationalised. In other 
words, it accounts for how I ‘did’ Grounded Theory.   The chapter begins with the 
rationale for selecting Grounded Theory as methodology and a reiteration of the aim 
of the research process.  I then outline how the methodology was operationalised 
including, the selection of respondents, the interview process (including contracting, 
recording, transcribing) and purposive and theoretical sampling. Ethical 
considerations generated by the study are addressed and I clarify choices I made in 
relation to working with research respondents and their stories.  Finally, I give an 
account of how the data were analysed using memos (literary and visual), software, 
substantive and theoretical coding, theoretical saturation and the constant 
comparative method.   
 
This study began with my interest in disappointment as it manifests in work settings. 
My professional experience as a consultant and psychotherapist had led me to be 
curious about the unconscious and psychodynamic understandings of the 
phenomenon in practice.  I also became interested in the absence of stories of the 
lived experiences of disappointment in existing management literature.  I therefore 
approached the research study with curiosity and interest rather than a question or 
hypothesis to be tested.  This fits with Glaser’s position that a Grounded Theory 
study should begin with a researcher’s interest in an area of study which in turn, 
forms the basis of inquiry and which leads to an understanding of the main concern 
of respondents (Glaser, 1998). Grounded Theory was chosen as the methodology for 
the study because it is a useful process if there is a research focus on meaning-
making as distinct from theory testing (Suddaby, 2006).  Grounded Theory is also 
congruent with the ‘psychodynamic lens’ I wished to bring to the research.  Both 
approaches recognise that experience cannot be accepted at face value and that there 
is much going on beneath the surface of which we remain unaware.  Grounded 
Theory can ‘give a voice’ to individuals and feeling states that have hitherto been 
ignored, overlooked or silenced’ (Mazhindu, 2007:102). In particular, it recognises 
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the ‘latent pattern’ (Glaser, 1998:117) of behaviour that is not always immediately 
recognisable.   One of the purposes of Grounded Theory is to make that latent 
pattern visible by attending to experience as understood by research respondents 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The methodology therefore allows for ‘the generation of 
theories of process, sequence, and change pertaining to organizations, positions, and 
social interaction’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:114).  
 
Grounded Theory is a complex methodology and does not lend itself to easy 
explication.  Research literature presents the methodology as unfolding in logical 
sequential steps.  This differs significantly from the experience of actually applying 
the method in practice.  For ease of reference and to capture the complexity of its 
stages, I present the following as a diagrammatic representation of the main phases 
of the methodology and how they relate when ‘doing’ Grounded Theory. 
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Diagram 2 The Grounded Theory process 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from (Hoda et al., 2011) 
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Generating the idea 
 
Reframing is part of my toolkit as a consultant and psychotherapist.  Over the past 
ten years I have assisted individuals and groups in re-thinking and reimagining their 
relationship with reality and fantasy.  A major component of my practice has been 
working with emotion and how it manifests organisationally in behaviour such as 
anger, sadness, absenteeism and bullying.  Consulting at the boundary between 
reason and feeling has left many unanswered questions and unresolved dilemmas.  
One of those dilemmas concerns socially excluded feelings and the myriad ways in 
which they are modified into more accepted emotional behaviour.   My consulting 
and psychotherapeutic relationships returned frequently to the subject of 
disappointment, though they were never languaged as such.  Disappointment 
hovered around the edges of more pressing concerns and became visible only when 
modified into something else.  I became good at helping clients reframe 
disappointment, colluding with my clients’ stories that disappointment itself was less 
important than more pressing issues.  Stories of disappointment in my consulting 
practice invariably involved personal narratives and deeply experienced losses while 
those in my therapeutic practice generated emotive examples of work and 
organisational politics.  Disappointment crossed personal and professional 
boundaries and brought work and emotion into alignment in each professional 
setting.  An example may help illustrate these points. 
 
A consulting client had spent some time discussing an upcoming promotion 
opportunity in his company.  The client felt very prepared for the interview and was 
confident that he would be considered a credible candidate for the post.  He had 
worked in the company for twenty years and, the promotion would be to a very 
senior level in the organisation.  It represented not only recognition of his experience 
but also a validation of his sense of self-worth as an accomplished professional.  The 
client was not awarded the promotion.  His emotional response was one of anger 
directed mainly towards what he described as a ‘flawed interview process’ and ‘a 
biased chairperson who refused to recognise my experience and did not allow me to 
demonstrate that in the interview’.  Our work together focused on his anger and our 
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assumption that this emotion could potentially impact negatively on him if not 
contained appropriately.  In this sense I colluded with the organisational assumption 
that emotion, left uncontrolled, could be disruptive (in this case there is some truth to 
that assumption).  But perhaps more importantly, I missed the opportunity to work 
with this client around his disappointment and all that it represented, e.g., sense of 
achievement, self-worth, visibility in the organisation, an organisation ideal that 
valued his experience, the ideal of who he thought he would be personally and 
professionally at this stage in his working life.  Our work together focused on 
helping him manage his anger so that he could go back to the organisation and ‘get 
on’ with being a ‘good’ organisational citizen.  The client viewed our coaching 
sessions as having been ‘successful’, yet I was left with a lingering feeling that I had 
done something ‘wrong’ or vaguely unethical.  On the surface, the client appeared to 
he ‘happy’ with the outcome of our work.  Underneath the surface, there was on-
going anxiety that the emotional fallout from his disappointment could potentially 
threaten his existing position in the company and that it should therefore be ‘covered 
up’.  Shortly after our work together, the client terminated the contract which, on 
reflection, I interpreted as an enactment of his disappointment in me and our work 
together.  The presenting issue had been addressed but the underlying issue had 
merely been reorganised.  I was left feeling disappointed in myself, in the client and 
in my professionalism, which I am sure mirrored the client’s feelings about himself, 
our work together and his experience of the promotion process. 
 
The subject of disappointment and my collusive attempts with clients to ‘remedy’ or 
transform it into something more useful seemed to take up considerable energy.  I 
was also aware that I wasn’t very good at helping clients manage their ‘transformed’ 
feelings (anger, shame, frustration).  Reframing got us out of a particular ‘stuckness’ 
but I recognised that unconsciously I was avoiding a particular set of feelings evoked 
in me by my clients’ stories. There was clearly something more going on here than 
an attempt to help individual clients in both work and personal settings.  The energy 
directed towards the understanding and management of disappointment as well as 
my increasing sense of failing my clients prompted some reflection in personal 
therapy and supervision.    The results of that work facilitated different kinds of 
engagements with clients yet I couldn’t put my finger on the difference.  All I knew 
was that disappointment had been very present in my working relationships and very 
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absent through our attempts to transform it into something more acceptable.  In 
considering topics for further research I recognised a desire to explore this on-going 
and obvious theme from my consultancy practice.  
 
The importance of disappointment 
 
The historical study of emotion in the workplace suggests an emphasis on 
organisational effectiveness as the primary site of investigation. The amelioration of 
negative impacts on the bottom line is a core task of management.  From this 
perspective, disappointment has little to contribute to organisational growth and 
learning. Yet, as this study demonstrates, disappointment is a common experience.  
Considerable resources are expended in managing the fantasy of its potential impact 
(destruction) out of organisational systems.  Positivity has become the focus of 
managerial attention and those who fail to live up to its expectations are considered 
disappointing corporate citizens.  This emphasis on positivity is not only 
organisational; it is institutional, political and cultural.  Two examples may help to 
illustrate this point.  In his 2009 inaugural speech, American President Barack 
Obama proclaimed his vision for the United States: 
 
Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions, who 
suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their 
memories are short, for they have forgotten what this country has 
already done, what free men and women can achieve when 
imagination is joined to common purpose and necessity to courage. 
What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted 
beneath them, that the stale political arguments that have consumed 
us for so long, no longer apply. (Obama, 20 January 2009) 
 
Two years prior to this as the property market in Ireland hovered on the verge of the 
biggest downturn the country has ever witnessed, Irish Taoiseach16 Bertie Ahern 
delivered a speech to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions in which:  
 
                                                
16 Ireland’s Prime Minister 
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He said he didn't understand why people sitting on the sidelines, 
moaning and cribbing about the economy did not commit suicide. 
(BBC, 2007, RTE, 2007) 
 
The collapse of Lehman brothers in 2008 catapulted the world into a global recession.   
European countries (most notably Ireland) have suffered severe economic hardship, 
austerity budgets, rising unemployment, bankruptcies and industry closures.  Major 
organisational structures in which the public has had faith (capitalism, the European 
Union, the Catholic church, political parties) are now the subjects of rage and anger.  
The dominant discussion in international media is one of blame and shame.  Yet 
politicians, corporate leaders and management theorists continue to emphasise 
positivity, and some (see above) are willing to vilify publicly those who dare to 
question its validity.   Positions 1 and 2 of disappointment (Clancy et al., In Press) 
have emerged as organising strategies for confusion and a myriad emotions that 
people are unsure how to manage.  There has never been a more prescient time in 
which to think and talk about the systemic manifestation of disappointment.  In 
particular, a movement into position 3 may offer some way of processing the loss of 
idealisation that these past four years have magnified. 
 
The study of disappointment matters for three reasons.  First, disappointment alerts 
us to what we really value.  Mission and vision statements declaim a version of 
reality that is imaginary, and it is only when we test that fantasy against reality that 
we are confronted with our hopes, expectations and fantasies.  Disappointment 
points to the differences between what we say we want (or who we say we are) and 
what we truly desire. In this sense, disappointment is a useful and productive 
indicator of what organisation members value and what really matters.  
 
Second, disappointment is a ‘middle way’ between reality and fantasy, reason and 
feeling, positivity and negativity.  It facilitates the integration of these polarities and, 
as a result, contests the fantasy of the ‘all-satisfying’ or ‘all-disappointing’ object.  If 
we relinquish our attachment to the fantasy of perfection, we can also relinquish our 
attachment to its opposite, destruction.  
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Third, disappointment can alert us to the nature of ‘stuckness’ in organisations.  
Organised as failure (of self or other), disappointment reinforces attachment to 
limiting roles.  If disappointment is an unwanted feeling and, as this study shows, is 
organised as a personal phenomenon, this will inevitably reinforce the concept of 
individual failure within systems.  Disappointment’s potential is in helping us 
understand and potentially transform the dynamics of blame and blame cultures.   
 
These three areas suggest a different way of engaging with the subject of emotion in 
organisations: one in which emotion is viewed as systemic intelligence and as an 
ordinary component of human systems (in and out of work settings) and, perhaps 
more importantly, as neither positive nor negative. Disappointment matters because 
it highlights the political life of organisations.  It alerts us to the cultural rules and 
roles and the inconsistencies between what should happen and what does.   It is for 
these reasons that the study of disappointment matters. 
 
Aim of the study 
 
Beginning a research project in the absence of a research question or hypothesis is 
challenging and, at the same time, liberating.  At the outset of the project it seemed 
that everybody I met had a story about disappointment.  The most frequent response 
I received when talking about my intention to research this subject was ‘oh… I could 
tell you a few stories about disappointment!’  One colleague captured this prevalence 
by suggesting that ‘all great literature is about disappointment’.  Disappointment 
was ubiquitous.  I had clearly stumbled upon a topic of some interest but was then 
faced with the challenge of designing a research process in the face of such ubiquity.   
Glaser’s suggestion that the researcher’s area of interest should be guided by the 
main concerns of the respondents threatened to overwhelm me before the process 
had begun.   At the same time, the absence of extensive literature on the subject 
combined with the obvious interest from those with whom I discussed the topic with 
presented an opportunity to ask broad and open-ended questions. The study had as a 
general aim the development of a substantive theory of disappointment in 
organisations.  In order to frame the inquiry, I developed three broad areas of interest 
which formed the basis of the initial interviews with respondents.  I set out: first, to 
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gather respondents’ stories of disappointment in work settings; second, to understand 
how respondents make meaning of their experiences of disappointment in work 
settings; and third to understand the significance (if any) of disappointment in 
organisations. 
 
Recruitment and sampling 
 
On the basis of my working assumption that disappointment was a common 
phenomenon, I used my professional and personal contacts to purposively sample 
(Cutliffe, 2000) potential respondents. Purposive sampling consists of choosing 
respondents who the researcher believes can make a contribution to the study.  
 
The process of data generation unfolded in three phases.  Phase one focused on an 
analysis of data from a purposively sampled group of twelve respondents from a 
variety of organisational settings.  The purpose of this phase was to inquire into how 
people experienced disappointment in work settings and to draw conclusions from 
those interviews leading to questions for further research.  I interviewed seven men 
and five women aged between thirty-seven and sixty; representing employed and 
self-employed, in for-profit and not-for-profit organisations and public sector work 
environments. A list of the twelve respondents is outlined in Appendix 1.   
 
Phase two consisted of theoretical sampling on the basis of emergent categories and 
their properties.  For example, it became clear through the initial coding process that 
interviewing respondents with responsibility for large organisational systems or 
groups would be a useful perspective.  I also concluded that interviewing 
professional commentators or writers who might have a broader view of the cultural 
role of disappointment would add to the emergent theory. The purpose of adding 
these perspectives was to highlight differences and develop links between individual 
and systemic perspectives on disappointment and to expand on the properties of the 
emergent categories.  The additional data was generated though an analysis of the 
emergent theory thereby ‘earning their way’ into the theory (Glaser, 2001:33).  A 
further fourteen respondents between the ages of twenty-four and fifty-five were 
interviewed. Interviewing concluded when there was sufficient repetition of 
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incidents to ‘indicate the same concept’ (Glaser, 1998:141).  A list of the fourteen 
respondents is outlined in Appendix 2. 
 
The first two phases of research had focused on individuals’ experiences of 
disappointment and had led to the generation of a hypothesis. Disappointment was 
organised as a personal phenomenon so as to manage organisational anxiety.  This 
anxiety related to paradoxical feelings about failure.  On the one hand organisation 
members had to cope with strong feelings of ‘personal’ failure (as represented by 
disappointment) while, at the same time, maintaining a positive outlook about the 
organisation. 
 
At this point in the study I wanted to explore this hypothesis in a focused 
organisational setting.  Generating data on disappointment was not difficult.  
Respondents were generous about sharing their personal and professional stories 
with me.  However my broad-based approach to the generation of data now needed 
to be narrowed so that I could explore my hypothesis.  I wanted to obtain a clearer 
perspective on the actual mechanics of how disappointment unfolded in an 
organisational setting.  This next phase of research generated its own dilemmas.  
Would one organisation suffice? Why not two? Or three?  How could (or would) I 
compare data emerging in one organisation with another? How would my theory 
stand up to scrutiny if it only related to one company and the experience of its 
organisation members?  Was my data set disappointing? I realised I was wrestling 
with the fantasy that a more generous sample size would generate more and better 
data which would result in a better theory and a more robust audit trail.  I also 
realised that I was splitting off the data which had been generated through interviews, 
reflection and supervision as a form of preliminary process that would now need to 
‘stand up’ in an organisational context. I had fallen into the precise trap the Glaser 
was attempting to address in creating Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
Qualitative research is not a warm-up act for a more robust interrogation of 
hypothesis via quantitative analysis.  I needed to rethink my approach to this next 
phase as a continuation not a repetition of data collection and analysis.  I wasn’t 
starting again in a new context but was furthering the exploration of my hypothesis 
and theoretically sampling on the basis of categories in a focused and contained 
environment.  Once I reconceptualised the research process in this way, I was able to 
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see the data set as the totality of data collection measures and as being ‘good 
enough’.  I will, however, return to this issue of being ‘good enough’ in my review 
of the study in chapter 10. 
 
Using personal and professional contacts once again, I secured agreement from the 
principals of a start-up company to follow their development over a two-year period.  
One of the principals had been a respondent in phase one of the research and had 
expressed an interest in how the findings could be applied to his organisational 
setting, a new social care organisation.  When approached to participate in phase 
three, he and the second principal agreed to give me full access to the day-to-day 
operation of the company.   
 
The three phases of the study afforded an opportunity to extend and develop the 
initial categories and their properties, generate hypotheses and theoretically sample 
on the basis of the emergent theory.  Data were also collected from researcher 
reflection throughout all stages of the project (this will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter). The following section describes the data collection methods 
and the process of analysis undertaken to generate the theory.  
 
Data collection methods 
 
Many of the respondents in phase one and two were personally known to me.  I was 
aware that their previous knowledge of me might make the invitation more 
interesting, bias their contributions and increase the likelihood of a favourable 
response. I was also aware that I might unconsciously choose people that would 
respond in a compliant way with my preformed perceptions about the topic. In 
choosing a site for a case study, it was clear that the owner’s experience of me in the 
first phase of research was an influencing factor in his desire to participate.  In our 
contracting conversations, we explored the advantages and disadvantages of all the 
above factors and how they might impact both on a conscious and unconscious level 
for all parties.  
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At a personal level, I addressed these issues through the various reflective processes 
I established, and I continued to do so as the research project evolved.   On a more 
formal level, I chose to address the issues of informed consent, confidentiality and 
consequences (Kvale, 1996) in writing and used the conversations before and during 
the initial part of the interviews and meetings to establish the boundaries around the 
context for the conversations. 
 
All of those asked to participate in the study accepted the invitation.  As part of the 
invitation (extended by phone and via email), to participate each respondent was 
given an information sheet outlining the nature of my research which also indicated 
how I would manage the data from our interviews (see Appendices 3 and 4).  I also 
forwarded consent forms (see Appendix 5) giving respondents the opportunity to 
reflect on anything they wished to clarify.  I made myself available to speak with 
respondents in advance of our meeting and took time at the beginning of the 
interview to re-visit the context of the research, clarify any outstanding questions and 
to contract for our conversation. 
 
Exercising an ethical imagination 
 
In philosophy ethics are associated with moral concerns and, particularly, how 
human actions are determined to be right or wrong.  In research settings, ethics relate 
to the use of humans as research respondents and, in particular, the obligations of 
researchers towards those who participate in such studies.  Redwood and Todres 
(2006) distinguish between two types of ethics, procedural and process.  The former 
is associated with the formalities surrounding research such as gaining approval, 
assessing the ethical implications of research, identifying potential problems and 
generating potential solutions.  In broad terms, procedural ethics assume that issues 
are tangible, can be consciously identified prior to embarking on research and are 
universally understood.  Process ethics, on the other hand, assume that ethical 
concerns cannot always be known and will emerge throughout the research process.  
Therefore ethical decision-making will be an on-going process requiring researcher 
reflection and reflexivity.   Process ethics present a challenge for researchers in that 
issues are unpredictable which, in turn challenges the idea of informed consent 
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(Parahoo, 1997, Polit et al., 2001).   If ethical issues cannot be determined in 
advance how can research respondents consent to involvement? 
 
I was not required to obtain formal ethical approval for this study from the 
University.  I was aware, however, that any study that seeks to generate knowledge 
by inquiring into personal stories would generate ethical issues.  I would therefore 
need to give consideration to how I understood this arena and how I would engage 
with those ethical issues as they arose. I have outlined in the previous section the 
processes I engaged in to obtain ‘informed consent’ from research respondents17.  I 
also allowed time before, during and after interviews to review the process and to 
invite respondents to reflect on their experience.  In this way, I attempted to reflect 
on procedure and process as my engagement with respondents unfolded.  However, 
as Redwood and Todres observe, ‘as soon as people start sharing their lives, one 
does not always know …what the full implications of that are’ (2006).  My approach 
to the subject of ethics was to see it as an emergent concept. Process ethics were an 
appropriate fit with the emergent nature of the study design and the principles of 
Grounded Theory.  In practice, this meant engaging in conversation with respondents 
about their experience of participation in the research process.  I gained formal 
consent to begin with, but I proceeded on the basis that continuous negotiation 
would form a central part of the research relationship.  In this sense I was engaged in 
‘process consent’, a more fluid model of negotiation that is congruent with the 
emergent nature of qualitative research (Munhall, 1991:260).  In summary I was, as 
Redwood and Todres describe, charged with engaging my ‘ethical imagination’ 
(2006) by responding to ethical dilemmas as they presented themselves throughout 
the research project. 
 
  
                                                
17 The issue of ‘informed’ consent implies that both parties are consciously aware of what each is 
consenting to.  A psychodynamic perspective offers an alternative view: that each is consenting to 
their fantasy of what the process entails.  This view assumes that disappointment will be an inevitable 
part of the process. 
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Interview as research method 
 
As a consultant and psychotherapist, conversation is the main way in which I get to 
know my clients and the primary way in which we create meaning together. As a 
researcher, interviewing seemed to be an obvious method to use in the generation of 
data. However, the interview process continued to throw up methodological and 
ethical issues, which I needed to consider and reflect upon as the study unfolded.  
 
The initial enthusiasm and interest from friends and colleagues about my research 
subject belied the strong feelings underneath the surface of the many stories 
recounted.  It was clear from the outset that disappointment was experienced as a 
very personal issue.  Respondents’ stories were complex, dramatic and emotional. 
On two occasions, respondents became distressed and apologised for being ‘too 
emotional’.  I was attentive to signs of distress and asked respondents what they 
needed in the particular circumstances.  Both wished to continue with the interview, 
and both commented afterwards on how ‘cathartic’ the discussion had been for them.   
These experiences led me to reflect on the powerful emotions at the heart of the 
subject of my study.  As the interviews progressed, the context rather than the 
content of the interviews became more prominent in my mind.  I attended to the 
emotional ‘tone’ of the discussions as well as to the stories being recounted. 
 
This awareness of the impact of talking about disappointment caused me to reflect 
on my position as researcher. I was challenged to consider that I might be 
transgressing a boundary between therapy and research.  In this sense, I had an 
idealised version of research in my mind, which was ‘not’ therapy and an idealised 
version of therapy, which was ‘not’ research.  This splitting served to help manage 
my anxiety that I might transgress a boundary and destroy the research project.  
Working through this distinction helped me move to a different researcher position.  
I was able to value therapeutic listening as a useful research tool without the anxiety 
associated with breaking the rules18.  
 
                                                
18 In retrospect, this was not too different from my theory, and it probably contributed to my thinking. 
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In psychoanalytic therapy the interview constitutes the primary intervention. For 
Freud, it was ‘a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost 
inaccessible in any other way’ (Freud, 1955c:235).  There are many elements of the 
psychoanalytic encounter that mirror the qualitative research interview (Kvale, 2003).  
For example, the combination of the patient’s free association, the therapist’s 
attention and the time boundary combine to create an environment in which the 
patient’s perspective unfolds.  From a Grounded Theory perspective as in the 
psychoanalytic encounter, it is the respondent who is the main focus of attention.  It 
is their story and the meaning they make of their experiences that frames the 
intervention.  Psychoanalysis is predicated on the relationship between two 
individuals in which the emotional lives of each are important research tools.  
Grounded Theory allows for the creative use of research data including the 
emotional response of the researcher.  This countertransference, as previously 
highlighted, can be an important source of unconsciously held information about the 
subject of research.   A distinction between the roles of researcher and 
psychotherapist was highlighted at times when I felt I wanted to interpret what the 
respondent was saying.  The psychoanalytic technique of interpretation is relevant in 
a therapeutic setting or perhaps, when one has received an invitation to consult. But 
in the interview setting, it was misplaced. Instead of interpreting what the respondent 
was saying, I focused on my instinct to interpret.  In this way, I captured the data 
contained in my own experience without infringing on the respondent’s story.  This 
awareness usefully indicated that I was brushing up against the boundary between 
psychotherapist and researcher.  It was important also to differentiate between a 
desire to interpret what I felt a respondent might be saying ‘in the moment’ 
(therapeutic position) and my epistemological position of interpretivism (researcher 
position) as related to the research project.   
 
Mindful of Kvale’s distinction between therapy and research that ‘the main goal in 
therapy is change in the patient; in research it is the acquisition of knowledge’ 
(1996:155), and the insight it afforded into the idealised researcher/idealised 
therapist, I was able to inhabit a middle position seeing these as ‘ethically important 
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moments’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004:265)19.  I resolved these dilemmas by 
naming the dilemma, inquiring into what the respondent might need if they were 
feeling ‘too emotional’ and seeking permission to inquire into ‘personal’ stories that 
were offered as part of the conversation. In this way the various roles I occupied 
were allowed space to coexist, and I involved the respondents in the inquiry as 
authorities on their own needs and experiences.  
 
I concluded each interview by inviting the respondents to reflect on the experience of 
the interview.  This proved to be a powerful intervention in many instances. Several 
respondents expressed surprise that the experience had been so emotional for them.  
Expressions such as ‘I had no idea I felt so deeply about that’ and ‘talking this 
through has helped me make a connection with why I was so affected by that incident’ 
were commonplace.  The interviews acted as a reflective and reflexive process for 
some respondents.  One of them described the interview process as follows:  
 
I’ll take this back to work… this insight I’ve gained from talking…. 
about the importance of disappointment and how we don’t talk 
enough about it in the office…I’m wondering now what might 
happen if I started to say something…anything at all…it might break 
a silence? (Respondent 5) 
 
In phase three of the research, the reflective and reflexive process was more obvious 
in that the principals and organisation members in STL (the company in which phase 
three was undertaken) actively engaged me in conversation about the subject of 
study.  A number of ‘sit down’ interviews were scheduled but a considerable body of 
discussion took place during the day-to-day work of the company during which I 
was present.  In the case of the core disappointment (described in chapter 8 
Reimagining the future), the principals actively engaged me as a ‘trusted other’ with 
whom to process their experiences of disappointment.  This led to a change in the 
emotional tone of the organisation whereby disappointment and loss were articulated 
publicly for the first time.  
                                                
19  This ‘middle position’ equated with position 3 of the organisation of disappointment and 
contributed to my thinking about the emotional tone and quality of that position. 
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A further ethical dilemma presented itself at the outset of discussions with the 
principals of STL.  Both were willing to have their names and that of the company 
disclosed in the research and any published material.  I was curious about what this 
type of disclosure meant for the principals and, in turn, how it would impact on the 
research project.  My fantasy was that it represented the idealisation of a successful 
venture on the part of Adam and Paul.  Disclosure would also mean visibility, 
publicity and association with an academic institution.  I further fantasised that they 
were making an unconscious statement about my involvement with their company, 
i.e., my research would be useful and not disappointing.  Adam and Paul’s rationale 
was that they were pleased and interested to be involved with my research and could 
see no negative impact on revealing their identities and that of the company. My 
response to Adam and Paul’s interest in disclosing their identities was one of caution.  
Emotionally I felt under pressure to be a ‘good’ researcher and to deliver a satisfying 
piece of research (or at least a story about STL that would be perceived as a ‘success 
story’).  I also felt an obligation to think through a variety of scenarios in which 
disclosure of identities could be problematic.  For example, company employees 
might not wish their involvement with STL to be disclosed, competitors might gain 
insight to internal operations that might prove problematic in the future, or the 
company might fail in its endeavour and be publicly shamed or humiliated.  I also 
wondered how comfortable organisation members would be telling their stories of 
disappointment if there was any doubt regarding disclosure of identity.  For all these 
reasons, I exercised my ethical imagination.  I declined the invitation to join with 
STL’s fantasy of success or my own of being a disappointing researcher and made a 
decision to discuss the organisation and its members pseudonymously.  
 
There is a therapeutic benefit to telling one’s story to a trusted other (Kvale, 1996, 
Murray, 2003).  The act of storytelling becomes a meaning-making act in which new 
understanding and insight is generated. The Hawthorne interviews, for example, 
demonstrated that management’s interest in workers had a positive effect on workers’ 
morale.  The follow-up study demonstrated that the social relationships between the 
interviewers and respondents, in particular the quality of listening, had an impact on 
what the workers wanted to say (Kvale, 2003, Mayo, 1931, Roethlisberger et al., 
1946).  In other words, the context in which conversation takes place impacts 
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directly on the content.  The value of speaking about disappointment became a 
recurring theme as the research project unfolded.  This contributed to an 
understanding of the politics of emotion in organisations that determine which 
emotions are perceived to be of value and which are not.  It also emphasised the 
‘silence’ around the subject of disappointment in management literature. 
 
Interview guides and transcripts 
 
As part of my preparation for interviewing, I created an interview guide consisting of 
some general questions about disappointment at work (see beginning of this chapter 
and Appendix 6).  I realised shortly after creating the guide that it reflected the 
organisation of my interests and might pre-determine the way in which respondents 
would tell their stories.  It might also suggest to them that these questions were, in 
fact, the only ones of relevance.  After two interviews and on reflection, I dispensed 
with the guide. Following Glaser’s advice that Grounded Theory inquiry must reflect 
the concerns of the respondents I simply asked a broad opening question such as 
‘please tell me about your experiences (if any) of disappointment at work’.  Rather 
than force the data to emerge (Glaser, 1992), I trusted respondents to tell their stories 
which they did in great detail.  
 
In phases one and two respondents were interviewed individually (with the exception 
of two people) at a location convenient for each. Each interview, lasting 
approximately sixty minutes, was recorded.  In total there were over thirty hours of 
recorded data.  In phase three a series of formal interviews was undertaken (ten 
hours), and I spent a total of one hundred hours in the organisation.  This time was 
spent shadowing and observing the staff as they went about their daily work, 
conducting small group interviews, observing management and board meetings and 
conducting individual interviews.  In the final months of my time with STL and 
during the significant incident described in chapter 8, I facilitated a series of three 
directors’ meetings. 
 
I made a decision at the outset of the research process to transcribe all formal 
recorded interviews. Glaser’s advice is to take field notes rather than transcribe.  He 
 134 
cautions against generating an excess of data that may not assist in theory generation 
(Glaser, 1998).  For Glaser, data collection and analysis occur simultaneously 
followed in quick succession by theoretical sampling.  The purpose of theoretical 
sampling is to ‘delimit’ the data by focusing on recurring patterns and categories.  
Glaser believes that detailed session notes following interviews give sufficient 
information for analysis to begin.  This position has been challenged by some 
Grounded Theory researchers.  Morse (2001), for example, questions how 
researchers can make use of direct quotes if transcribing has not occurred.  This of 
course revisits the on-going debate about the use of respondents’ words in a 
Grounded Theory study.  As far as Glaser is concerned, direct quotes are only useful 
if they demonstrate a general principle.  The purpose of Grounded Theory is not to 
give a voice to individual stories but to conceptualise from those stories a general 
theory (for additional information on this debate, see the previous chapter on 
methodology).   
 
From my perspective, I wanted to have a range of data which recording would 
provide including the transcripts of the interviews (respondents’ words as well as my 
own), an audio record of the tone and emotional quality of the engagement between 
researcher and respondent as well as documentary data to revisit during theoretical 
sampling. Contemporaneous notes were kept during interviews to capture basic 
biographical data on respondents such as age, gender, career to date and current role.  
I also used these notes to document the non-verbal and sub-textural content of 
conversations.   The notes were then used to write up a memo following each 
interview: for an example see Appendix 7.  The process of recording and 
transcribing interviews generated a huge amount of data and took considerable time. 
I became very familiar with the tone and content of material through the process of 
listening to and transcribing interviews. Each time I revisited transcripts and audio 
files, I did so in a new way, and I was able to hear new material and encounter 
myself as listener in a different way. It is questionable however, how much this 
process of visiting and revisiting data actually helped in progressing theory 
development.  I felt overwhelmed by detail at times and was mindful of Glaser’s 
suggestion that detail might be a substitute for a false sense of security but I was also 
mindful of the need to create an audit trail.  How had I progressed from a story told 
by a respondent several years ago to a core concern and emergent theory? Once 
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again, in hindsight, my need to record and transcribe was an attempt to manage my 
fear of being a disappointing or disappointed researcher (I might ‘miss something’) 
as much as it was an attempt to capture the stories of respondents.   
 
Transcription presented another dilemma in relation to the ‘voices’ of respondents.  
The use of respondents’ actual words is a contested issue in Grounded Theory (see 
previous chapter on methodology) and in qualitative research in general.  Silverman 
(2003) highlights the issue of ‘anecdotalism’ in which respondents’ words are used 
to substantiate researchers’ claims of validity.  This presupposes the objective 
existence of ‘validity’ and raises questions about fit with ontological and 
epistemological positioning.  (I will address this issue in more detail in chapter 10 in 
Review of the study).  Glaser’s view is that quotations should be used to illustrate 
theoretical concepts, not offered as evidence of them (Glaser, 2003). However, 
returning to a point made above, I felt it was important that the theoretical concepts 
and the emergent theory would ‘make sense’ to those who participated in the study. 
As the conceptualisations developed and extended, I revisited interview data to 
compare and contrast the emerging theory.  The simple question I asked myself 
during that process was ‘could I recognise the emergent theory in the stories told by 
respondents?’.  As the theory developed the answer was mainly ‘yes’ but, in some 
cases, the answer was ‘no’ or ‘kind of’.  This prompted a revision of the emergent 
theory and a further process of constant comparison across data.  
 
Interviews were one source of data used in the generation of the theory.  Reflective 
processes were another significant source of material. 
 
Reflection and reflexivity 
 
The topic and methodology generated confusion and surprise from the outset.  It 
appeared that everyone I spoke to had a story about disappointment. I had also 
encountered the phenomenon in my therapy and consulting practice.  
Disappointment appeared to be personal and professional, and I was confused and 
concerned about transgressing the boundary between research and therapy (as 
though each were discrete and unrelated entities).  A rational approach to problem 
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solving was not going to be sufficient to address the issues this project generated.  I 
needed to create some reflective spaces in order to capture the conscious and 
unconscious processes, the seemingly important and the irrelevant, at work in my 
approach to the task (Vince and Reynolds, 2010). 
 
I have always had particular types of reflective spaces, for example supervision for 
my therapy practice or role consultation for my consultancy work.  These reflective 
spaces have been psychodynamic in orientation, and a key element of those 
processes has been reflection on feelings and countertransference as useful 
information about my clients.  However, a characteristic of those spaces has been the 
boundary between my roles as therapist on the one hand and consultant on the other 
and the separate ways in which I have reflected on my practice.  My therapy 
supervisor has worked with me around individual client issues, and consultants have 
worked with me on individual and group work based issues.  
 
I was aware that I wanted to do something more than reflect, which I understand to 
be an ‘after the fact’ consideration of events, or a ‘thinking about’ something (Finlay, 
2003:108). I wanted to be a reflexive interviewer which meant using my self-
awareness in the ‘here and now’ as a source of data.   Reflection and reflexivity are 
already embedded within psychoanalysis as research tools, primarily through the 
concepts of transference and countertransference. Freud established the importance 
of transference and its centrality as both research method and theory in practice 
(Breuer and Freud, 2000b).  Transference and countertransference are also 
considered to be important epistemological tools during the psychoanalytic process 
of infant observation (Rustin, 1989).  Researchers such as Hollway and Jefferson 
(2000) and Hunt (1989) incorporate psychoanalytic concepts of reflexivity into the 
collection and analysis of data.  One way in which I attended to the reflexive 
elements of the research process was by observing parallel process. 
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Parallel process 
 
Parallel process refers to the way in which we use projected feelings as information 
about unconscious processes at play in related activity. For example, I have felt 
anxious about being a ‘disappointing’ student wondering if my supervisor was 
disappointed in my output. I was very aware of how this echoed the stories told by 
research respondents. I used parallel processes as data to reflect more thoroughly on 
the issues emerging from the study. I also realised that I wanted a more formal 
conversational space in which to reflect psychodynamically on the research.  I 
wasn’t sure if that was supervision or a therapeutic space. However, I did not want to 
set up a competing or split-off supervision process that would undermine my 
academic supervision.  I recognised that if I had an alternative supervisory process, 
there was a possibility that one space could hold the idealised and emotional 
elements and the other the disappointing and rational elements (or any other 
variation) thereby avoiding the possibility of engaging with both in one relationship.  
Nevertheless, I did feel the absence of a more regular conversational space in which 
to make sense of my conscious and unconscious engagement with the process of 
research and the emergent data.  I asked a therapist to work with me for three 
sessions to identify what it was I needed.  The therapist, student, client, researcher 
and consultant parts of me had a voice, and the therapist I worked with was creative 
in finding a way for all of the competing pieces of me to co-exist.  I decided at the 
end of these three sessions to enter into weekly therapy on an on-going basis.  
 
A core part of the therapeutic work has therefore been my own relationship with 
idealisation and disappointment. I have asked myself the same questions as my 
research respondents, explored unconscious processes at work in the generation of 
the data, explored my countertransference and reflected on a higher level what being 
involved in a PhD process means.  I therefore made a conscious choice to make 
myself a research respondent and became ‘unafraid to draw on… [my]… own 
experiences when analyzing materials’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:5).   
 
Cunliffe suggests that ‘reflection is… associated with assumptions of a rational and 
reasoning being with an inner consciousness, making logical sense of an outside 
world.’ Reflection is also viewed as a ‘cognitive or intellectual activity in which 
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critical reflection should be objective, logical and rational’ (2009:412).   My 
experience of reflection has not been logical, linear or objective.  I have drawn on 
dreams, feelings, irrational behaviour, my family of origin story, conversations with 
colleagues, research respondents, friends, my supervisor and a myriad ‘illogical’ 
strands of information woven together as material from which to learn about the 
topic of research.  For example, the three positions of disappointment emerged as 
part of a dream. In this sense, I was engaged in ‘preconscious processing’ of data 
(Glaser, 1998:50).  This material illuminated the data and has given me a first-hand 
experience of the depth and range of feeling associated with disappointment.  
Without this reflective process, I might have accepted at face value the stories told 
by respondents that disappointment is not dramatic enough to be attended to.  I 
captured the relevant learning from this process in a series of memos; an early 
example is attached at Appendix 8. 
 
Data analysis tools 
 
Memos  
 
I created memos from the outset of the research process.  Initially I thought there 
might be a ‘right’ way of creating these records.  There were useful suggestions in 
the literature as to how to approach the process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) but I 
ultimately decided to incorporate Glaser’s suggestion to eschew formal structure and 
adopt a free-flowing approach (Glaser, 1998).  I used memos at various levels of 
sophistication.  At times I simply wrote up an idea that emerged ‘out of nowhere’ 
and occasionally, I captured dream fragments upon waking.  I wrote up my 
emotional responses to interviews and my reflective spaces.  Ultimately, I used 
memos as a meaning-making process rather than a purely documentary space.  The 
types of memos I created included formal written memos and visual diagrams. 
 
Mind maps and word clouds  
 
The detail of the coding process very often precluded my attempts to see the ‘bigger 
picture’.  I realised that the linear process of writing memos was useful in terms of 
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capturing discrete ideas, but I needed a method of linking these in a way that would 
facilitate the emergent theory.  I began to use mind maps20 at an early stage of the 
study to organise themes from interviews and to visualise individual categories and 
their properties.  I then linked individual mind maps together to generate a visual 
image of the whole process. An example of an early mind map is attached in 
Appendix 9. 
 
I used a combination of tools including mind mapping software (Mindjet, 2010), 
flowcharts and a large whiteboard on which I captured ideas manually using markers 
and post-its.  I also used word clouds (Wordle, 2010) to get an instant sense of the 
relationship between the descriptive terms which respondents were using in their 
stories of disappointment.  A word cloud is a visual depiction of a text in which the 
size of the word corresponds to the number of times it is used.  I created the 
following illustration from interview transcripts and memos and, in combination 
with other tools, found it a helpful method for elevating my thinking beyond the 
descriptive. 
 
Diagram 3 Word cloud representation of interview data and memos
 
  
                                                
20 Mind maps are a visual representation of ideas.  A central idea is placed in the centre of a page, and 
related concepts are linked to the centre by branches.  Colour, single words and images are 
encouraged as a method of brainstorming and gathering the ‘whole system’ in one single image.  
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Software 
 
I used MAXQDA, a qualitative software package to code the data emerging from the 
first phase of the study.  I realised quickly that its linear format was useful for 
capturing discrete pieces of data such as a print-out of all respondents’ quotations 
relating to a particular code.  However, I used the programme to generate a series of 
labels rather than conceptual codes (see following section) and ended up with a 
massive amount of raw data simply reorganised around unhelpful categorisations. 
My experience of the software was that it reduced rather than enhanced my capacity 
to engage with the material.  The quantitative aspect of the software interfered or 
blurred the qualitative nature of the research, which presented a potential conflict.  
Following the first phase of research, I decided to revert to more primitive methods 
(highlighter, pen and scissors) and to use the programme as a storage and retrieval 
system for discrete quotations or references. 
 
Generating the Grounded Theory 
 
Coding 
 
The process of ‘doing’ Grounded Theory is frequently presented in literature as a 
logical and linear process. One proceeds from open coding via constant comparison 
to the generation of a theory in an almost seamless manner.  This did not equate with 
my own experience of doing Grounded Theory.  I frequently found the process 
messy, circular, blocking and frustrating.  There were times when I wanted to 
abandon the methodology altogether and try a new approach.  Memos generated 
during this time are replete with references to frustration, disappointment, anger and 
stuckness as I tried to organise the data and my relationship to it.  The following 
extract from an early memo on ‘organising’ gives a flavour of the process. 
 
Memo: Organising 
I’m attempting to organise the data by coding for all possible interpretations of 
disappointment.  So far I have coded two transcripts and have amassed nearly 100 
codes.  At this stage, I can’t see any connection between these codes, and I can feel a 
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rising anxiety (no, not anxiety, fear) about how I am going to organise this data into 
something coherent.  I don’t know what it is I am trying to organise…. 
 
At the same time there is something about the whole concept of organising that is 
coming across very clearly in the data.  Respondents are attempting to organise 
unwanted and disowned feelings, they are organising their thoughts in order to 
present them to me (on more than one occasion a respondent has asked if he had the 
‘correct’ understanding of disappointment so as to be a ‘good’ respondent). I am 
unsure about what data is contained in all of this but the struggle to organise, the 
confusion about what is being organised and the gap between feeling chaotic (a 
private experience) and wanting to appear coherent (public experience) all feel 
important. 
 
The initial coding process, developed from the coding principles of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) and informed by psychodynamic theory, was based on interview 
transcripts, researcher notes, memos and reflections.  Initially, I used an open coding 
strategy in order to generate a detailed map of ideas emerging from the data.   The 
purpose of coding is to generate a pattern of behaviour or activity.  This requires 
constant comparison between data sources.  I commenced the open coding process 
with three transcripts by coding for all possible interpretations of the data.  Very 
quickly I had amassed 153 codes which I realised would rapidly grow to an 
unmanageable number:  see Appendix 10 for a list of these codes. The codes I had 
generated did not help me understand the pattern of behaviour, because I had 
focused on each individual code in relation to its source material.  I had not 
constantly compared the code across data fields.  As a result, the code in transcript 1 
bore little resemblance to the same code in transcript 2.  Instead of creating useful 
codes that would help in the conceptualisation of data, I had created a shopping list 
of labels which were useful within their own specific context but of little use when 
considered outside of that context.  
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Returning to Glaser for advice I adopted his strategy of coding using three questions: 
 
1. What category does this incident indicate? 
2. What property of a category does this incident indicate? 
3. What is the main concern of the participants? (Glaser, 1998:140) 
 
Glaser’s questions allowed me to revisit the existing codes and, by theoretically 
coding, reorganise them into dynamic descriptions rather than labels.   
 
The following provides an example of the development of a category from initial 
‘labelling’ to more dynamic descriptions in the revised codes:   
 
Oh I rationalised it perfectly and before I rationalised it I would have 
gone around kicking the chair... really pissed off… I would have 
worked myself into a frenzy saying ‘they hate me’ (Adam) 
 
In this segment, Adam is referring to an interview process he underwent to secure a 
consulting assignment.  He was not successful, and the data describes his response to 
receiving the disappointing news.  My original codes for this data were: rationalising, 
anger, self-worth and internal dialogue.  Although descriptive of the emotional 
content of the data segment, these codes were only useful in the context of this 
particular quotation.  They were not helpful in elevating theory-building beyond the 
descriptive.   Likewise with this data fragment: 
 
I think that there is a whole other level of disappointment in terms of 
the way organisations deal with people…we set levels of impossible 
attainment (Respondent 7) 
 
My initial codes for this data were pressure, systemic, fantasy.  Once again, these 
codes tell me something about what was going on in this data fragment but did not 
help me theorise beyond this story.  
 
I realised as I worked with interview transcripts that I had amassed useful codes but 
unhelpful categories. I then set about comparing data segments with others in which 
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respondents described their emotional experiences of disappointing episodes.    In 
comparing and contrasting data and the codes I had assigned them, I realised that I 
needed to observe the pattern of behavior that these codes described.  In the first data 
fragment, my revised code was ‘managing the experience of disappointment’ and in 
the second ‘internalising expectations’. I continued this process of taking single 
descriptive words, coding for an activity and comparing and contrasting with other 
data.  These revised codes were then reorganised into a higher conceptual category 
‘living out the projection of the other’ which subsequently became a property of ‘I 
am disappointing’.  This process of developing a code into the higher concept of 
category is summarised using three data samples in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Development of a category 
Interview data Initial substantive 
(open) code/label 
Revised substantive 
(open) code 
Category 
Oh I rationalised it 
perfectly and before I 
rationalised it I would 
have gone around 
kicking the chair 
….really pissed off… I 
would have worked 
myself into a frenzy 
saying ‘they hate me’ 
 
Rationalising 
Anger 
Self-worth 
Internal dialogue 
Managing the 
experience of 
disappointment 
 
I think that there is a 
whole other level of 
disappointment in terms 
of the way organisations 
deal with people…we 
set levels of impossible 
attainment 
 
Pressure 
Systemic 
Fantasy 
 
Internalising 
expectations 
 
 
 
Living out the 
projection of the 
other 
I think anger is almost 
like a psychic response 
to being hurt or 
disappointed.  It’s a way 
of trying to defend the 
psyche from the feelings 
that occur…if you feel 
overwhelmed with the 
sense of being 
disappointed or being 
hurt or being 
abandoned 
Hurt 
Abandonment 
Sadness 
Loss 
Defence 
 
Recognising the 
damage done in 
relationship 
 
 
 
This reorganisation of the initial codes helped in the subsequent analysis of 
transcripts.  For example, instead of coding for each separate individual feeling in 
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the data, I used the conceptual category of ‘emotional aspects of disappointment’.  
Similarly, the following codes/labels humiliation, anti-climax, rage, rejection and 
avoidance were reconceptualised as properties of ‘living with the rejection of my 
projection’ which subsequently became a property of ‘I am disappointed’.  In this 
way, the original labels were reconceptualised at a higher level of abstraction and, at 
the same time, I generated the properties of categories which I had developed 
inductively.  
 
However, I was still faced with a number of unrelated concepts: what had 
‘recognising the damage done in relationship’ to do with ‘managing the experience 
of disappointment?’  At this early stage in the coding process, I was embedded in the 
detail of data and could not pull back enough to see how these concepts connected to 
my inquiry.  This was all very interesting material, but I frequently returned to the 
question, ‘yes, but so what?’  Glaser identifies the absence of an organising model as 
the reason for this type of confusion.  At this stage in the process no structure exists 
to make sense of codes, concepts, data and their relation to emerging theory (Glaser, 
1998).  Glaser cautions against forcing a structure on the data as a solution to the 
confusion and anxiety that the process generates. 
 
From an emotional perspective, I found this aspect of the process profoundly 
frustrating.  I experienced the research project as ‘in bits’ and falling apart around 
me.  I didn’t welcome the constant anxiety and ambivalence that this process 
engendered. On more than one occasion, I considered throwing the methodology out 
and even terminating the project entirely.  I became both paranoid and schizoid in 
relation to the task I had set out to accomplish.  On the one hand, I wanted to trust 
the methodology; on the other, I couldn’t tolerate the feelings it evoked in me.  I 
assumed I was stupid and unable to understand how the methodology ‘should’ work.  
I became profoundly disappointed in the methodology, in my capacity as a 
researcher and in the task I had embarked upon.  I did not find it helpful to know that 
this was an expected part of the process and that I should have expected to feel 
‘stupid, young, out of control and like one doesn’t know anything’ (Glaser, 1998:50).  
Grounded Theory was beginning to feel like a bad lifestyle choice as one sleepless 
night followed another and my stress levels climbed.  In my fantasy life, I imagined 
a methodology that would ease me into the process of theory development and in 
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which categories would appear as if by magic.  This is where examining the parallel 
process assisted in shifting my thinking.  The language I had used to describe both 
my ‘stuckness’ and my sense of incompetence was mirrored in the language used by 
respondents to describe their experiences of disappointment ‘at work’. Playing with 
my experience as researcher freed me from the tyranny of detail in which I had 
embedded myself and helped me move to a higher level of abstraction in relation to 
the data.  For example, my experience of frustration, shame, blame, sadness, loss and 
ambivalence characterised the emotional elements of the three positions of 
disappointment, and I was able to use this insight at a later stage as the theory 
emerged.    
 
Another issue that presented itself during this phase of analysis was what to include 
and what to leave out.  As previously discussed, there was no shortage of stories 
about disappointment and, in fact, there were times when I felt somewhat 
overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of respondents, friends, colleagues and clients to 
share their experiences with me.  As I worked with the disappointing open codes and 
reconceptualised them as more useful substantive codes and properties, I began to 
see the range of experiences described as ‘disappointment’ by respondents.  Each 
individual’s story of disappointment was experienced as personal.  I could find 
nothing in the data to suggest why one experience (for example the disappointment 
at not securing a promotion) was considered overwhelming by one respondent and 
not by another.  If the experience of disappointment was purely personal, how could 
I conceptualise a theory that would transcend individual experience? This issue 
(which I eventually called ‘hierarchies of disappointment’) was the subject of many 
memos throughout the analysis phase.  Hierarchies of disappointment subsequently 
became an important property of the category ‘reimagining the future’ which is 
described in detail in chapter 8. 
 
Excerpts from two memos are included here.  The first is from an early stage in the 
analysis: the second is a maturer memo when my thinking was more fully developed.   
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Memo: Organising stories of disappointment 
I am in danger of being overwhelmed by the number and variety of stories of 
disappointment and am at a loss as to how to evaluate which stories are important to 
my research.  If every story is of importance to the respondent, how can value be 
attributed? It is as though each story was of personal value and any attempt to 
determine otherwise implied a personal judgement?  There appear to be various 
dynamics at play, which I will need to attend to in more detail. 
 
1. Why are stories of disappointment personal? 
2. Stories of disappointment range from the insignificant to the overwhelming 
(and I am aware that I am making a judgement in this analysis)… however, 
there is something important about the range of stories that masks my 
attempt to organise them into coherent ‘categories’.  If disappointment is so 
common an experience, why is it hidden from organisational view? 
3. Why are similar stories (such as the failure to win a contract or to secure a 
promotion) experienced so differently by different people?  
4. What work is being done by individuals in keeping these stories so personal?  
My fantasy is that we are not allowed to talk about the ‘personal’ at work. 
Therefore, something organisational is being ‘hidden’ from view by being 
located within the personal realm. 
 
I am aware that the language I am using to try to work out this dilemma is littered 
with ‘inverted commas’ as though I am in a contested and politically correct arena… 
what is that about? Disappointment is confusing – everywhere, yet nowhere… 
 
Memo: Hierarchies of disappointment 
It is clear that there are hierarchies of disappointment.  At its most basic level, 
disappointment represents the requirement to modify existing ways of doing things.  
The daily life of an organisation can be conceptualised as the process of adapting to 
this change.  Recovery from manageable loss is a core component of organising and 
a central feature of management literature. I term these manageable losses ordinary 
disappointments.  They present no damage to organisational effectiveness and, as 
well as being absorbed into day-to-day organising, are frequently addressed through 
interventions such as executive consultation or various strategising processes.  
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Workers, like managers, vary in their personal susceptibility to daily disappointment. 
For managers, inability to tolerate and adapt to daily disappointment may result in 
the potential for ‘derailment’ with referral to executive coaching.  To the degree that 
such daily disappointments frustrate the worker, they either get metabolised by the 
individual (for example, taken home) or added to the growing pile of small 
frustrations that can’t be dealt with effectively in daily life.  At another level, there 
are disappointments that challenge the existence of the organisation and which 
cannot be metabolised by organisation members. I term this the core disappointment.  
The core disappointment represents the potential destruction of the organisation and, 
from a psychodynamic perspective, a significant fear against which the organisation 
is defended.21 
 
By reflecting on the dilemma of how to organise the data, I was able to articulate a 
rationale for the choices I made.  There were three elements at play in each choice I 
made about including or excluding a category.  At a very simple level I asked: does 
this category make sense of the data? I then applied a psychodynamic lens and 
asked: what ‘work’ is this category performing and how does it illuminate or mask 
the core concern and the core category? Thirdly how does my emotional engagement 
with the process of data analysis inform the choices I am making? I attempted at 
each stage of the process to draw on all data sources and to reflect on how the data 
and process influenced the decisions I made as researcher.  
 
The core category and the core concern 
 
The purpose of theoretical coding is to arrive at a core category which is the 
organising principle of the theory.  The core category has explanatory power in that 
it accounts for the relationship between all other categories (Glaser, 1978, 1992), and 
it must also account for how respondents resolve their core concern.  Again there is a 
debate in the literature regarding the ‘core category’.  Charmaz suggests that some 
subjects may not conform to a single core category (2006);  Glaser in response, 
argues that it is possible to develop more than one theory from the same body of data 
                                                
21 This memo formed the basis of a substantial section of chapter 8. 
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(Glaser, 1978).  Either way, a Grounded Theory requires an organising principle 
which orientates the reader towards its theoretical relevance. 
 
The title of this study ‘The Organisation of Disappointment’, emerged at a relatively 
early stage in the research process but the organisation of disappointment did not 
emerge as a core category until much later in the process.  In fact, the core category 
was in front of me for a considerable period of time until I recognised it as the 
central organising dynamic in the data.  The main challenge was to identify the core 
concern of participants.  It was clear from an early stage of data analysis that 
disappointment was being organised.  At a personal level the organising processes 
employed were revealed through the constant comparative analysis of data.  
However it was more challenging to articulate ‘why’ respondents engaged in this 
practice and how this personal organisation related to the systemic manifestation of 
the dynamic.  For every ‘why?’ question, there were myriad answers, and attempting 
to get to the core concern proved even more challenging than the initial coding 
process.  I experimented with a number of core concerns each of which did fit to 
some degree with the experience of respondents, but I abandoned each in quick 
succession when they failed to fit across the data. I realised that I had become stuck 
in the detail of respondents’ replies.  I was looking for answers in their individual 
statements rather than abstracting from those statements.  Once I realised that I had 
to get out of the ‘personal’ and into the ‘systemic’, my thinking shifted22.  My 
eventual articulation of the core concern of the respondents was ‘maintaining 
stability and protecting the future’. 
 
Memo: Core concern – Maintaining stability and protecting the future 
Maintaining stability and protecting the future are recurring themes and concerns 
across the data.  Respondents engage in a variety of processes to ensure that the 
organisation ideal is maintained and protected.  The dismissal of disappointment as 
‘personal’ and of no great organisational significance belies, at an unconscious 
level, the fear that disappointment is potentially very disruptive.  If respondents were 
                                                
22 Once again, my experience of being stuck in the ‘personal’ mirrored the disappointment dynamic 
presented by respondents.  Disappointment is organised as a personal phenomenon as a way of 
protecting the organisational system from its perceived disruptive potential. 
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to allow their disappointment free reign, the organisational culture of positivity and 
‘being the best’ would be seriously contested.  This fear of suggesting that ‘the 
emperor wears no clothes’ presents a number of challenges for organisation 
members.  They must recognise the inevitable presence of disappointment by 
ignoring it.  This paradoxical activity requires a sophisticated organising strategy 
that is undertaken by individuals on behalf of the wider organisation system.  The 
fantasy being maintained is that individuals must manage disappointment ‘out’ of 
the system in order for the system to survive. 
 
The identification of the core category and the core concern did not merely ‘emerge’ 
from data.  It  resulted from a process of constant comparison in which I applied a 
psychodynamic lens to the emerging categories and theory.  I also used mind maps, 
memos, personal therapy and reflective spaces to process and analyse the conscious 
and unconscious dynamics at play in my engagement with data.  As previously 
discussed, these reflective spaces facilitated a deeper engagement with data as the 
study evolved.  
 
The core category ‘the organisation of disappointment’ fits with Glaser’s criteria in 
that it constantly occurred across the data, has explanatory power and integrates all 
of the categories in the theory (Glaser, 1998).  
 
Theoretical coding 
 
Substantive codes emerge directly from an analysis of the data.  Theoretical coding 
is the process by which theoretical links are made between substantive codes.  The 
purpose of theoretical coding is to generate a series of hypotheses that integrate the 
theory (Glaser, 2005).  Once the core category of ‘the organisation of 
disappointment’ emerged, I was able to see the relationship between the other 
categories.  For example I hypothesised that disappointment is organised by locating 
it within individuals and extruding it as ‘an unwanted feeling’.  One of the 
mechanisms by which this process occurs is through ‘the appointment of blame’.   I 
also hypothesised about the various levels and types of disappointment as not all 
disappointments were experienced in the same way, yet the experience appeared to 
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be common in organisations.  Were some disappointments more important than 
others?  This led me to reconceptualise disappointments as either ‘ordinary’ or ‘core’, 
which helped to illustrate the third category ‘reimagining the future’.  In this way, 
the links between categories and the core concern became more coherent and 
contributed to the theory-building process. 
Theoretical saturation 
 
Theoretical saturation is reached when no new data emerges to expand the properties 
of a category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  The purpose of saturation is not to 
generate complete coverage of an area, nor does it indicate that the researcher knows 
all there is to know about a category.  Rather, saturation implies that new data 
generates the same concepts as those identified previously.  It is worth pointing out 
that new descriptions will always emerge as data is revisited and explored in 
different ways.  The important aspect of saturation is that these new descriptions do 
not alter in any meaningful way the categories that have been generated.  An 
example may help to illustrate this point further.   
 
The data yielded rich descriptions of disappointment.  In particular, the emotional 
content of those descriptions created a vivid picture of how disappointment was 
experienced at a personal and systemic level by respondents (for example, ‘feeling 
let down’, ‘being unsuccessful’, ‘sadness’, ‘the afterness of sadness’).  These 
descriptions were eventually conceptualised as properties of the categories ‘I am 
disappointing’, ‘I am disappointed’ and ‘I disappoint’ which, in turn, were absorbed 
into the core category, ‘the organisation of disappointment’.  I continued to collect 
many empirical examples of the emotional content of disappointment, but when 
analysed these examples were all indicators of the same categories.  For example, in 
phase two of the research, I interviewed a journalist about the cultural context of 
disappointment.  I wanted to explore the systemic manifestation of disappointment 
outside the boundary of the organisation.  The conversation was wide-ranging and 
touched at one point on the Irish emigration experience and how those who left (and 
stayed) must have grappled with the experience of disappointment in a country that 
could not sustain its people.  My subsequent analysis and coding of this interview 
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generated new examples and stories of disappointment but, ultimately, these codes 
did not substantially alter the core concern and core category.  
 
An example of how a code such as ‘sadness’ progressed from being a ‘label’ to a 
property of the core category is illustrated in the following table.  ‘Sadness’ emerged 
at an early stage of coding as a common emotional aspect of disappointment.  The 
code was revised on several occasions through the process of theoretical sampling 
and memoing.  This constant code revision contributed to the saturation of the 
category ‘I disappoint’. 
 
Table 2 Code revision and saturation 
 
Code 
 
 
Initial 
definition 
 
 
Revised definition  
 
 
Property 
of 
category 
 
Property of 
core category 
 
Sadness 
 
 
Part of the 
emotional 
response to 
the absence 
of expected 
positive 
outcome 
Sadness at the loss of an 
ideal either organisational 
or personal.  Sadness and 
loss emerge after blame 
and shame (splitting and 
organising processes) and 
are related to a processing 
of disappointment rather 
than a rejection of it. 
 
 
 
 
I 
disappoint 
 
 
 
 
The 
organisation of 
disappointment 
 
 
I ceased data collection after completing forty hours of recorded interviews and 
having spent one hundred hours with one organisation.  My decision to stop 
collecting data was taken when: (a) I was confident that I had a comprehensive 
understanding of the categories and their properties; and (b) there were no new data 
emerging from the research process that caused me to modify the existing categories.  
In keeping with my epistemological position, I was also confident that, had I asked 
different questions or returned to talk with respondents, I would have generated 
alternative and equally valuable data. Theoretical saturation can only be considered 
in the context of evolving and provisional knowing (Cutliffe and McKenna, 2002). 
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Therefore ‘saturation’ can be considered a guide for researchers that enough data has 
been collected in relation to a particular category rather than a signal that an entire 
area has been comprehensively covered.  From Glaser’s perspective a Grounded 
Theory is always modifiable and ‘as good as far as it goes… there is always more 
data to keep correcting the categories with more relevant properties’ (Glaser, 
2001:145).  The Grounded Theory with its categories and properties is summarised 
in Appendix 11. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter described how Glaser’s method was put into practice in the ‘doing’ of 
Grounded Theory.  I outlined the practical steps taken to operationalise the 
methodology including the selection of participants and tools used to analyse data.  I 
also highlighted the ethical issues raised by the research project and discussed how I 
engaged with them throughout the process.  All through the chapter, I have identified 
the methodological and personal challenges this study generated.  I have also 
attempted to describe the various reflective processes I engaged in and how I used 
those processes to inform data analysis.  The following three chapters describe the 
theory, the organisation of disappointment. 
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6 An unwanted feeling 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is focused on phase one of the research, a purposively sampled group of 
twelve respondents from a variety of organisational settings. Using data generated 
from semi-structured interviews, I highlight individuals’ understanding of and 
response to disappointment. The initial patterns I have identified suggest that 
disappointment is an important starting point for organisational members’ learning 
and discovery; that it is a key emotion in relation to the integration of apparent 
contradictions; and that it offers a process for reflexive engagement with the limits of 
stability and control in organisations. In the concluding section of the paper, I 
highlight the systemic manifestation of disappointment and the connection between 
disappointment and ‘blame culture’.  
 
Overview of the chapter 
 
First, I review and develop the literature on disappointment, highlighting existing 
approaches and reflecting on the potential importance of this subject as an emerging 
issue in the study of emotion in organisations. I use psychodynamic theory to inform 
the exploration of disappointment and identify a ‘paradoxical tension’ (Vince and 
Broussine, 1996) surrounding disappointment in organisations.  The adverse impact 
of disappointment on organisational stability frequently results in the curtailment of 
its public acknowledgement and expression.  Extensive and chronic disappointment 
can indeed be a threat to organisational stability and a deeply unsettling 
organisational emotion.  It can, however, be a potential source of creativity, learning 
and renewal.  In the second part of the chapter, I construct an initial theoretical 
framework informed by psychodynamic theory that helps to broaden ways of 
thinking about disappointment including an optimistic view of a subject that has 
been framed as problematic. I develop a ‘suggestive theory’ of disappointment that 
can form the basis for future research. Suggestive theory is a contribution emerging 
from an open-ended, qualitative inquiry aimed at pattern identification and evidence 
of new constructs (Edmundson and McManus, 2007).  It is a starting point for the 
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broader development of theory. I propose that ‘the organisation of disappointment’ 
unfolds in three positions and that movement between the positions occurs in 
relation to how fantasy and reality are generated in organisational settings. The 
provisional framework is summarised in Table 3 (below).  
 
Table 3 The organisation of disappointment (initial summary) 
 
 
Position 1: 
 
 
Position 2: 
 
 
Position 3: 
 
 
I am disappointing 
You are disappointed 
I do not live up to the 
expectations of other 
people. 
 
Disappointment as failure 
of self 
 
I am disappointed 
You are disappointing 
Other people do not live 
up to my expectations of 
them 
 
Disappointment as failure 
of other 
 
 
I disappoint 
You disappoint 
I can tolerate 
disappointment 
 
 
Disappointment as loss 
 
 
Disappointment in organisations has been constructed as ‘problematic’ personal 
behaviour (positions 1 & 2).  I am trying to build a more complex picture (to include 
position 3) in which disappointment is reimagined as loss thereby supporting the 
possibility of change (Marris, 1986).  I suggest that the ‘splitting’ into good and bad 
that is characteristic of positions 1 and 2 promotes idealised and over-simplified 
relationships aimed at sustaining ‘a politics of imagined stability’ within an 
organisation (Vince, 2002b:1192).  ‘Imagined stability’ refers to a common fantasy 
of control and coherence, where organisational members behave as if organisations 
were the stable containers of rational decision-making and problem solving. 
Organisations can be ‘taken in by their own fantasies’ of stability (Gabriel, 1999b), 
and they are prone to idealised images unconsciously designed to protect the 
organisation and its members from the potential destructiveness that emotions such 
as disappointment might unleash. In position 3, this splitting is recognised as a 
disappointing construct, and it is the loss of these idealised images of coherence and 
stability that underpins the potential for learning and change. This view reimagines 
disappointment in the context of organisational power relations and shows how the 
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organisation ideal can become contested in different responses to disappointment. In 
summary, the third position in my model views ‘problematic’ behaviour as important 
information about the gap between fantasy and reality rather than as an attack on 
organisational stability.   
 
Disappointment: individual, role and organisation  
 
Disappointment has been described as arising from a realisation that ‘the outcome of 
a choice would have been better had something else occurred’ (Zeelenberg et al., 
1998a).  It is seen as a negative feeling (Johnson et al., 2009), and an ‘other-
condemning moral emotion’ (Wubben et al., 2011:499) that belongs to individuals 
within the organisation (Brandstatter and Kriz, 2001, Miller and Robinson, 2004, 
Schimmack and Diener, 1997, Zeelenberg et al., 2000a); as a ‘psychological reaction 
to an outcome that does not match up to expectation’ (Bell, 1985:1); and as a 
combination of surprise and sorrow (Plutchik, 1991, Rainey et al., 2009).  For 
individuals, disappointment can function as a defence against the risk and 
uncertainty that is characteristic of decision making of an organisational role. It 
serves as an anticipation of failure and thereby reduces the felt impact of a role. For 
example, one way to cope with the uncertainty of decision-making is to form rigid 
expectations of likely outcomes (Zeelenberg et al., 2000a) that create the potential 
not to be surprised when things go wrong.  
 
Within organisational roles disappointment is connected with risk aversion and 
decision avoidance (Anderson, 2003, Loomes and Sugden, 1986, Routledge and Zin, 
2012, Tzieropoulos et al., 2011): ‘people who are particularly averse to 
disappointment may learn to adopt a pessimistic view about the future’ (Bell, 
1985:1).  The existing literature suggests that individuals consciously employ coping 
strategies as a way of trying to manage expected disappointment (van Dijk and van 
der Pligt, 1997).  Two such strategies have been identified. First, people may attempt 
to exert control over external circumstances in ways that are intended to bring 
outcomes in line with expectations. However, this strategy has been shown to 
increase the level of disappointment if it is not successful (van Dijk et al., 2003).  
The second strategy involves bringing expectations in line with an anticipated lower 
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outcome (Richez and Bodet, 2012), which has been shown to be a more fruitful 
strategy in that ‘irrespective of whether an outcome is favourable or unfavourable, 
the lower one’s initial expectations the greater one’s satisfaction or the less intense 
one’s disappointment with the actual outcome’ (van Dijk et al., 2003:507).   
 
There are organisational consequences that arise from individuals’ feelings and role-
based strategies around disappointment. For example, McGrath (1995:141) suggests 
that a managers’ insistence on ‘being right (being able to accurately predict future 
events)’ inhibits the potential for learning from disappointment because 
disappointments are characterised as being ‘wrong’ and, as such, are seen as a sign 
of weakness or incompetence. McGrath suggests that the inaction that results from 
disappointment can inhibit organisational learning and that organisations would 
benefit from developing mechanisms that supported increased acceptance and 
understanding of the (organisational) implications of disappointing events. For 
example, disappointment helps organisational members to become stuck and to 
remain stuck in roles and relations that are self-limiting. Such roles are constructed 
from and help to reinforce ‘psychostructures’ (Carr, 1993) whereby language 
functions to embed social and cultural features into the individual psyche. The 
psychostructure of disappointment is built from perceived failures of the self 
interacting with the perceived failures of others, and, in combination, these 
contribute to contextually specific patterns of stuckness.  
 
In summary, disappointment, with some exceptions (Chandler, 2010), is seen as an 
unwanted feeling, an irrational condition that is of little utility or value and part of a 
strategy for lowering expectations and avoiding decisions. The disappointed self 
within organisations is constructed as a victim of unfortunate external circumstances 
and the disappointed organisation is one that fails in its mission to deliver. On the 
contrary, I, however, think that the study of disappointment can generate insights 
about learning and change and help to further our understanding of the interplay 
between emotion and power in organisations. It is this undeveloped aspect that my 
research begins to address.  
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A psychodynamic view of organisations 
 
In order to develop an understanding of disappointment, I reframe it in relation to its 
potential creativity by using psychodynamic theories of organisation. This 
perspective also seeks to make sense out of complex inter-personal experiences and 
‘incomprehensible phenomena’ (Kets de Vries, 2004) in terms of understanding 
everyday practices and inter-personal/inter-group relations that, at least on the 
surface of things, may not make much sense. Research into the application of 
psychodynamic theory in organisations is well developed (Antonacopoulou and 
Gabriel, 2001, Arnaud, 2007, Brown and Starkey, 2000, Gabriel, 1991, Huffington et 
al., 2004, Jarrett and Kellner, 1996, Kets de Vries, 2004, Obholzer and Zagier 
Roberts, 1994, Seel, 2001, Stavrakakis, 2008, Vince, 2001, Vince, 2002b) and has 
highlighted the ways in which repressed wishes and desires contained in unconscious 
material can be made explicit in order to reveal organisations ‘in depth’ (Gabriel, 
1999b).  The assumptions that underpin the psychodynamic study of organisations 
include the following: 
 
• organisations are human systems and as such, are emotional and emotion 
generating environments; 
• emotions are rarely located within a purely individual space. Like power, 
they are part of the medium within which all social relations occur (Hoggett 
and Thompson, 2002).  Emotions are inseparable from questions of power; 
• unconscious as well as conscious processes and dynamics are central to an 
understanding of human systems and how they function; 
• individuals and groups perform tasks on behalf of the wider system and we 
are always ‘trading in assumptions’ about what is real and what is not 
(Phillips, 2007); 
• anxiety and intolerable feelings are hidden from view through social defences 
(Bain, 1998, Krantz and Gilmore, 1990, Menzies, 1960); 
• action is as much the product of fantasy as it is of rational calculation 
(Gabriel, 2008). 
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The relationship between fantasy and reality is an important characteristic of a 
psychodynamic approach to organisations.  Fantasy is not by definition untrue, and 
some fantasies do become realities: for instance, many an entrepreneurial venture 
starts off as a fantasy.  However, the distinguishing features of fantasy as mental and 
social constructs are: first, that they are sustained by desire rather than ‘realistic’ 
considerations: second, that they maintain a link to unconscious processes at all 
stages: third, that they are symptoms of a certain ‘lack’ or absence.  Organisations 
may give the impression of being firmly rooted in reality, but fantasy is never far 
from the surface, and it assumes many forms both positive and negative.  There are 
fantasies of grandeur and beauty, fantasies of annihilation and destruction, fantasies 
of achievement and renewal.  Some of these fantasies are shared among numerous 
participants or they may set some against others, but generally, they serve a purpose 
similar to that for individuals.  Fantasies about good and bad and right and wrong in 
organisations help to generate self-imposed limitations on behaviour and action.  
They also act as triggers of particular emotions, ranging from pride to envy and from 
hope to disappointment. 
 
In summary, the key conceptual components I take from psychodynamic theory in 
order to study disappointment in organisations are: the importance and complexity of 
the relationship between fantasy and reality; the integration of good and bad in order 
to reduce defensive impulses; and the working of specific defensive processes, 
particularly projection, splitting and projective identification.  
 
Research approach and methods  
 
An immediate issue that faces the researcher interested in understanding 
disappointment in organisations is that it is problematic to isolate specific emotions 
in order to study them. Emotions are interconnected (Gabriel, 1999b), and to focus 
solely on disappointment without linking it, to e.g., anxiety, anger or ambivalence 
can make it seem as if disappointment could be understood independently from other 
emotions and rationalities.  These, however, are part of the construction and 
reconstruction of everyday organisational processes and dynamics. Moreover,  not 
all disappointments carry the same value or impact for the individual: 
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disappointment is experienced and understood differently by different individuals 
and it is a common experience within organisations that is continuously ignored or 
avoided. The challenge, at least at this early stage of attempting to generate research 
insights about disappointment, is to discover how meaning is made of the lived 
experience of disappointment for individuals within organisations, and to come to 
some initial conclusions about the potential impact of disappointment within 
organisations.  
 
As previously discussed, I adopted a Grounded Theory approach to this topic 
because Grounded Theory is ‘an inductive, theory discovery methodology that 
allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a 
topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data’ 
(Martin and Turner, 1986:141).  The purpose of a Grounded Theory study is initially 
to experience the problem or issue from the perspective of the research respondents. 
Therefore, Grounded Theory fits well with a study aimed at the development of 
suggestive theory, where there is (as yet) no strong theoretical basis from which to 
develop well-focused research questions. The research presented me with two 
particular dilemmas: first, whether to utilise the existing literature on disappointment 
in order to inform the structure and content of the interviews within the study. This is 
an issue because grounded research tends to discourage researchers from 
undertaking a comprehensive literature review in advance of embarking on data 
collection to avoid pre-conceptualising the subject of research (Glaser, 1998).  
Existing literature can be seen as an additional burden on top of data collection and a 
contributing factor to the potential ‘derailment’ (Glaser, 1992) of the researcher from 
the method. However, there is also the danger of understanding Grounded Theory as 
an excuse to ‘avoid the literature’ (Suddaby, 2006) and thereby to detach it from 
existing knowledge. I decided to conduct a ‘pre-view’ of the literature on 
disappointment as a way of locating myself as researcher in relation to existing 
knowledge and as a way of identifying gaps in the theme of the research.  
 
My second dilemma related to the criticism that grounded theorists offer a 
‘dispassionate account’ of the data (Charmaz, 2000, 2003) since they are striving to 
construct a research process that is uncontaminated by existing knowledge and 
experience. In a study that is explicitly about emotion in organisations, this led me to 
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ask whether it would be possible to embark on a Grounded Theory study that was 
not inevitably disappointing.  The specific value of Grounded Theory in this study is 
that the method is designed to help researchers recognise the ‘latent pattern’ (Glaser, 
1998) of behaviours that are not always immediately recognisable in situations. One 
of the purposes of Grounded Theory is to make such patterns visible by attending 
primarily to the experience of research respondents. Therefore, Grounded Theory is 
seen as a highly relevant method if there is a research focus on meaning-making as 
distinct from theory-testing (Suddaby, 2006). This is congruent with my 
psychodynamic theoretical lens which focuses on conscious and unconscious (visible 
and hidden) ways in which meaning is made. For example, a psychodynamic 
approach invites researchers to include the feelings and emotions evoked in the 
researcher by respondents and vice versa. In this sense, I feel that I am constructing a 
passionate rather than dispassionate account of disappointment.  
 
Research design and analysis 
 
I embarked on the study with a total of twelve respondents to gather personal stories 
of disappointment in various organisational contexts.  The purpose of this phase was 
to inquire into how people experienced disappointment in work settings and to draw 
conclusions from those interviews leading to questions for further research.  I 
interviewed seven men and five women aged between thirty-seven and sixty; 
representing employed and self-employed, in for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations and public sector work environments.   A list of the respondents is 
outlined in Appendix 1.   
 
There were three main interpretations arising from the coding of the data.  First, 
feelings of disappointment are processed before they are publicly expressed. Second, 
disappointment is associated with anger, which is projected onto others as blame, 
and it is associated with ambivalence, whereby feelings are withheld from others. 
Third, disappointment is bound up with paradoxical feelings of failure: the tension 
apparent in having to engage with feelings of failure in the organisation at the same 
time as maintaining positive feelings about the organisation. My analysis provided 
 161 
the basis for the integrative theoretical position I articulate in Table 4 and that I 
discuss and illustrate in the following section of the chapter.  
 
Discussion 
 
When qualitative researchers come to the conclusion, ‘that’s interesting’ it is ‘a clue 
that current experience has been tested against past experience, and that past 
experience has been found wanting’ (Weick, 1989:525).  One of the results I found 
most interesting in the data was an assumption from respondents that disappointment 
is not dramatic or important enough to be acknowledged outside of oneself; it is not 
a spectacular emotion, like anger, fear or envy, and it is not considered a major 
challenge for organisations.  This assumption leads to the paradoxical conclusions 
that disappointment is both prevalent in yet of no consequence to organisations and 
that it is both of concern and yet of only personal interest to individuals.  Paradoxes 
can be viewed as resources for theory-building (Alvesson and Karreman, 2007) 
because they point to breakdowns or contradictions in understanding thereby 
providing opportunities for transformations that are of theoretical interest.  
 
Despite their view that disappointment is of no great concern, respondents 
acknowledged that disappointment does not occur in isolation but is always 
connected to a set of internalised expectations which invariably differ, compete and 
are negotiated within a political environment. A psychodynamic perspective views 
emotion as ‘individually felt and collectively produced and performed’ (Vince, 
2006:348) and the implications of examining disappointment from this perspective 
help us understand how individuals within organisations are performing an 
emotional task on behalf of the wider system, expressing relations of power and 
subordination.  Contrary to the view of respondents, then, disappointment may be of 
concern to organisations, since it could undermine a carefully constructed vision and 
destroy positive feelings, replacing them with cynicism or detachment (Fleming and 
Spicer, 2003). 
 
There are three aspects of this paradox that are interesting for the development of 
organisation theory in relation to disappointment. First, a significant finding in the 
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data is the degree to which the feeling of disappointment is being processed before it 
is publicly expressed. I see the idea that such feelings are of little concern as a 
defence mechanism against the imagined destructive impact of disappointment in 
and on the organisation. Disappointment is constructed as problematic personal 
behaviour because it is a potential threat to organisational stability and effectiveness. 
Second, despite individual perceptions, disappointment is being publicly performed 
in organisations by being transformed into anger (dumped on others) and aligned 
with ambivalence (withdrawn from others). These transformations remake 
disappointment in relation to the more usual and legitimate feelings of blame and 
withholding within organisations. Third, disappointment arises when an expected 
positive outcome does not emerge. It reveals a continuous tension in our experience 
of organisations: how to engage with inevitable failures in the organisation while at 
maintaining positive feelings about the organisation in service of an ideal. These 
three findings helped me to develop a model of the organisation of disappointment, 
which differentiates three positions, depending on whether the organisation of 
disappointment results from what is perceived as failure of the self, a failure of the 
other or whether it is acknowledged as the product of loss.  In the remainder of the 
discussion, I revisit the components of the provisional model and offer further 
elaboration of the emerging theoretical framework (see Table 4, on the following 
page). 
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Table 4 The organisation of disappointment (elaborated conceptual frame) 
 
Organisation of 
Disappointment 
Quality Unconscious 
Identification & 
Emotional response 
Purpose Relation to the Organisation Ideal 
I am disappointing 
(Position 1) 
I cannot say no.  I live out 
the projection of the other 
 
Shame 
Guilt 
Persecution 
Victim 
Impotence 
Resignation 
 
Projective 
Identification 
Paranoid-schizoid  
position 
Protects the external good object from 
being damaged by the internal bad 
object. 
 
 
The organisation cannot tolerate itself as 
disappointing. 
 
The individual contains the 
disappointment protecting the 
organisation ideal of ‘not disappointing’.   
 I am disappointed 
(Position 2) 
I have to live with the no of 
others.  My fantasy is 
unfulfilled 
 
 
Blame 
Rage 
Attack 
Potency 
Rejection 
 
Projection 
Paranoid-schizoid 
position 
Protects the internal good object from 
being damaged by the external bad 
object. 
 
 
The organisation cannot tolerate itself as 
disappointed. 
 
The individual contains the 
disappointment protecting the 
organisation ideal of ‘not disappointed’.   
 I disappoint 
(Position 3) 
Transference is dissolved 
and disappointment is 
tolerable 
 
Risk  
Challenge 
Learning  
Acceptance 
I say the no 
I return the projection 
Depressive position 
Integration of the good and bad within 
the self and others is tolerated 
The organisation can tolerate 
disappointment. 
 
The ideal of the not disappointing 
organisation is contested by containing 
disappointment within the system. 
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The organisation of disappointment 
 
In Table 4, I present an integrative model of the organisation of disappointment. 
Position 1 (I am disappointing) highlights perceived failures of the self, constructed 
from conscious feelings (I do not live up to the expectations of other people) and 
unconscious behaviour (I live out the projections of the other). Personal descriptions 
of this position from data include ‘letting colleagues down’, ‘being unhappy with my 
own performance’, ‘I wasn’t good enough to get the contract’.  However, such 
feelings are also connected to organisational dynamics, for example: ‘an insatiable 
greed, demand, higher expectations all of the time for nothing…’ (Respondent 3). 
Such organisational dynamics reinforce individual feelings of disappointment and 
underpin increased expectations both individual and organisational. There can be a 
strong fantasy in organisations that ‘we must move forward’ and that disappointment 
is in the way. The organisation is unable to tolerate disappointment and, as a result, 
everything suffers from comparison and nothing satisfies (Schwartz, 2004).  
Individual members of the organisation are aware of the contradiction and 
discomfort inherent in ideas like ‘continuous improvement’ and ‘being the best’, 
however, they still protect the organisation ideal of ‘not disappointing’:  
 
It’s just a lot of fantasy talk about being the best… being world class, 
it’s a load of rubbish…do your best that’s about all you can do in 
anything (Respondent 3) 
 
In position 1, the individual experiences himself as the object of disappointment and 
unknowingly acts out the role that has been assigned and adopted. In this position, 
the individual feels powerless in the face of external events. The stability of the 
organisation is protected and defended by locating disappointment within the 
individual thus reinforcing the fantasy that disappointment is personal and can be 
remedied by splitting the individual from the system in which the experience is 
generated.   
 
Position 2 also represents personal behaviour as problematic, not only in relation to 
the self, but also in relation to perceived failures of the other, whether a person, 
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object or desired future state. The other often does not live up to my expectations. 
Descriptions include: ‘I really had hoped to secure that promotion’ (that they didn’t 
give me), ‘I imagined this would be a completely different working environment to 
my previous job’ (it is just as bad, if not worse), ‘the boss simply didn’t live up to 
my expectation of her’. Emotions such as anger, blame and rejection reinforce 
personal feelings of disappointment. The individual experiences himself as 
disappointed and may blame and attack the external source of disappointment.  In 
position 2, disappointment with the other’s rejection of my desire and with their 
perceived failures is again turned inwards in the service of protecting the 
organisation, of sustaining a fantasy of the organisation that does not disappoint.  
The individual therefore has to contain the disappointment so that the organisation 
ideal (the organisation that does not disappoint) can be maintained. For example:  
 
The worst thing is to wish for something and then to get it… where 
you think something is going to be different to what you have 
already been doing and then you get there and it’s pretty much what 
you’ve been doing before (Respondent 9) 
 
The experience of Respondent 9, a Director of Human Resources, represents a 
common feeling of being disappointed with and within organisations. She desires a 
position that in fantasy represents a better future, only to discover on arrival that it 
feels much the same as before. She gets what she wants and yet she does not get 
what she wants and she blames herself for wanting it in the first place (‘I should 
have known’). Positions 1 and 2 both lead to individual confusion as to how 
disappointment can be managed in a satisfactory way.  In particular, position 1 
promotes self-withdrawal and position 2 promotes blame. Both positions split good 
and bad in ways that encourage attempts to reduce the impact of disappointment 
within and on the organisation.  
 
Position 3 is related to a more complex understanding of the way in which 
disappointment is contained within the system. The attachment to fantasies of both 
satisfying and disappointing objects is relinquished.  Good and bad, satisfaction and 
disappointment, are seen as component parts of relating and organising. This 
suggests an ability to tolerate the loss of the fantasy of ‘what should be’ and to 
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reimagine a future where disappointment is tolerable. A central feature of the third 
position is the capacity to return projections and not to act out a pre-assigned role.  
Part of the reality of moving to the third position is the recognition that damage is 
inevitably done to self and others within organisations and that acts of reparation 
offer a way of ensuring that the relationships in which disappointment is generated 
are not permanently damaged.  For example:  
 
I remember at one point being in charge of a pitch and losing the 
thing – and I remember the head guy coming up and he said – ‘that 
was really good work – you did your best’.  And that really helped – 
and also the empathy of him saying ‘of course you must be really 
disappointed’.  Whereas in the other case I’m thinking of the guy 
came back from a failed pitch and said ‘the creatives let us down’, it 
really was like a kick in the stomach to everybody (Respondent 7) 
 
Respondent 7, a self-employed Marketing and Communications Consultant, 
experiences an integrative response to disappointment from her boss. 
Disappointment is not managed out of the system in which it originates, but it is 
acknowledged and contained.  The realisation that ‘I disappoint’ is both a common 
and an acceptable organisational experience, allowing the individual to recognise 
that he cannot live up to the idealised expectation of others and others cannot live up 
to his idealised expectations of them. The splitting into ‘all good’ and ‘all bad’ by 
locating disappointment in self or other is now recognised as a disappointing 
construct, and the loss of this idealisation is experienced.  ‘I disappoint’ is associated 
with the depressive position which Klein (1940) describes as containing two sets of 
feelings, ‘persecution and the characteristic defences against it’ and ‘sorrow and 
concern about the feared loss of the ‘good’ objects’.  Quoting Freud she also 
suggests that the primary way of overcoming this state of mourning is by ‘the testing 
of reality’ (Klein, 1940:126). The loss and mourning of the idealised relationship 
contains the hope of a more realistic way of relating in which disappointment is 
tolerable and understood to be a component part of relating.  
 
The first two positions create a simplified way of organising disappointment 
connected to self-withdrawal (I am disappointing) or blame (I am disappointed).  
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Position 3 contests this splitting as a defensive response that sustains a fantasy of 
organisational stability.  When split and located between positions 1 and 2, private 
feelings of disappointment manifest as potentially destructive public emotion (e.g., 
anxiety, anger, ambivalence and blame). Position 3 suggests a need to recognise 
good and bad objects in ourselves and others, thereby contesting the fantasy that 
emotion can be satisfactorily organised by making it only an individual or personal 
phenomenon. Allowing disappointment to be present within the organisation 
encourages the integration of good and bad and reframes disappointment as tolerable 
rather than damaging. The association between disappointment and damage is 
assuaged through everyday acts of reparation, such as picking up the phone to offer 
feedback; finding a way to say sorry; making time to ensure the relationship between 
colleagues can survive not winning a contract.  
 
The organisation ideal as all good or all bad is contested by position 3 in that the 
ability to tolerate both good and bad in self and other becomes bearable. In 
contesting the fantasy of a stable state, of an organisation ideal, the third position 
also contests the fantasy of the disappointing object. The implied invitation is to 
view the organisation ideal and disappointment as relational concepts, generated and 
contained within the same system.  Freud reminds us that desire is in excess of an 
object’s capacity to satisfy it (Phillips, 1993).  The inability to meet demand or not 
be satisfied by what one attains is constructed as failure, thereby reinforcing the 
attachment to the fantasy of perfection and the inevitability of disappointment.  
 
Disappointment is complex and confusing primarily because our desires are 
unconscious, sublimated and redirected towards satisfaction.  In order to feel 
disappointed, we must have a fantasy of the satisfying object or an assumption that 
there is a possibility of not being disappointed.  But if we are to be desiring subjects, 
we can only experience desire in its absence and if getting what we want and not 
getting what we want both evoke disappointment, the implied invitation is to find 
ways of wanting that are satisfying or ‘good enough’ and thereby not inevitably 
disappointing.  The paradox of the stories recounted by respondents and the narrative 
that disappointment is not dramatic enough to attend to conceals an unconscious fear 
that disappointment is dangerous and potentially very dramatic.  Balancing a life 
lived and a life desired is difficult work.  If we are disappointed, we are trying to be 
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in two places at once and not living in the emotional and political complexity of the 
organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The paradox I have identified concerning disappointment in organisations challenges 
existing perceptions and provides an initial framework for future thought and inquiry. 
The work I have done so far implies some key issues and research questions for the 
future study of this topic. The insight gained from the study of disappointment is its 
connection to the dynamics of blame in organisations in ways I had not imagined.  If 
blame is seen as a legitimate expression of feeling in organisations, but 
disappointment is not, this implies the need to understand better why some emotions 
and expressive forms dominate in organisations and others do not (Hoggett and 
Thompson, 2002).   
 
A second area for future research arises from this. The framework outlined in this 
chapter has emerged from the study of the perception of individuals within varied 
organisational settings. The following two chapters apply the theory to a single 
organisational context in which the collective dynamics of disappointment are 
explored. The analysis of group level behaviour in relation to disappointment 
provides results that make a stronger contribution to management practice than I 
have been able to identify from the initial study.  
 
The next chapter, The appointment of blame, examines in more detail the collective 
function of blame in the management of disappointment. I will outline the systemic 
manifestation of positions 1 and 2 and explore the hypothesis that disappointment is 
organised as a personal phenomenon as a way of protecting and perpetuating the 
fantasy of organisational stability.  
 
The third data chapter, Reimagining the future, describes the systemic manifestation 
of position 3 and outlines the complexity of moving from positions 1 and 2 to 
position 3. I will examine a significant incident which threatened organisational 
stability.  Reimagining the future describes the process by which a potentially 
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destructive event functions as a reflective act by being transformed into a creative 
and productive experience.   
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7 The appointment of blame 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter conceptualised disappointment as an unwanted feeling and 
described the process by which respondents addressed their core concern of 
maintaining stability and protecting the future. Respondents described 
disappointment as a potentially negative and disruptive force which might 
undermine their organisational role and damage relationships.  Yet, paradoxically 
disappointment was considered un-deserving of attention, un-dramatic and perceived 
to be a personal issue separate from the work environment in which it was 
experienced. This unwanted feeling was conceptualised as a movement between 
three positions: I am disappointing; I am disappointed; and I disappoint.  Together, 
they mark the dynamic processes in which individuals become the momentary 
bearers of systemic disappointment. The unsatisfactory experience of disappointment 
is disclaimed by the wider system as an unwanted feeling but is experienced by 
individuals.  This is made possible by the dual function of individual experience: on 
the one hand, individuals are systemic actors, on the other, their experience is private.  
Through the displacement of emotional impact from system to individual members, 
unpleasant feelings, experienced personally, are treated as if they were located 
exclusively within the personal domain.  
 
The appointment of blame refers to the strategy employed by respondents to separate 
themselves and their intended actions from disappointing experiences.  This process 
of appointing blame has a dual function.  On the one hand disappointment 
(conceptualised as failure in positions 1 and 2) is a mechanism for outsourcing 
failure which is relegated to previous organisations, other people and prior 
experiences. On the other hand, the appointment of blame facilitates the idealisation 
of a new job/organisation/manager as a stable and satisfying entity.   
 
This process extends and develops the process conceptualised as an unwanted 
feeling by considering the systemic impact of disappointment.  The appointment of 
blame draws from data collected over a two-year period in an organisation called 
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Support to Live (STL) 23.  The individual stories of disappointment recounted by 
members contribute to the vision of a new type of organisation. The appointment of 
blame is the necessary freeing of self from disappointment as a precondition for 
future action and is also a mechanism for containing and contesting the idealised and 
stable organisation.  In creating a vision of a new organisation, members 
collaborated to extrude disappointment by locating it in previous work experiences.  
This fantasy was extended to include a wish for satisfaction in a new organisation 
that could meet its members’ expectations.  
 
The ‘organisation in the mind’ refers to the processes engaged in by respondents to 
create and interpret the idealised organisation; the mental constructs, fantasies, 
assumptions and emotional resonances that go to creating the internal image of the 
organisation (Armstrong, 2005).  Organisations are not created in a vacuum; there is 
always a ‘before’ consisting of the lived experience of members in previous work 
environments and their continued personal and professional dreams of what the 
future might hold.  These ‘before’ episodes contain stories of disappointment as well 
as triumph and they are frequently transformed into new experiences and new 
organisational structures.  
 
The appointment of blame refers to the mechanism by which these ‘before’ episodes 
are transformed into action. It is the first step in the organisation of disappointment 
in which anxiety, fear and unwanted feelings are displaced.  This displacement 
reduces anxiety and generates the fantasy of certainty.  It is a social defence designed 
to protect individuals and groups from the anxiety of learning from previous 
disappointments.  By locating uncomfortable feelings elsewhere the group confirms 
its view of the world as a satisfying place.  The world meets our expectations, and 
therefore, we avoid the disturbance of the unknown.  This group defence is a 
simplification of the world, a limitation of complexity.  Just as ‘bounded rationality’ 
acts organisationally to constrain thinking (Simon, 1991), the appointment of blame 
acts organisationally to limit affective experience. 
 
                                                
23 The name of the organisation and its founders and members have been changed 
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The appointment of blame draws a line between the past and the present and, as such, 
is the foundational strategy for new beginnings. This chapter describes the method 
by which respondents used their disappointment in previous work settings to 
conceptualise a new type of organisation.  The appointment of blame is a 
sophisticated strategy that attempts a transition from ‘what wasn’t’ to ‘what is’ and 
in this process completes a de-idealisation of what went before in order to re-idealise 
the future. In other words, organisation members use their experience of 
disappointment in previous work settings to imagine a better job, a different boss or 
to leave the organisation altogether.  This process of imagining a new and better 
future performs two functions.  It de-idealises the past working environment (it is 
disappointing) and re-idealises a future one (it will be satisfying).  The re-
idealisation of the future presents several alternatives including a repetition of 
disappointment for the individual (whether caused by the organisation or the 
individual) and/or the opportunity to work through disappointment (in the new ideal) 
productively.  This process of de-idealisation and re-idealisation is examined in more 
detail in this chapter as it relates to the STL organisation.  
 
Overview of chapter 
 
The chapter begins with an introduction to Support to Live (STL), the company in 
which data were collected over a two-year period during the start-up phase of the 
organisation.  The purpose of focusing on one organisation was to inquire further 
into the organisation-of-disappointment cycle that emerged from interviewing 
individuals and to develop the hypothesis that disappointment is organised as a 
personal phenomenon as a way of containing and contesting the fantasy of 
organisational stability.   
 
Another way to think about the ‘fantasy of organisational stability’ is as the vision or 
ideal of the organisation.  In order to feel disappointed we must have the hope of a 
vision or fantasy of the future: this chapter proceeds with a discussion of how STL 
came into being and the processes by which the vision of STL evolved.  The mental 
constructs that underlie the unarticulated vision of STL are outlined including the 
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members’ previous disappointments and how those experiences impacted on the 
vision for a new organisation.   
 
STL’s relationship with existing service providers is outlined and an overview given 
of the principals, staff and contractual obligations entered into in relation to its 
customer.  The second part of the chapter outlines the ‘organisation in the mind’ 
(Armstrong, 2005) underlying STL’s vision and analyses the unconscious processes, 
particularly the centrality of blame, as an important force in the generation of a new 
organisation.  The psychodynamic and business literature on blame and scapegoating 
is referenced and linked to these categories.  The appointment of blame is the first 
part of the disappointment cycle in which difficult and unacceptable feelings are 
outsourced.  This process is a necessary ‘first step’ in creating distance between what 
has not worked in the past and the fantasy of what will in the future. 
 
Introduction to STL 
 
Those who find themselves homeless in Ireland present to the Health Services 
Executive (HSE)24, register as homeless and wait to be placed in emergency 
accommodation.  Many of those who need accommodation are also in need of some 
kind of social/medical care or support.  Accommodation and care are organised and 
administered as separate services.  Accommodation is the responsibility of the local 
authority, while care is the responsibility of the HSE.  For those in more straightened 
circumstances, emergency accommodation is provided by voluntary sector 
organisations funded by both agencies.  Funding for emergency accommodation is 
administered by a separate state agency.  ‘Homeless’ people may then move to 
private Bed and Breakfast (B&B) accommodation, paid for by the local authority 
while they wait for more permanent accommodation.  Depending on the needs of the 
client, they may move from B&Bs into transitional (supported) housing or they may 
be given an apartment or house by the local authority.  Transition from one status 
and one type of accommodation to another can take a long time and is frequently 
                                                
24The Health Services Executive is the Irish government agency charged with the delivery of health 
and social services throughout Ireland.  It manages and distributes an annual budget in excess of €13 
billion. 
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caught up in bureaucratic processes leading to considerable delays and overlap.  
Accommodation is allocated on the basis of availability and suitability.  Those in 
need of housing are rarely consulted at the outset of the process but are given ‘first 
refusal’ on a set number of properties.  Diagram 4 outlines the path to housing for 
homeless people in Ireland. 
 
Diagram 4 Path to housing 
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In 2004, Adam Johnson and Paul O’Neill conceived of a new way of delivering 
services to people who found themselves homeless in Ireland. Adam was an 
independent business consultant who worked across the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors including the social housing area. Paul was CEO of a charitable organisation.  
One of its services included the provision of emergency accommodation. 
Adam and Paul wanted to establish a private company (STL) that would find rented 
accommodation in the private sector in areas where people wished to live rather than 
where accommodation could be found. This was a radical departure from the way in 
which homeless services had been delivered to date and differentiated STL from 
other service providers in the sector.  STL was formally registered as a company in 
2005.  Adam was appointed managing director and Paul chairman, and they were 
equal partners in the company. Adam, in his role as managing director, was 
responsible for overseeing the set up and day-to-day operation of the company.  Paul 
would participate in business development as required and continue to work full-
time in his role with another organisation.  In 2007, three staff members joined the 
company, Sally (manager) and Marie and Mark (care workers). Diagram 5 outlines 
the STL organisation chart. 
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Diagram 5 STL organisation chart 
 
 
 
 
STL would negotiate long-term leases with landlords, create individualised and 
supported care plans for end-users and support those end-users through their first 
twelve months in the new accommodation.  Rents would continue to be paid by the 
local authority, care plans would be supported directly through STL and end-users 
would be referred to STL from the homeless list in the local authority.  STL 
identified local authorities as their customer base.  The company’s intention was to 
reduce the administrative and bureaucratic processes involved in housing tenants, 
reduce the size of the housing lists, streamline the costs involved in the process and 
make a profit for the company. 
STL grew out of the two principals’ frustration at the labyrinthine path to finding a 
home and a concern at the duplication of resources and ‘waste of money’ which the 
existing system appeared to foster. Adam and Paul also saw the business opportunity 
in developing a different kind of service that could deliver on the stated political and 
social intention of local authorities to reduce accommodation waiting lists.  From the 
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outset STL, was conceived as a new type of social care organisation: one in which 
profit could sit alongside the delivery of high quality social services to end-users of 
their customer base.  
Adam and Paul approached a local authority and embarked on an eighteen month 
negotiation process with it to win a two-year contract worth €1.12million to pilot the 
initiative.  The pilot was championed by a senior executive within the local authority 
who steered the initiative through the political and administrative channels necessary 
to bring it to fruition.  The contract terms were as follows: STL would find 
sustainable housing for one hundred people from the existing homeless list within 
two years of start up; the company would be front-loaded with a large percentage of 
the fee to cover start-up costs; and an evaluation (the terms and conditions of which 
would be agreed between both parties) would be conducted by an independent 
evaluator within fifteen months of commencement.  The implicit agreement was that 
if the pilot was successful, STL could expect a repeat contract to mainstream the 
service.  Start-up funding allowed Adam and Paul to secure an administrative base; 
appoint a service manager (Sally); two case workers (Mark and Marie); identify a 
property portfolio and begin the process of working with referrals from the local 
authority. 
Appointing a vision 
 
Consolidation of the STL vision emerged in the overlap between the emotional 
concerns of its founders and their belief in the profit-making potential of a radical 
service delivery idea in the socially-charged area of homeless services. Their vision25, 
articulated in the company’s documentation, was in fact the result of a complex and 
sophisticated processing of three inter-linking processes.   
 
 
  
                                                
25 For the purposes of anonymising the company, Adam rewrote the company’s vision statement for 
this study.  The spirit of the statement remains the same, although individual phrases have been 
altered. 
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STL’s vision statement reads: 
The company’s mission is to enable socially disadvantaged people to 
live independently by enabling them to successfully manage the 
causes of their disadvantage such as homelessness, addiction, mental 
ill health or other factors.   Our primary focus is on accessing 
housing from the private rented market and providing tenancy 
support services 
 
The three inter-linking processes at work in the definition of this vision can be 
summarised as: 
1. The principals’ experience of disappointment in public service delivery in 
the area of homelessness (I am disappointed); 
2. The need for external markers of success linked to the internal sense of 
self-worth on the part of the principals (I am disappointing); 
3. The lack of felt occupational self-worth in previous work settings (I am 
disappointing). 
STL’s developing vision is best articulated in the following quotations from Adam, 
Paul and Sally: 
If someone said give me just one sentence about STL, it would be 
around its achievement in terms of having delivered outcomes for 
people who are disadvantaged or who have a disadvantage, which 
they cannot address themselves, so they need support...  (Adam) 
 
Adam’s words not only address STL’s customers and end-users, but also the 
needs of its founders.  His own vocational experience in homeless services was that 
inefficiency triumphed over profitability: 
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If all this were in a pure private environment and you were being 
ultimately paid or the ultimate profit were based on the efficiency of 
your product, you’d have taken this whole thing apart [referring to 
the homeless sector] and put it back together.  And while there’s a 
very human element… there also has to be a profit in what we’re 
doing and there aren’t many people thinking about that… and that’s 
the thinking we have brought into the process—or into the service 
community. We’re not doing it brilliantly, but we’re doing it better 
than others. (Adam) 
 
Adam statement reveals a fantasy.  In his mind, the private sector is more organised 
and efficient than the not-for-profit service community, albeit not as organised as he 
would wish.  The service community is mired by the ‘human element’, which 
represents a kind of sloppiness and endogenous inefficiency reflected in a lack of 
caring about getting it right.  Unconsciously, Adam reveals his desire for more 
competency in both arenas and the fantasy that he and his partner can do it better.  In 
his mind, the money metrics provide some form of criterion by which the service can 
be evaluated and his own contribution seen. 
Adam’s desire to prove the vision of efficient homeless service delivery is one 
element underpinning STL’s emerging vision. This is supported by two others; each 
stemming from the founders’ need for affirmation of self-worth.  
This could be really cool money wise. All of a sudden—all through 
our lives, I’m Mr Responsible. I’ve never missed a day’s work ever 
since college… I’ve always done the right thing but I’m always 
fucking broke—now we have a nice house and we have two cars and 
we have the kids. But I’m always broke. And I’m thinking of our 
20th anniversary. I’m thinking I really want to buy P [his wife] a 
really fuck-off present for our twentieth anniversary—twenty years 
that’s how long it is. And now I could do this with STL (Paul) 
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if anything, the motivation for me to start up STL was 
disappointment with [names other agency] in the voluntary sector.  
That’s what got us going.  And so towards the end of my time in 
[other agency] I was… fit to kill them.  And STL was an escape 
route out—an invention—a new way of giving ‘one-up’ to the whole 
system and coming into this role it’s completely different. So I don’t 
carry any of the disappointment in this role that I had in [previous 
agency] (Paul) 
 
Paul articulates a vision of a successful STL that can be measured in monetary terms 
(his ability to buy his wife a ‘fuck-off present’) and but perhaps more importantly, in 
its capacity to address his over-developed sense of responsibility (‘I’m Mr 
Responsible. I’ve never missed a day’s work ever since college’).  STL, as 
envisioned by Paul, represents the possibility of a type of emotional freedom that he 
has not experienced to date (‘STL was an escape route out—an invention—a new 
way at giving ‘one-up’ to the whole system’). Furthermore, for Paul, STL is an 
extra-curricular activity and an almost riskless venture for his professional self.  STL 
in Paul’s fantasy is envisioned as a place where he becomes a risk-taker, addressing 
his sense of disappointment in himself.  Paul’s statement regarding a ‘fuck-off 
present’ also alerts us to his ambivalence about STL. The statement can be read in a 
number of ways, for example, as a description of something fantastic and equally as 
a description of something he would like to ‘fuck-off’ or get rid of. Paul’s 
professional background was in the service industries criticised by each owner for 
inefficiencies. Paul and Adam wanted the existing services to ‘fuck-off’ so they 
could demonstrate their efficiency and capacity to deliver a more streamlined and 
effective service.  At the same time, Paul maintained his loyalty to this community 
by continuing to work full-time in a similar organisation.  The statement may also 
represent a ‘fuck-off’ to an external world that has demanded he be ‘Mr 
Responsible’, i.e., a moment of rebellion.  
Sally articulates the third important contribution to the vision building for the 
company, occupational worth; STL becomes the vehicle for occupational recognition 
or solidarity not experienced in previous work settings. 
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I remember in my last job I got into work for quarter past nine in the 
morning and I met my manager out for a cigarette later that morning 
and she says ‘Oh I thought there was something wrong, you weren’t 
in this morning’… I wasn’t in, meant I wasn’t in at a quarter to seven. 
So everything was noted, it was always stored up and it was thrown 
at you. Nothing was ever good enough, like. You’d bring in a 
contract and you’d be so happy and go ‘right we’ve ¾ of a million’ 
and they’d be there ‘yeah that’s great, but you really should have 
gone for a million… (Sally) 
 
Sally articulates a common frustration in which one’s considerable efforts are never 
enough.  Because external recognition and markers of success have been elusive, she 
has internalised the organisation’s disappointment.  She has generated negative 
feelings about her employer, her role and eventually her job with the organisation.  
The STL vision originates in emotions born of previous disappointments, the 
system’s inefficiency, its lack of financial reward for its workers and its disdain for 
workers’ productive efforts.  The stated vision of the organisation focuses on the 
external partners, end-users and service users.  STL, while serving its customer and 
the homeless, was also meant to transform the above for its founders and staff. 
The fault lines of vision 
 
Organisational ‘vision’, conventionally described within mission and vision 
statements, provides a superordinate goal for the organisation by defining the 
‘fundamental ideas around which a business is built’ (Waterman Jr et al., 1980). 
Vision is both an inspirational ideal and a ‘shared lie’ and, as such must disappoint 
in its enactment.  Organisational life proceeds through continuous cycles of balance 
and imbalance; between what appears rational, logical and functional and what is 
experienced as irrational, illogical and emotional. Matters become more complicated 
because organisation-work is undertaken by people, for example managers with 
shifting momentary and limited capabilities of work focus which adds potential 
disappointment to vision. Vision, then, is an idealised driver which at its fullest, 
comes close to task accomplishment but which must always contain the seeds of its 
own inability to achieve perfection.  The fault lines of vision refer to the gaps and 
discontinuities which emerge between the organisation’s stated vision of itself and 
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the day-to-day enactment of that view in the ‘real-world’, performed by ‘real people’.  
The enactment of the disharmony experienced by STL’s members resulted in a 
rupture between them and their employing organisations and/or end-users. Each of 
STL’s founding members chose to invest in a new vision in the belief that previous 
disappointments would not be repeated in a new setting. 
 
Mobilising vision into action 
 
Goals are an organising methodology. They are the primary method by which vision 
is translated into action and they serve as targets by which organisational 
performance is contained and assessed.  At a personal level, goals serve to establish 
the role of the individual within the organisation system by outlining job function 
and managerial expectation. They introduce new members to the ‘way we do things 
here’ i.e., the cultural and political expectations of the organisation.   
 
Management literature identifies contagion as one method by which these processes 
are enacted in organisations (Aarts et al., 2004, Chartrand and Bargh, 1999, Fast and 
Tiedens, 2010, Loersch et al., 2008, Neumann and Strack, 2000, Stein, 2007).  Goals 
represent an idealised state (Aarts et al., 2004) and are assumed to be positive 
artefacts worth pursuing in the collective best interest of the organisation and its 
members. Research suggests that viewing the goal-directed behaviour of members of 
a group to which we belong results in goal contagion: we are likely to want to adopt 
their goals as our own.  We are also more likely to adopt the goal-directed behaviour 
of those with whom we identify emotionally and, conversely, we are more likely to 
identify emotionally with those with whom we share interests and values (Anderson 
et al., 2003).  Groups with shared goals are more likely to work effectively to meet 
targets, hence the promotion of consensus via a contagious process is considered to 
be an important factor in group cohesion (Loersch et al., 2008). Studies show that 
those with a positive relationship to the organisation are less likely to blame it when 
something goes wrong.  Therefore maintaining positive relationships with staff, 
customers and external stakeholders becomes an equally important goal for 
organisations (Brown and White, 2011). 
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Another way of thinking about goals is to view them as ‘phantastic objects’ i.e., 
mental representations that allow us feel omnipotent or, desirable outcomes towards 
which we want organisation members to work (Tuckett and Taffler, 2008).   The 
manner by which we observe and make decisions in relation to others’ behaviour is 
not always obvious.  Psychodynamic theory argues for the unconscious nature of 
desire, and from this perspective, goal setting is more influenced by what we don’t 
know rather than what we do. Freud established the idea that there is always a gap 
between what we want and what is realisable (1958b).  The future is unknown and 
the lack of certainty results in anxiety.  Planning for the future occupies a 
considerable amount of management energy and operates ‘as if’ it were possible to 
predict the unknown and in doing so, control its impact. One task of management 
becomes that of neutralising the projected fantasy of unknown events (in which 
‘unknown’ represents a sinister occurrence).  
 
We rarely desire something unpleasant, and sophisticated strategies are employed for 
the evacuation of bad feelings. Klein developed this idea into the paranoid-schizoid  
and depressive positions.  The former describes the process by which unbearable 
feelings are discharged elsewhere: the latter our acceptance of ambivalence. Klein 
did not suggest that the management of ambivalence is ever complete: we are 
capable of perceiving contradiction, complexity and confusion throughout our 
lifetimes and we are continually thrown into a pattern leading from ambivalence into 
what appears functionally as a temporary resolution in action. The pattern, of course, 
is repetitive through continual iterations.  Any assumption that we resolve 
ambivalence is misguided, as the absence of ambiguity represents one pole of the 
schizoid divide.  Our capacity to negotiate the tension between these varied feelings 
becomes the project of maturation.   
 
As research suggests that people tend to choose goals that are ‘desirable and feasible’ 
(Oettingen and Gollwitzer, 2004:167), creating a ‘positive’ context for goal adoption 
becomes an important task.   The social acceptability of a goal is an important factor 
in whether it will be adopted or not.  For example, deriving profit from homelessness 
could be construed either as a cynical exercise or, it could be understood as the most 
cost-efficient way of delivering a social care service, or both. Considerable 
discussion took place amongst STL’s stakeholders in which members challenged the 
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taken-for-granted view that profit and care should not be linked. The conversations 
surfaced previously un-named yet widely-held cultural norms regarding the function 
of money in social care organisations.  These discussions are captured in the 
following two quotations from Mark and Adam: 
 
It’s a business… That’s what disappointing to me – the fact that 
that’s not really what I’m about (Mark) 
 
If we found in five year’s time that homelessness is just about to be 
eliminated… and as a consequence we lose business that’s fine.  
That’s the market changing and you look at different elements in the 
market.  I think in many cases these organisations [in the voluntary 
sector] have taken a tactical approach and they try to preserve what 
is producing for them a revenue stream at the moment (Adam) 
 
Funding is secured and distributed by the homeless sector, reinforcing the powerful 
gatekeeping role of expert and helper.  Challenging the profit/care dichotomy 
allowed STL’s members to bring a customer focus to the organisation in which their 
customer (the local authority) and the end-users (homeless people) could expect 
particular standards of service with redress if those standards went unmet.   These 
discussions also surfaced the three inter-linking processes that influenced the 
articulation of STL’s vision:   
 
1. The principals’ experience of disappointment in public service delivery in 
the area of homelessness (I am disappointed); 
2. The need for external markers of success linked to the internal sense of 
self-worth on the part of the principals (I am disappointing); 
3. The lack of felt occupational self-worth in previous work settings (I am 
disappointing). 
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Adam describes this process: 
 
Optimism can be a dream. And dreams typically aren’t real. But you 
can direct the reality towards your dream by doing certain things. 
And the certain things then would be—what are the enablers of 
various directions then that you would take? So for me what STL has 
done is that it has helped me to identify the types of things that need 
to be done, or put a qualification around a vision or an objective 
(Adam) 
 
Targets for housing end-users became a focus of management meetings.  Adam 
created a visual indicator—a series of numbers pasted on the hallway—of the 
number of end-users housed.  Starting at zero and slowly increasing as families were 
housed, the climb to the first floor offices of STL became a reminder of the 
conscious rationale for the organisation’s existence.  The impact of this visual 
indicator is described by Mark and Sally: 
 
 I found it difficult at first to see the numbers on the wall – it seemed 
weird, and yet as we housed more and more people those targets 
became a focus for celebration.  I realise I never had a concrete 
indicator of how I was doing, as a worker, as a member of a team in 
any public sector or voluntary organisation in which I worked 
(Mark) 
 
On a day-to-day basis we know how we’re doing.  I don’t need to 
rely on someone else to tell me we’re doing well or badly – of course 
it’s great to get affirmation (and I do get that) but having a target to 
aim for makes it real and keeps me focused on the job in hand.  It’s 
visible, out there for all to see and that’s a good thing (Sally) 
 
The targets on the wall of the office can also be interpreted as Adam’s defensiveness 
made concrete.  Adam’s fantasy that the public sector is less competent than the 
private sector is translated into the need to develop a measure or a rule.  The 
numbers on the wall become a type of container for staff (both of anxiety and 
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expectation).  From a psychodynamic perspective, we might say that this metric 
became a benign Superego in the absence of a good enough parent or container in 
this sector. 
 
On a conscious level, the members of STL translated their previous disappointments 
into a plan for the delivery of services to the homeless sector.  In this way, they 
demonstrated an ‘active and positive response to disappointment’ (Chandler, 
2010:607). They adopted goals that were socially acceptable and easy to 
accommodate. The goals animated the organisation vision and appeared to resolve 
concerns expressed about previous work environments.  At an unconscious level, 
goal adoption further solidified the separation of STL from other sectoral agencies, 
reinforcing the fantasy that STL conducted business the ‘right’ way or ‘better’ than 
its competitors. The target of a defined number of housed end-users, demonstrated as 
a visual image on the stairway, was also a defence against the fear of failure 
(represented by the fantasy of private sector superiority and the genuine utility of 
visual rubrics).  STL positioned itself as a new kind of social care organisation: one 
in which care and profit could sit side by side. Its vision emerged from a processing 
of previous disappointments into a renewed concept of social care and effective 
delivery. The translation of disappointment into vision and goals precluded 
discussion of failure. The ‘shared lie’ within the company was that of omnipotence.  
STL would redress previous injustices, house the homeless, create a welcoming and 
supportive work environment for members and be a ‘better’ organisation than others 
in the sector.  Previous disappointment had been transformed into a shared vision for 
the future.  The principal method by which that transformation occurred was through 
the appointment of blame.   
 
Appointing blame 
 
Appointing blame refers to the process by which disappointment is marshalled into a 
motivational power, transforming earlier negativity into a renewed vision for STL.  
The previous section outlined the ‘organisation in the mind’ (Armstrong, 2005) as 
created by the members of STL.  This organisation in the mind was conceptualised 
as a safe environment in which personal risks could be taken, worker effort rewarded, 
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sectoral waste eliminated, a more humanistic approach taken to the resolution of 
homelessness and profit made from a social-care endeavour.   
 
The primary mechanism by which disappointment is mobilised into action is through 
the appointment of blame.  In each of the scenarios described by respondents, 
members of the organisation outsourced blame to previous employers (I am 
disappointed) or internalised blame through self-criticism (I am disappointing).  A 
new organisation (STL) is envisioned as the remedy to a set of previously 
experienced disappointments.  Blame is the mechanism for retreating from the past 
and advancing towards the future.  
 
The purpose of blame 
 
We attempt to make sense of reality by dividing the world into good and bad.  The 
implicit judgement of bad provides a satisfying solution to ambiguity, anxiety and 
systemic complexity.  This simple splitting provides a useful mechanism for 
negotiating social reality.  A confusing world can be simplified by the identification 
of villains and heroes to whom tasks are assigned and on whom judgements are 
pronounced. In the absence of certainty about what happened, blame strives to 
stabilise confusion, impose certainty and reorient our actions to the possibility of a 
new, perfect outcome.  The attribution of responsibility assuages anxiety and restores 
the illusion of order (Brown and White, 2011). At the same time, blame punishes: it 
absolves the good and complicit of knowing any alternative intent while it exports 
the frustrations of unbearable emotion. 
 
Catching blame 
 
There is some concern amongst researchers that blame may be contagious as it 
contains ‘one factor that can be transmitted from actor to observer: A goal of 
protecting one’s self image’ (Bradley, 1978, Fast and Tiedens, 2010:98).  
Preservation of self-image is constructed as a positive goal, and blame is the 
mechanism by which that goal is achieved.  Pointing the finger at somebody else 
becomes a culturally sanctioned method of feeling good by attributing badness 
 188 
elsewhere.  This may lead to anxiety that blame is a contagious process in 
organisations: if I see others adopting this behavior, why shouldn’t I?  Power is an 
important factor in blame contagion because those with power are more likely to 
create social environments populated by people who share their emotional 
disposition.  The influence exerted by those with power, particularly if it endorses a 
blame culture, will permeate all levels of the organisation thereby contributing to a 
culture of retribution.   A culture of blame, endorsed by authority, reinforces fear of 
openness and closes down opportunities for learning (Anderson et al., 2003, 
Edmondson, 1996).  Organisation members internalise the ‘way we do things here’ 
confirming blame’s status as a ‘negative’ emotion.  Blame contagion is reinforced as 
an organisation dynamic and contributes to the illusion that positive self-image is in 
tact.  Crises are unforeseen events the causes of which are not always obvious. 
Blaming the organisation can have a negative impact on profit, resulting in reduced 
share value26 or diminution of sales (Brown and White, 2011). Positive self-image as 
evidenced in an organisation’s vision (and share value) is as important to maintain at 
a systemic level as it is at an individual level.  A question raised by research is 
whether the goal of protecting self-image can be attained by other methods so as to 
avoid blame contagion (Fast and Tiedens, 2010).  The ability to trust the organisation 
system may be damaged if members believe they will be blamed for unjust errors. 
Fear of being blamed shuts down the possibility of learning about and from mistakes 
(Edmondson, 1996) reducing the incentive to report information that could be 
addressed at the systemic level (Simpson et al., 2002). 
 
A ‘no blame’ safety culture is one suggested method for learning from mistakes. 
Catino and Albolino (Catino, 2008, Catino and Albolino, 2007) outline a process by 
which different modes of analysis and solutions are offered based on the complexity 
of the event.  They suggest a layered model which inquires into the individual (the 
functions of people), the organisational (work processes, management and 
organisation of the context in which the work takes place) and the inter-
organisational (the organisation field, suppliers and the wider environment). 
Depending on data emerging from inquiry, interventions can be made at any level of 
                                                
26The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Macondo explosion and oil spill in which eleven people died 
resulted in an initial 60% drop in BP’s share price (Miller, 2011). 
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this hierarchy. Intervention at the individual level, though, may not address the 
systemic conditions in which the event occurred and may result in technical or 
training solutions focused on error reduction (Edmondson, 1996).  A systemic 
inquiry may challenge and potentially eradicate the useful aspects of blame 
(boundary setting, addressing injustice) by assuming a negative intent.  However, 
such models are predicated on the willingness of the organisation to act on the 
findings of its inquiry.  Blaming individuals and creating individualised 
interventions are appealing strategies, because difficult feelings can be outsourced 
and more costly and complex systemic interventions avoided.  
 
The term ‘contagion’ however, evokes the image of an out-of-control state.  When 
we judge something contagious we declare it beyond our means to manage.  
Something is transmitted person-to-person with or without physical contact.  The 
method of communication may not be obvious, but results become visible very 
quickly.  The word itself evokes images of laughter, illness, economic crises, i.e., 
extremes of positive and negative experiences.  Experiences deemed to be 
contagious are rarely left to their own devices; we are required to act lest they get out 
of control.  On the one hand, contagion when associated with ‘positive’ emotion, is 
viewed as force for social cohesion in groups i.e., a method by which individuals 
bond around shared goals.  On the other, when associated with ‘negative’ emotion, it 
is a potential ‘out of control’ state that should be bounded lest it cause damage.  In 
either case, the potential effect of contagion is to marshal resources towards the 
management of process and outcome.  This reinforces the idea that emotions both 
positive and negative are potentially disruptive forces which should not be left 
unattended in organisations.   These studies also suggest that a new layer of work has 
been introduced for managers: not alone are they charged with delivery of the 
organisation’s explicit goals but they now must now make those goals implicitly 
attractive so that members will want to subscribe to them.  A new level of evaluation 
is introduced to the organisation system wherein a goal may be evaluated on its 
explicit indicators and on its attractiveness as a goal in the first place.     
 
Research into blame contagion is problematic in that it accepts as a given the split 
between positive and negative emotion. Blame is constructed as a negative emotion 
even when employed in the service of a perceived positive outcome.  Blame is 
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neither bacterial nor viral.  The negativity assumed here by implying a right/wrong 
split means that what is transmitted is not even anxiety but genuine fear of 
organisational consequences.  The word contagion is misused, unless we are talking 
about the  ‘contagiousness’ of implied threats which reflects an appropriate reading 
of reality by many employees.  Anxiety implies an unknown entity; fear implies the 
known.  Existing literature on blame contagion outlines very clearly the threat to 
organisational effectiveness of mistakes, failure and other behaviours deemed 
inappropriate or unacceptable and the attendant implications for non-compliance by 
organisation members. 
 
The emphasis on the creation of the ‘right’ environment, the direction and control of 
contagion, the emphasis on good/bad and right/wrong goals and emotions parallels 
themes emerging in broader management research in relation to emotion in 
organisations. Emotions and feelings (and the terms are used interchangeably) are 
located within individuals but transferable to others contingent on particular 
circumstances.  In order to ensure the ‘right’ environment, the manipulation and 
management of those external circumstances is perceived to be a critical 
management task. The implication from existing research is that an atmosphere of 
positivity is the most useful and productive environment for the realisation of an 
organisational vision: an ‘optimistic route to optimistic outcomes' (Fineman, 
2006b:272).  However, the focus on positivity can only lead to disappointing 
outcomes.  
 
A psychodynamic perspective on blame and scapegoating  
 
In psychoanalytic literature, blame is discussed in relation to social learning within 
individual development and, by extension, to the interpersonal dynamics of 
individuals in groups (Fingarette, 1957).  Klein places blame at the heart of her 
developmental positions.  In the paranoid-schizoid position, blame allows the 
outsourcing of uncomfortable and unwanted feelings which the child is unable to 
integrate.  Blaming the ‘bad’ mother allows ‘badness’ to exist in close proximity 
without fear of losing it altogether.  It also allows the child to experience its own 
‘goodness’ in the knowledge that this will be protected by blaming the other.  Blame 
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is a successful strategy for managing difficult and anxious feelings that threaten to 
overwhelm (Klein, 1946).     
 
Blame occurs when one party disappoints the other by not upholding an agreed-upon 
social good.  This agreed-upon social good will always contain both consciously 
negotiated boundaries and the unconsciously assumed.  Blame, therefore, is the basic 
splitting of a whole into the certainty of idealised polarisation: good and bad.  Blame 
preserves the fantasy of the all-good and satisfying object by locating fault elsewhere.  
In blaming another, the blamer withdraws his narcissistic resources.  This has two 
consquences: it bolsters self-esteem and provides psychic energy to be discharged 
aggressively upon the blamed. In Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position, the child has 
aggressive and violent fantasies that attack the external container of ‘badness’.  
Psychologically, blame provides a double benefit: the blamer feels better having 
defended and identified with a group norm and, at the same time, he engages in 
justifiable expression of negativity, dismissing the blamed.   
 
The situation is far worse for the person blamed. Previously invested narcissistic 
resources from former relationships and understandings are dissolved under the 
weight of attack from the blamer.  The blamed party also suffers loss, and that loss 
seems justified too. The blamed party has disappointed both the blamer and the 
group’s common ideal. 
 
The tendency for some organisation members to take the blame for events that are 
not their fault can be linked to Ferenczi’s theories of identification with the aggressor 
(1955).  Ferenczi theorised that, given a choice between being emotionally 
abandoned by an abusive parent or identifying with the abuser (becoming like them) 
as way of surviving, the child will choose the latter.   The most difficult concept for a 
small child to imagine is being emotionally abandoned and therefore, blaming 
himself for the abuse is more acceptable than being left alone with its consequences.   
In adult life, this can lead to ‘a chronic tendency to comply’ or a ‘lack of conviction 
in one’s beliefs’ (Frankel, 2004:80).   Blaming oneself preserves the fantasy that the 
other is less bad than we imagine and alleviates the anxiety of abandonment or 
isolation.  Extending an understanding of blame beyond a dyad introduces the 
concept of the scapegoat.  
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The scapegoat 
 
Since biblical times, the scapegoat has functioned to regain the favour of the gods 
and to atone for corporate misbehavior.  The Hebrew scriptures describe the origins 
of the scapegoating practice among the Jewish high priests on the holiest day of their 
liturgical year when a male goat was sent into the wilderness taking with him the 
sins of the children of Israel.27  There are two mechanisms at work in the act of 
scapegoating.  The first is the use of projection to facilitate the evacuation of 
unwanted/uncomfortable feelings onto another.  The second mechanism at work is 
the displacement of aggressive feelings, which cannot be directed towards the 
appropriate actor (Toker, 1972). Scapegoating is a group process: although the 
activity appears to take place in a dyad between blamer and accused, it requires a 
witness or third person in order to be truly effective.  This distinguishes scapegoating 
as a systemic method of appointing blame, separate from but related to the individual 
previously referred to. The scapegoat performs an important role in group-
functioning by being the target for unacceptable feelings.  It allows for the stability 
of the group to remain unchallenged and is an enactment of projective identification.  
The act of scapegoating is a systemic act of blame perpetrated by one person on 
behalf of the group for the purposes of managing intolerable feelings. These 
intolerable feelings (such as intimacy, aggression, guilt) cause group members to 
regress to earlier and younger modes of functioning.  Freud described this act of 
regression as the reenactment of the earliest relationships between parent and child 
and between siblings i.e., as taking place within the first group to which we belong 
(Freud, 1955b).  In Freud’s view the act of regression was an individual phenomenon 
enacted within a group context.  Freud’s views were developed and challenged by 
Bion (1961) who believed that more primitive fantasies were enacted in a group 
context than those described by Freud. These fantasies were so disturbing that 
defences needed to be erected to prevent their conscious experience.   
 
Bion’s basic assumptions articulate the process by which scapegoats are nominated 
to perform the redemptive task of saving the group from a conscious encounter with 
its unconscious fantasy.  The fantasy of the scapegoat as a lone individual, operating 
outside the influence of the group is shown to be misguided even though the 
                                                
27The ritual is described in Leviticus 16:1-34 (KJV Pew Bible, 1991) 
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scapegoat, as a member of the group, must deal with his own repressed feelings as 
well as the projected feelings of other group members (Gemmil, 2010).  The 
scapegoat holds the disowned and unarticulated elements of the group and is 
attacked precisely because he represents this aspect of the group’s unconscious.  The 
scapegoat, through the initiatory act (Gemmil, 2010) of articulating the unspoken 
feelings of the group, gives permission to follow and in so doing, expedites his own 
extrusion.  The function of the scapegoating process is the blaming and expulsion of 
the scapegoat in the illusory fantasy that this will rid group members of 
uncomfortable feelings.  
 
According to psychodynamic thought, what remains unrecognised is that while 
blame is enacted between individuals on the group level, its essential roots are within 
the psychology of the blamer. Blaming an individual for an event does not mean that 
they are responsible for it but rather reveals the blamer’s distrust of the offending 
person’s explanation (Tennen and Affleck, 1990). When the blamer is capable of 
neutralising internally held conflict, the externalising action of blame becomes 
unnecessary and the disappointments and imperfections of others become the fertile 
ground for learning rather than aggression.  Only when internal conflict remains 
active, with its awareness capable of upsetting a fragile psychological equilibrium, 
does the defensive action of blame protect the blamer from the upsetting awareness 
of insight.  
 
Blame originates in the interpersonal processes of developmental learning.  It 
continues defensively as an individually-led manifestation of group behaviour in 
which the inner conflicts of a group member are relieved by aggressive displacement 
and withdrawal of love from another. In the process, both accuser and fellow group 
members are incentivised through the benefits of personal narcissistic pleasures, 
while defensive action is justified both in the behaviour and punishment of an 
external other. The blamed individual further blames himself, adding insult to injury, 
in the desire to affirm group affinities. Blame functions as an activity defending the 
individual and group from the creative disturbance of insight. The group leader 
remains unmindful of personal conflicts and his role in defending the group’s 
fragilities. Group members remain unmindful both of their own invidious feelings 
towards the blamer as a breaker of group norms and of their group roles. The blamed 
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finally remains unmindful not only of his own conflicts but of his role within a group 
hypocrisy focused on the false construction of rationality but operating on the level 
of group defence.  
 
The beauty of blame is that it preserves the fiction that we understand; and, will act 
forcefully based on that understanding. While many of us seek information to 
manage our anxiety, very few of us knowingly seek information that would increase 
anxiety; yet this is the only effective information-seeking to neutralise blame. Why 
upset certainty when that upset increases our emotional pain? Rather, blame operates 
in the opposite direction: it projects transformed anxiety outward as righteous 
aggression.  
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to develop an understanding of disappointment as a systemic 
phenomenon.  The appointment of blame is the first part of the mechanism by which 
disappointment is productively utilised as a method for separating from the past and 
reimagining the future. The previous chapter, an unwanted feeling conceptualised 
disappointment as a dynamic interaction between three positions: I am 
disappointing; I am disappointed: I disappoint. The appointment of blame described 
the first and second positions within the membership of one organisation and 
outlined how adherence to those positions facilitated the emergence of a new 
organisational vision.   In the coming together of any organisation there will be a 
necessary omnipotent fantasy of possibility against which disappointment is 
defended. In the case of STL, the omnipotent fantasy was of an organisation that 
could redress previous experiences of disappointment in public service delivery in 
the area of homelessness and compensate for the lack of internal and external 
markers of success and the felt lack of occupational worth in previous work settings.  
STL emerged from the unsatisfied expectations of its members as a container of 
renewed expectation.  
 
The appointment of blame is the first part of the disappointment cycle in which 
unacceptable feelings are extruded from the group with a view to creating the fantasy 
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of the ‘all good’ organisation. In the case of STL unacceptable feelings were located 
in the previous work settings of its members and in the wider homeless sector, which 
was perceived to be wasteful of resources.  Blaming previous experiences allowed 
the fantasy of a satisfactory and ‘good’ organisation to be created in the minds of its 
founders.  In this sense, the appointment of blame is the mechanism by which 
organisation stability is contained and contested. The vision expressed by its 
members reinforces the idea of STL as a satisfying work setting that delivers on 
services to end-users and customer and offers redress for individuals’ previous 
disappointments. In other words, the organisational vision is a containing mechanism 
for omnipotence.  However, this vision is predicated on a split between 
disappointment (previous work settings) and satisfaction (STL).  The members of 
STL, in this early stage of development, cannot tolerate both satisfaction and 
disappointment in their own organisational system.  STL is constructed as a 
container of ‘good’; previous work settings are constructed as ‘bad’.  The only 
tolerable challenge to organisational omnipotence is in previous work settings: once 
hopeful and satisfying places they are now constructed as disappointing.  The 
appointment of blame is a necessary precondition for future action.  In this sense 
disappointment can be seen as a useful and productive emotion assisting in the 
transition from ‘before’ to ‘now’.  However, in re-idealising the future organisation, 
members are faced with the choice of repeating the past or working through 
disappointment in the service of creating a new ideal.  The appointment of blame 
describes the systemic representation of the two positions ‘I am disappointed’ and ‘I 
am disappointing’ in which the division between good and bad, satisfaction and 
disappointment, is organised as a separate process.  The organisation of 
disappointment in this manner offers two choices, repetition of the past or flight 
from it.  Positions 1 and 2 offer no opportunity for learning, review or reflection.  
The systemic success of positions 1 and 2 can be summarised as follows. 
 
Disappointment is always located in the past and as failure of self or other to deliver 
on internalised ideas of satisfaction.  The future is a place of possibility and 
‘newness’.  This splitting reinforces the fantasy that failure is not an everyday 
occurrence thus leaving organisations unprepared and unable to address the likely 
occurrence of success and failure happening simultaneously.  The politics of 
positivity is reinforced through the relegation of disappointment to the past with its 
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implicit understanding that to disappoint is to fail.  The organisational threat of 
failure hangs over the heads of organisation members who are unconsciously 
coerced into (and unconsciously collude with) the myth of ‘success’. The 
appointment of blame alerts us to the realisation that some emotions (even ‘negative’ 
emotions) are more acceptable in organisations than others.  Blame, as one of those 
negative emotions, performs a useful function in that it tidies up and organises messy 
feelings by locating them in individuals and groups on behalf of the wider system.  
The data generated in this study offers insight into the useful and productive 
outcomes from such activity.  In the case of STL, the organisation of disappointment 
through the appointment of blame allows for a renewed sense of possibility on the 
part of organisation members without the uncomfortable intrusion of reflection and 
insight.  A new version of possibility emerges and is translated into vision and goals.  
The appointment of blame is the strategy by which past failures are relegated to a 
safe distance creating the possibility of newness in the future.  However, the system 
itself remains without reflective mechanisms for addressing the placement of 
system-generated disappointment within its members’ individual domains.   
 
The following chapter develops and extends the collective production and systemic 
understanding of disappointment.  Reimagining the future describes the process by 
which the third position, I disappoint, emerges as a tolerable position for the 
organisation.  
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8 Reimagining the future  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to explore the collective production and systemic manifestation 
of position 3 the realisation that ‘I disappoint’.  ‘Reimagining the future’ examines 
the process by which a potentially destructive episode termed the core 
disappointment is transformed into a creative and productive experience through its 
movement into position 3. The act of reimagination involves: (1) the transformation 
of past idealisations, both fragmented and emotionally defended against within 
positions 1 and 2; and (2) the integration of fragmented thought.  This takes place 
through a return of the organisation’s thinking capacity in which there is a realistic 
assessment of potential catastrophe as shaping a new organisational vision for the 
future. 
 
The process begins in the resolution of a paradox.  The constructed defensive 
strengths of positions 1 and 2 have so far been successful in ensuring the imaginary 
sustainability of the organisation. But core disappointment represents a different type 
of disruption: one with the potential to destroy the organisation.  Paradoxically, the 
very constructions devised to survive disappointment now threaten the organisation 
in that their blindness precludes productive action under the pressure of reality. The 
knowledge of potential organisational distress precipitates a crisis, challenging the 
complacencies secured through positions 1 and 2.  The organisation of 
disappointment through positions 1 and 2 is now recognised as a disappointing 
methodology.  Survival of the organisation requires the integration of previously 
fragmented thought and displaced emotion which facilitates the movement into 
position 3 (I disappoint).  The previously idealised once-imagined future, challenged 
by the core disappointment, must now be mourned and a new and sustainable image 
must take its place if the organisation is to survive. 
 
The chapter commences with an overview of the hierarchies of disappointment 
representative of the daily life of any organisation. Each day, yesterday’s plans must 
be referenced and adjusted in light of today’s realities. Overcoming these daily 
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disappointments and losses termed ordinary disappointments is continuous and 
represents constant adaptation to change. This process of adaptation and change, or 
to put it another way, the experience of daily disappointments and losses, is 
metabolised into daily functioning. Because it is so basic to organisational life, it 
goes un-noted.  Yet, it is at the heart of management, representing a type of 
disruption that is a manageable part of organising.  Ideally, through such continuous 
management, the organisational fantasy of stability remains unthreatened by daily 
disappointment.   
 
The core disappointment is then introduced.  This significant incident represents the 
potential destruction of STL and forces the owners to address the strategies 
employed to sustain the fantasy of a thriving and successful business.  The principals 
are faced with a choice: to continue with their strategy of appointing blame which 
will inevitably prevent learning and lead to the destruction of the company or, to 
reimagine the future of STL. Reimagining the future becomes the process by which 
the owners ensure the survival of the company.  
 
I then use psychodynamic theories of loss and mourning  (those of Freud and Klein 
in particular) to explore these dynamics.  The concept of loss and mourning is central 
to psychodynamic theory as it confronts us as with the inevitability of death and the 
paradoxical demand that we continue living.  The function of mourning is a process 
of ‘working through that leads to the acceptance of what has been lost’ (Melgar, 
2009:121).  Finally I will refer to the management literature on loss.  The emotional 
experience of loss is under-represented in management research.  Where loss is 
considered, it is linked with failure and considered to be the emotional fallout of 
unsuccessful business ventures.  Loss, riding on the emotional coattails of failure, is 
conceptualised as a negative emotion and relegated to the category of unhelpful and 
unproductive experience.  
 
Hierarchies of disappointment 
 
There are hierarchies of disappointment.  At its most basic level, disappointment 
represents the requirement to modify existing ways of doing things.  The daily life of 
an organisation can be conceptualised as the process of adapting to this change. 
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Organisation change is a broad and sophisticated area of research ranging from 
models in which it is conceived as planned and externally driven (see, for example, 
Lewin, 1958) to theories of organising in which change is conceptualised as a 
component part of the organising lifecycle (see, for example, Campbell, 2000, Carr, 
1999, Hatch, 1999, Marris, 1986).   
 
Whether in Human Resources, strategy, customer relations, finance or indeed 
‘change management’ (Kotter, 1996), yesterday’s plans must be revisited in the light 
of today’s realities.  Recovery from manageable loss is a core component of 
organising and a central feature of management literature. I term these manageable 
losses ordinary disappointments.  They present no damage to organisational 
effectiveness and, as well as being absorbed into day-to-day organising, are 
frequently addressed through interventions such as executive consultation or various 
strategising processes.  
 
Workers, like managers, vary in their personal susceptibility to daily disappointment. 
For managers, inability to tolerate and adapt to daily disappointment may result in 
the potential for ‘derailment’ with referral to executive coaching.  To the degree that 
such daily disappointments frustrate the worker, they are either metabolised by the 
individual (for example, taken home) or added to the growing pile of small 
frustrations that can’t be dealt with effectively in daily life.   
 
At another level, there are disappointments that challenge the very existence of the 
organisation and which cannot be metabolised by organisation members.  These I 
term the core disappointment.  The core disappointment represents the potential 
destruction of the organisation and, from a psychodynamic perspective, a significant 
fear against which the organisation is defended.  A summary of the characteristics of 
each is outlined in the following table. 
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Table 5 Hierarchies of disappointment 
 
Ordinary disappointment 
 
Core disappointment 
Feelings evoked are tolerable Feelings evoked are intolerable 
Tolerable feelings are integrated and 
contained within the organisation 
system.  Splitting is not utilised as a 
strategy to manage feelings 
Intolerable feelings are uncontainable 
within the organisation system.  Splitting 
is utilised as a strategy to manage 
intolerable feelings  
Within the realm of expectation Beyond the realm of expectation 
Can be anticipated and planned for Is not anticipated 
Organisation members can manage and 
adapt to change 
Organisation members are unable to 
manage and adapt to change 
Organisation members feel empowered 
to make necessary changes 
Organisation members feel powerless to 
make changes 
Threatens to disrupt the work of the 
organisation (its content) 
Threatens to destroy the actual existence 
of the organisation (its structure) 
Interpreted as learning—‘life’ Interpreted as absence of learning—
‘death’ 
Does not threaten the organisation ideal Threatens the organisation ideal 
 
 
Ordinary disappointments in STL 
 
Ordinary disappointments occur on a daily basis in organisations.  The change they 
represent is routine and not perceived to be disruptive to the organisation’s capacity 
to function.  Neither do they pose a threat to the ‘integrity of what has already been 
learned’ (Marris, 1986:21).  Ordinary disappointments do not threaten the 
fundamental rationale for the organisation’s existence and, as such are absorbed into 
the daily routine of work. 
 
The following narratives highlight examples of ordinary disappointments mastered 
in the day-to-day life of STL. 
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I had hoped to house one person this week but the property fell 
through at the last minute.  So he is disappointed and so am I…but 
we’ll sort it out…it’ll be grand – I think we’ll have him housed 
within the week in another place so in the long run it’s a hitch but 
nothing we can’t cope with (Mark) 
 
The last few weeks have been brilliant – if we got through that we 
can get through anything – it’s very much…a learning curve but it’s 
like we’ve been through shit and we got through it anyway and got 
on with the work and I think we’re better now, we’re more open… I 
think because the work we started is coming into fruition (Marie) 
 
Well the start up of the company took much longer than expected, 
negotiations with the [customer] took ages …but we’ve adjusted our 
strategy and extended a few deadlines here and there so at the end of 
the day we are back on target (Adam) 
 
These three quotations demonstrate the capacity of the individuals and the 
organisational system to adapt to unplanned changes. The first reflects STL’s bread-
and-butter work of locating housing for its end-users.  Mark describes personal 
disappointment (his and the end-user’s) at not reaching a target to provide a house.  
The disappointment represents a disruption to existing plans, but Mark represents it 
as a ‘hitch’.  In this instance he can see a resolution to the disappointment: deadlines 
will have to be moved but the client will ultimately be housed.   
 
The next example of ordinary disappointment concerns the developmental process of 
organisational learning. Marie describes the aftermath of a disappointing effort to 
secure a number of properties (the quality of the properties was misrepresented and 
did not conform to building regulations).  In this instance, the learning from the 
disappointment is represented as a voyage through ‘shit’.  Yet, she remains 
optimistic and reframes the ‘shit’ as a component part of the broader work of the 
organisation.   
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In the third example, Adam describes a potentially larger threat to organisational 
effectiveness: a delay in negotiating contractual details with the company’s only 
customer and the resultant delay in formalising the company start-up. In this instance 
Adam contextualises the disappointment as part of the longer-term strategy for the 
organisation.  He has the capacity to shift deadlines and adapt the company’s 
strategy to respond to the unplanned delay. 
 
Ordinary disappointments represent the basic challenges faced by organisational 
members on a regular basis.  Organisation members demonstrate their capacity to 
manage and adapt to the unplanned events. Polarised positions are not taken up in 
relation to the disruption.  The defining characteristics of ordinary disappointments 
are that the feelings evoked are tolerable, the individual feels empowered to make 
necessary changes to alleviate the disappointment and the disappointments do not 
represent a threat to organisational stability.  The fantasy of the all-good and 
satisfying organisation remains in tact.   
 
Such disappointments are not experienced as an attack on organisation members or 
on the organisation itself. This allows members to consider them ‘hitches’ or 
interruptions to the planned work of the company rather than a fatal disruption to its 
existence or as a personal attack on an individual’s own capacity. Ordinary 
disappointments represent uncomfortable yet manageable emotional challenges for 
organisation members and splitting is not required as a way of organising the 
feelings evoked.  Ordinary disappointments represent the capacity of the 
organisation to tolerate ‘good enough’ and ‘bad enough’ feelings at the same time.  
Neither overwhelms the capacity of individuals to perform their work task and 
neither threatens to destroy the existence of the organisation.  
 
The core disappointment 
 
Ordinary disappointments neither evoke an organisationally disruptive defensive 
response nor result in ‘basic assumption’ behaviour as described by Bion (1961). 
Rather, ordinary disappointments are seamlessly folded into the day-to-day work of 
the organisation. Their daily resolution is in the service of Bion’s ‘primary task’ 
(1961). Ordinary disappointments are tolerable and public. While they may disrupt 
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individual or organisational complacency, they do not threaten the organisation. 
Because organisations are developed in hierarchical silos along the task-related lines 
of Simon’s ‘bounded rationality’ (1991) ordinary disappointments are knowable. If 
they are not predictable, they are still within the realm of expectation and resolution 
is achievable within the scope of one’s role and duties. 
 
However, the same hierarchical structure lacks categories for potentially unbearable 
events and situations that fall beyond the categories of acceptable loss and change 
just as they fall outside the organisation’s silos of bounded rationality. Organisations 
are not structured for this type of event, nor do they have adequate processes for 
dealing with it.  The core disappointment represents a type of catastrophic change 
that threatens to destroy the organisation.  The following data reflect the 
development of catastrophic disappointment at STL. 
 
One year into the contract with their customer, STL believed they were on target to 
fulfil their contractual obligation of accommodating one hundred people in 
sustainable housing within two years.  Adam and Paul had established the company, 
secured private housing, contracted staff and begun the process of housing referrals 
from the customer.  Leaving time for the establishment of the organisation, at the 
end of the first year of their contract 30% of the agreed target numbers had been met, 
and the principals were confident of achieving 100% within the timescale agreed.  
 
There had been some personnel changes within the customer’s system during this 
time.  The senior executive who had championed the initiative had left, and 
responsibility for the project now rested with a different manager with less authority 
in the organisation. 
 
One year from the date of signing the contract and nine months from the formal start 
of the project, managing director Adam and manager Sally attended what they 
believed to be a routine meeting with their customer. Adam and Sally were excited 
and confident about the meeting.  They had updates about recently housed end-users 
and projections for the coming months:   
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We met the evening before…thinking…’this is going to be 
grand’…..we met that morning for coffee saying ‘this will be grand’ 
laughing and joking going out the door (Sally) 
 
I actually said to Sally – ‘I don’t see anything that could go wrong 
here’ (Adam) 
 
They were not prepared for the news they received at the outset of the meeting. The 
customer told them that the service was ‘not working’ and it was their view that it 
‘never would’.   
 
AB came in and sat down and said ‘right, this is not a success’ 
(Adam) 
 
STL was criticised for the low number of end-users that had been housed.  Adam 
and Sally were ‘interrogated’ about the social care credentials of their staff, criticised 
for taking so long to ‘ramp up’ the organisation and told that the evaluation of the 
project would go ahead without input from STL as to the terms of reference or the 
consultant to be appointed.  Adam and Sally were also asked how they intended to 
refund the local authority any outstanding monies when (not if) they failed to reach 
the agreed target numbers at the end of the two-year period.  The meeting proceeded 
in a confrontational and aggressive manner leaving Adam and Sally feeling angry 
and upset: 
 
We were just so shocked and I think we were going in with a great 
sense of achievement and pride that day going ‘listen this is great – 
look at, look at…’ and all of a sudden they just stripped that away… 
we were shocked (Sally) 
 
The meeting kept going in a confrontational manner right through to 
the end… maybe the confidence had just been battered out of us 
(Adam) 
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Adam and Sally had not anticipated a hostile response to their achievements to date. 
Their fantasy was of a receptive and grateful customer who would appreciate their 
hard work and be pleased that they were on target to achieve their contractual 
obligations.  An assumption fuelling the fantasy was that they had similar goals for 
the initiative: 
 
That’s how we got the service up and running. We met people who 
were willing to take a chance on it ‘cos it was something new. They 
were willing to take a chance on us as a private organisation. And 
with that type of a background and that type of relationship, this 
service can be brought to fruition quite positively (Adam) 
 
Following this meeting the relationship between STL and their customer deteriorated.  
Marie and Mark experienced delays in processing paperwork for end-users, an 
increasing number of ‘problematic clients’ were referred to them and outstanding 
invoices were not honoured.  Two subsequent meetings between STL and the 
customer failed to resolve the tension between the two organisations.  The customer 
formally wrote to STL to outline its disappointment with the number of end-users 
housed and the way in which the service was being delivered.   
 
The customer continued to withhold payment, and with six months of outstanding 
payments due, Adam instructed lawyers to begin proceedings against the customer 
for breach of contract.  Within two weeks, all outstanding invoices were paid in full.  
At the end of the two-year period STL had housed one hundred people, on time and 
on budget as per their contract. The customer then decided to put the service out to 
tender, and STL was invited to respond.  The contract was awarded to one of STL’s 
competitors in the market.   
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The organisation of disappointment  
 
Position 1: I am disappointing 
 
The initial shock of the meeting with their customer caused STL to move into a 
defensive position which evoked positions 1 and 2 of the organisation of 
disappointment, ‘I am disappointing’ and ‘I am disappointed’.  STL were confronted 
with not living up to the expectations of their customer.  The customer used figures 
and bureaucratic processes (e.g., withholding payment) to support their contention 
that STL was failing to deliver on its part of the contractual relationship.  No 
explanation during the meeting seemed to impact on the negative image the 
customer had of STL.  Adam felt as though he was the recipient of hatred from the 
customer and he could not understand what was happening:  
 
I simply can’t understand where this level of vitriol is coming 
from…what have we done to deserve this? It makes no rational sense 
(Adam) 
 
Adam’s comment helps us to understand the powerful emotional impact of position 
1.   The feelings make ‘no rational sense’, and Adam cannot understand why he (and 
STL) is the recipient of such ‘vitriol’.  He is confused and dazed but, perhaps more 
importantly, he experiences ‘I am disappointing’ as an attack on his capacity to 
think28.  It is this element of position 1 that defends against learning.  If the capacity 
to think is suffocated by overwhelming confusion, shame, guilt and a sense of 
persecution, no amount of reasoning will facilitate the metabolisation of the 
experience in a useful and productive way.  In living out the projection and fantasy 
of the other, position 1 generates an undermining and self-defeating process of 
questioning ‘what have we done to deserve this?’  Adam’s inability to think 
(however true or false this is) justifies the blame heaped on him by his customer.  He 
is literally unable to think his way out of the situation (he must be doing something 
                                                
28 This is an example of Bion’s ‘attacks on linking’ which is an elaboration of Melanie Klein’s 
concept of splitting in which psychotic anxiety prevents curiosity, inquiry or a capacity to make sense 
of one’s emotional experience (Bion, 1959). 
 207 
wrong) and is therefore unable to come up with a defence.  Left unexplored, position 
1 sustains the fantasy that STL has failed in its mission to deliver.  Position 1 evokes 
the politics of positivity once again.  Under these politics, to be wrong is to be a 
failure, hence blame for being wrong is initially self-directed.   
Position 2: I am disappointed 
 
The immediacy of this attack, paired with the owners’ inability to think, propelled 
them into position 1. In time, they were able to construe events, together with a 
renewed sense of earlier disappointments, as deserving of blame. ‘I am disappointing’ 
characterised their self-appraisal. While this self-appraisal necessarily limited their 
scope of consideration in considering the attack, it also provided a kind of solace for 
the pain they had suffered.  In this sense, the defensiveness of position 1 also 
provided a foundation for new growth in the temporary (if erroneous) lessening of 
anxiety.  With the lessening of anxiety, the thinking capacity was able to return. At 
this point they generated together a number of hypotheses as to what might be 
happening in the relationship between the company and their customer.  These 
included: 
 
There was love in the air when that [contract] was signed, and the 
guy we were dealing with  [CD]… was saying to us ‘this is really 
important to me – I want this to work – let’s work this together, it’ll 
look good for all of us’ you know? CD leaves and he gets replaced 
with someone that really isn’t that interested.  So I think there was a 
natural inclination for them to rubbish what was agreed with the 
previous people. And CD was perceived very much as a maverick 
and a self-motivated guy who worked outside the system to make 
things happen (Paul) 
 
We just started. We didn’t have those roots into – be it into other 
parts of the [customer’s system], be it into politicians or the media 
(Adam) 
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These two hypotheses are suggestive of the paranoid-schizoid position: STL is the 
victim of a political agenda at work in the customer’s system, or STL was not 
sufficiently networked within the political or media systems to utilise usefully 
informal contacts to address the dilemma.  The ‘love in the air’ implies a type of 
intimacy between STL and its customer.  From a psychodynamic perspective, this 
evokes oedipal associations.  STL was championed and favoured by the executive in 
the system; their project was considered superior to that which the customer 
currently employed.  This evoked strong feelings from staff.  For example, at an 
early stage in negotiations, staff (in the customer’s system) referred STL’s proposal 
to their union, fearing it would result in a loss of jobs and authority.  STL’s proposal 
was subsequently referred to a government department for review and amendment.   
These anxieties and delays added a further six months to contract negotiations: 
 
During this time we had about six discussions with [representatives 
of the customer’s system] most of whom were being courteous but 
ultimately they didn’t want this project to progress, because it would 
require them to do things differently (Paul) 
 
It is possible to hypothesise that there was jealousy and envy within the customer 
system about the favoured new child (STL) who received the love and attention of 
the father (their manager and STL’s contact).  STL’s model was clearly gaining 
approval even though it would require a change in the customer’s way of delivering 
its commitments. These feelings may have been dumped on STL and were 
experienced by them as punishment for the loss of their manager’s interest (and the 
actual loss of the manager when he moved to another organisation). 
 
The unconscious fantasy contained in these data extracts is that there is some kind of 
conspiracy against STL.  This sustains the fantasy that STL is a good organisation 
which is delivering on its mission and is merely victimised by a set of circumstances 
over which it has no control.  The client organisation is a disappointing system 
which cannot deliver on its contractual obligations, caught in a never-ending 
political process from which it dispenses illogical messages and powerful feelings of 
anger, vitriol and rage to its service provider.  ‘I am disappointed’ allows STL to 
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blame the customer for being inadequate while sustaining the fantasy of its own 
potency to deliver.  
 
The polarisations were subsequently played out between STL and its customer.  The 
customer supplied more ‘difficult’ clients for STL to house and failed to remunerate 
STL for its services.  STL adhered to the detail of their contract and escalated the 
issue by referring it to their legal team.   As time evolved, the positions of both 
agencies became more entrenched.  This period of time was characterised by strong 
emotions and powerful fantasies on the part of organisational members:  
 
I was devastated… I cried my eyes out…we had worked so hard to 
get this far and they [customer] couldn’t/wouldn’t see it.  What was 
the point of it all? (Sally) 
 
I saw him [customer] in the distance some day last week, and it 
happened to be this horrible red haired ugly man who looked like he 
had every weight of the world on him – and I genuinely for just a 
moment thought ‘Oh My God there he is’. I looked again and it 
wasn’t him. But I was thinking ‘Oh My God wouldn’t it have been 
great if it was him – and if he’d fallen in front a bus’ or something 
(Adam) 
 
These two quotes capture the resignation and impotence associated with position 1 
and the rage and attack associated with position 2.  To remain either in position 1 or 
position 2, blaming self or client, serves to buffer pain and incredulity. Yet, the 
defensive binding of hurt only blunts clear thinking aimed at further action in the 
preservation of STL. Being stuck in these positions, in fact, looked likely to aid the 
destruction of the STL organisation rather than to save it (its leaders) from anxiety.  
Were the rhythm of the Kleinian movement from the paranoid-schizoid position to 
hold true, positions 1 and 2 should give way to the depressive position, with 
reparation emerging from the guilty sense that the blaming of others has caused 
damage. 
 
Yet, in this organisational sense, the only damage facing STL was to its own survival. 
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The attacks contained in ‘I am disappointing’ and ‘I am disappointed’ successfully 
contained difficult feelings; but remaining anchored to this strategy would eventually 
lead to immobilisation and the firm’s destruction. STL had been structured around 
the design and delivery of a distinct service which had been tailored for particular 
market conditions.  The relationship with their client had been permanently damaged 
and STL was sure that it would not secure another contract from this agency.  The 
only way to ensure the survival of the organisation was to mourn the future. 
Mourning the future refers to the mourning of the idealisation which is required to 
integrate good/bad and to reimagine a more ‘realistic’ future.  The owners and staff 
of STL were confronted with the realisation that the future as they had envisioned it 
was never going to materialise.  Paul would not be in a position to buy a ‘fuck off’ 
gift for his wife for their anniversary; Adam’s desire to give a ‘one up’ to the whole 
system would never happen.  The three inter-linking processes that defined the 
vision of STL namely, (1) the principals’ experience of disappointment in public 
service delivery in the area of homelessness, (2) the need for external markers of 
success linked to the internal sense of self-worth on the part of the principals, and (3) 
the lack of felt occupational self-worth in previous work settings, all had not been 
adequately challenged or changed by STL.  
 
Position 3: I disappoint 
 
Adam and Paul recognised that there could be no reconciliation with the customer. 
To continue to invest their energy in these polarised positions would disable them 
from addressing the pressing business concerns. To focus on the customer (and all 
that this relationship represented) would ensure the closure of STL.  Positions 1 and 
2 are limiting and limited strategies which, however, help to contain enough anxiety 
so that thinking (which characterises position 3) re-emerges. That it occurs in a 
company where there is sufficient authority to re-direct organisational vision, is also 
crucial. Position 3 must be in alignment with the politics of organisational power. 
 
It felt very satisfying to hate them for a while – I mean, you can 
derive a lot of energy from that and it certainly bonded us as a 
group… but after a while you realise that all of your attention is 
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going to the past and what hasn’t worked, and staying stuck in that… 
well… it’s not healthy… we have to free up energy to do something 
different… we’re not the company we thought we were, and that’s 
really sad… but maybe we can be a different and better company? 
(Paul) 
 
I have two views on it – one is I’m disappointed by it because I was 
trying to develop a business here which is gaining some traction 
from an operational and delivery point of view, and probably has 
been derailed by virtue of this. Another part is that if this is the way 
they [customer] are, then I don’t want a contract with them. I don’t 
want to go through this again…it’s been too painful and has cost too 
much (Adam) 
 
But we have to work on the basis that this contract is not going to be 
repeated.  Therefore we’ve got to focus on some other business 
development areas. And you know as a consequence there’s a few 
things… on the cards. So it’s a focus on developing the business 
through other contracts at this stage rather than expecting this one to 
be renewed (Adam) 
 
STL continued to deliver the service, and the owners made a decision to prepare a 
response to the public tendering process initiated by the customer.  However, they 
realised that they would be unsuccessful in winning further business from the 
customer29 and had to make some difficult decisions in relation to the business in 
order to ensure its survival.  The contracts of two staff members, Marie and Mark, 
were not renewed, and Adam accepted a reduced fee for his management services.   
As time went on organisation members recognised that perhaps their way of doing 
things was incongruent with the way in which the customer was used to doing 
business:   
 
                                                
29 This was subsequently proved to be the case when the next contract was awarded to one of STL’s 
competitors. 
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I think perhaps we challenged the system a bit (Sally) 
 
Their initial champion was an executive who was also perceived to be a ‘bit of a 
rebel’ and this mutual recognition served to fuel the fantasy that the system could be 
changed dramatically.   The principals recognised that their desire to ‘challenge the 
system’ could have been perceived as an attack on the system.  The integration of 
split-off aspects of STL (confined previously in positions 1 and 2) propelled the 
organisation into position 3 and initiated the process of reimagining the future. 
 
The emotional atmosphere in STL changed.  The departure of staff, the uncertainty 
about the future and the subsidence of rage and shame led to a more contemplative 
atmosphere in the organisation.  Adam began to use the meetings with the researcher 
as way of ‘talking out’ and ‘trying to make sense’ of his and the company’s 
experiences.  He expressed a desire to understand what this core disappointment had 
meant for him personally and for the company.  The researcher was invited to 
participate as a ‘trusted outsider’ and to feed back observations and reflections.  The 
discussions focused on the experience and manifestation of disappointment.  In 
particular Adam discussed his sense of shame, anger, failure and, most poignantly, 
loss.  As the conversations continued and the day-to-day work of the organisation 
culminated in the completion of the contract, the emotional tone in STL shifted to 
sadness and loss.  Adam’s capacity to experience the full range of emotion in 
relation to the core disappointment allowed for a more full expression of feelings 
amongst staff.  The ‘way we do things’ shifted from a focus on numbers housed to 
discussions of loss and recovery.   
 
The organisation members’ capacity to think returned, allowing them to reorganise 
and regroup.  Adam and Paul slowly began to reconfigure STL’s product offering, 
and they were successful in securing new business opportunities.  On a practical 
level, a new office was procured.  The existing one was associated too closely with 
the previous contract, and the staff wanted literally and metaphorically to ‘close the 
door’. STL was reconfigured to provide a similar service to a different client group, 
and the company has been successful in winning contracts in other sectors.  
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On a more profound level, Adam and Paul began to discuss their working 
partnership and how it had coped with the challenges the company had faced in the 
previous two years.  They made a decision to part ways: Paul would focus on his 
full-time position in another company and Adam would work full time with STL.  
The core disappointment served to highlight other ruptures within the STL system 
which could no longer be ignored.  Paul and Adam had become frustrated with each 
other’s management style, and this had been exacerbated by the crisis with their 
customer.  They were at risk of enacting positions 1 and 2 and perpetuating the 
splitting that had been generated through the core disappointment.  Reflecting on this 
parallel process with the help of the researcher, they realised that their ‘organisations 
in the mind’ were different. It wasn’t that one was better than the other, it was 
simply that they differed.   Adam and Paul discussed their disappointments in each 
other and their fantasies of what STL was meant to be, and they decided on a 
mutually agreeable separation, which was devoid of blame, shame or anger.  
 
Psychoanalysis and mourning 
 
 
Mourning and loss are central themes in psychoanalysis, confronting us with the 
inevitability of death and the paradoxical demand that we deny its existence in order 
to continue to live. Freud reminds us that mourning is central to living and that if we 
renounce it, we renounce life.  Mourning, in this sense, reminds us of our 
attachments to other people (Phillips, 1995).  It is our capacity to mourn loved 
people and objects30 sufficiently that allows us to go on living. In this sense, the 
important task of mourning is the testing of reality (Freud, 1957).   This testing of 
reality involves a comparison between what we imagined and what is.  Organisations 
test the correspondence of ideas and strategies to reality every day through their 
management of ordinary disappointments.    
 
                                                
30 Normal mourning and pathological melancholia can arise in ‘reaction to the loss of a loved person, 
or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, and 
ideal, and so on’ (Freud, 1957:243).  
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According to Freud, everything we experience in mental life remains stored in our 
unconscious and can be retrieved under particular circumstances (Freud, 1961a).  To 
remember everything would be overwhelming, so the psyche practices a process of 
storage and retrieval.  Repressed memories are retrieved when we are psychically 
strong enough to process their meaning.  Psychoanalytic theory emphasises the 
importance of giving expression to repressed material.  Failure to do so can result in 
pathological behavior including ‘acting out’ which is a psychoanalytic term 
describing the process by which thought is replaced by action as a substitute for 
remembering (Rycroft, 1972).   The work of mourning, according to Freud, is a 
process of continued and obsessive remembering in which the loved and lost person 
(or object) is reified and idealised.  It is through the act of remembering that the lost 
object is kept alive until such time as the reality of their loss becomes apparent. This 
reality-testing allows the individual to relinquish their ties to the lost object. 
Mourning comes to a close when the individual is able to forget and reattach to a 
new substitute. Normal mourning is a process of remembering and forgetting. The 
loss of the loved object is no longer overwhelming and is contained as a memory that 
can be revisited.  Memories are stored for continual retrieval as required and it then 
becomes possible to forget and to go on living.  It is important to note at this point 
that the ‘going on’ described by Freud is not a simple return to things as they were.  
Going on requires a reimagination of the future in the absence of the loss of the 
loved object or person.  The future, once imagined in the presence of the loved 
object, must now also be mourned and a new future substituted in its place.  The 
project of mourning is not only retrospective, but also prospective.   
 
Mourning is also central to Klein’s theory of human development (Klein, 1975b).  
The movement from the paranoid-schizoid position into the depressive position is 
characterised by the presence of mourning.  Mourning emerges as a response to the 
recognition that damage has been done by the process of splitting.  The child 
experiences guilt and wishes to make reparation for its destructive acts, thus 
precipitating the move into the depressive position.  The depressive position is 
characterised by a recognition that good and bad are present in self and other.  The 
process of mourning can also be understood as a relinquishing of the fantasy of 
control (of self and other) and the realisation that disappointment is a central feature 
of relating.  The capacity to manage ambivalent feelings and, in particular, the 
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capacity to tolerate disappointment, is a form of reality-testing.  Klein proposes that 
mourning the fantasy of satisfaction and an ‘all good’ self or other allows for real 
relating to emerge.  A characteristic of this real relating is that consideration for the 
self is replaced with consideration for the other.  In this sense, it is our external 
relating to others and the guilt associated with the damage we have caused them that 
precipitates the movement into the third position. Some scholars, developing Klein 
and Bion’s work, suggest that it is the experience of collective guilt that propels the 
group from Basic Assumption to Work mode (Fraher, 2007).  In other words, 
collective guilt  is associated with damage done to other people.   
 
My research into disappointment suggests an alternative idea.  Position 3 emerges 
through a new capacity to think and reflect following the defensive postures of 
positions 1 and 2.  These restrictive positions do not reflect damage to others, hence 
they do not evoke Kleinian guilt. Position 1 reflects a personally directed and 
defensive assumption of guilt while position 2, in blaming, reflects an externalisation 
of rage. Why? At the heart of self-accusation and the blaming of others is the 
catastrophic damage potentially facing the organisation: core disappointment. Only 
through an awareness that the acts of cognitive and emotional splitting mirrored in 
positions 1 and 2 will indeed be successful in splitting up the organisation is 
movement possible into forward-looking thought.  
  
Certainly, if the integrative work of position 3 does not occur, damage will be borne 
by the individuals, themselves embedded within positions 1 and 2, as well as by the 
organisation. It is central, however that Klein’s theory is interpersonal whereas the 
organisation is a task-driven system of people. The issue is the construal of 
organisational survival rather than culpability for having wronged another.  
 
The successful management of anxiety through positions 1 and 2 and the inability to 
reintegrate difficult aspects of how the organisation relates will inevitably lead to its 
destruction.  Paradoxically it is only in acknowledging the organisations’s capacity 
to self destruct that the reintegration of the organisation is possible.  The mourning 
associated with this movement is the mourning of the loss of the idealised 
organisation: the STL that could change the way in which particular kinds of 
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services were delivered; the STL that would alleviate and remedy the experiences of 
its members’ disappointments from other work environments. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Where the emotional experience of loss appears in management literature, it is 
represented as the negative emotional fallout from business failure (Shepherd, 2003).  
It is also considered to be a response to succession (Kets de Vries, 1988); as 
representative of suffering in organisational life (Driver, 2007); or as a reaction to 
the death of a significant organisational member (or indeed the organisation itself) 
(Harris and Sutton, 1986, Hyde and Thomas, 2003, Marks and Vansteenkiste, 2008, 
Sutton, 1987).   Within the family business literature, loss is primarily associated 
with the dynamics of succession. Succession evokes strong feelings connected to the 
loss of role within the business but is also represented as a fear of loss of role within 
the family system.  Succession planning evokes anxieties about legacy and the 
inevitability of death, and as such, is tempered with considerable ambivalence: the 
desire to succeed one’s father and anxiety about filling his shoes. The family 
business can also be considered a symbolic representation of ‘mother’ in which the 
business represents nurturance and connectedness (Lansberg, 1988). From a 
psychodynamic perspective, the loss associated with succession represents the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex in which ‘the son symbolically defeats the father 
by starting his own business. He simultaneously builds and marries his organization; 
it represents the mother he could never win away from his father’ (Levinson, 1971) 
quoted in (Goleman, 1986).   Loss and failure are inextricably linked as negative 
aspects of business performance.  
 
Management literature has highlighted the emotional links between entrepreneurs 
and their businesses (Shepherd et al., 2009:144).  Entrepreneurs’ passion can lead to 
‘intense identification’ with work leading them in turn to leave aside other 
relationships to concentrate fully on their businesses (Cardon et al., 2005:38). In 
these scenarios, loss and failure are inextricably tied.   Loss is linked with personal 
failure which renders the subsequent emotional fallout a personal experience 
(Shepherd, 2003).   
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The characterisation of loss as personal, or as the fallout from business failure, 
reinforces the idea that emotions are unhelpful aspects of organising. Organisations 
are armoured against learning from loss, relegating it to being a by-product of day-
to-day mistakes rather than seeing it as a central element of business life.  In a 
political climate in which triumph triumphs, there is nothing to learn from loss.   
Seen in this way, loss (and other emotions characterised as ‘negative’) is a threat to 
effective organising.  Its presence signals a disruption of meaning and evokes 
anxiety that meaning will never be restored.   Successful mourning, according to 
Freud and Klein, is the process of attributing new meaning to changed circumstances.   
Conceptualised in this way, loss represents a challenge to the identity of the 
organisation and its members.  In the case of STL its initial flight into positions 1 
and 2 protected it from asking very serious questions about its rationale.   
 
STL’s organisation members reimagined a more realistic organisation ideal that 
included the following insights generated from consideration of the core 
disappointment:   
 
• A recognition of the value of emotion as a reflective tool that positively 
impacts on the ‘bottom line’; 
• Difficult and ‘negative’ emotions are a part of the daily work of organising 
and, as such, should be incorporated into how ‘we do things around here’.  
Emotion is not only personal but also organisational; 
• Given the political circumstances in which we operate, we could never be 
fully satisfying to the first customer.  Neither could our customer fully meet 
our expectations.   Disappointment will always be part of our business 
relationships.  We can’t eliminate it completely but we can be aware of how 
it manifests in our day-to-day business; 
• Damage is not only attributable to outside forces.  We have the capacity to 
damage and sabotage ourselves.  An awareness of this capacity can only be a 
useful insight in moving forward. 
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Adherence to positions 1 and 2 looked likely to facilitate the destruction of the 
organisation rather than saving it from its anxieties.  This differs from Klein's view 
that position 3, or the depressive position, comes into play when the individual 
becomes aware of the damage his attacks have caused thus inducing guilt and 
reparation.  I am suggesting that there is also an awareness that the attacks have been 
successful in keeping difficult feelings 'contained' though this strategy leads to 
destruction eventually.  The sustainability of the organisation is contingent on the 
integration of good/bad and a reimagining of the future as 'good enough'.  The core 
disappointment confronts organisation members with the efficiency of their defences 
and also with the inevitability of destruction.  At the same time, reconceptualised as 
loss rather than failure, the core disappointment presents an opportunity to ensure the 
survival of the organisation albeit in a different form.  The failure represented by 
positions 1 and 2, on the other hand, heralded the potential death of the organisation.  
It was only in such reconceptualisation as loss that STL could begin to reimagine the 
future and ultimately survive.   
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9 Summary of key ideas 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the key ideas outlined in the thesis. In particular I outline 
the relevance of the key ideas to organisational learning and then relate them to 
organisation theory.  I conclude the chapter by outlining ideas for further research. 
 
The excluded middle 
 
Success on any terms is the elusive idea of the organisation in the competitive 
marketplace. To appoint success as the goal is to drive for perfection and the realistic 
inevitability of falling-short of this ideal, this phantastic object of desire (Tuckett and 
Taffler, 2008), results in disappointment.  Therefore, disappointment becomes 
equivalent to failure, and loss, the necessary by-product of change itself becomes 
lost.  What is also lost is the opportunity to learn from what was not known—either 
by the organisation as a whole or by its members before the disappointment. 
 
The simplistic duality of positivism with its political severing of a whole into two 
parts (success and failure, good and bad) creates the problem of the excluded middle.  
This is exactly the territory of disappointment.  The recognition, in real time and 
action, of strategic hope which has been tempered by the realities of organisational 
engagement with the world. Blame concretises this dichotomy, justifying splitting 
and polarity. 
 
The present research underlines the significance of disappointment as a vehicle for 
organisational learning. Before disappointment itself can become a mainstream area 
of organisational study, however, it will be necessary to surface the two phantastic 
objects of organisational life that idealise what disappointment probes. These are the 
political fantasies, despite uncertainties, of maintaining organisational stability and 
protecting the future. 
 
 220 
Because both organisational fantasy and guaranteeing the future are necessary 
components of organisational defence, there is an absence of stories about 
disappointment. Indeed, as I found in my own personal inquiries into disappointment 
(which form my experiential motivation for embarking on this work), 
disappointment often emerges only in opposition to our collusion to avoid it as 
experience. In my own case, disappointment in the study of disappointment took the 
form of the research not being therapy and therapy not being research. In other 
words, disappointment describes a chasm: the absence of a positive and idealistic 
outcome. 
 
That chasm occupies the centre of the split between the so-called positive and 
negative emotions.  Like a discontinuous measurement imposed upon a continuous 
frame of reference, disappointment’s absence in the organisational understanding of 
success and failure distorts reality. Assigning fragmented aspects to organisation 
members who internalise it in congruence with their own personalities and life 
histories, the organisation consigns corporate disappointment to the failures of 
individual employees. Hidden away among individual workers, the organisation is 
able to avoid the adverse impact of processing disappointment and this therefore 
accounts for its public absence. 
 
Yet, disappointment is ubiquitous in the daily life of organisations: it is a necessary 
outcome of imperfection in strategy and execution. Disappointment is processed 
before it is publically expressed and handled as individual anger and ambivalence. It 
emerges as non-productive finger-pointing and blame. Alternatively, the awareness 
of disappointment alerts us to something we were unaware of, for example, a thought 
or emotion that had gone un-noted. Disappointment points us to what we desire, 
showing us what we genuinely want but may not have previously known. 
 
Some emotions seem to have particular importance in relation to organisation and 
organising because they can be associated with recurring patterns of behaviour, 
action and inaction. Examples are defensive routines emerging from anxiety 
(Argyris, 1990), the organisational dynamics of envy (Stein, 1997) and the function 
of blame in reinforcing political boundaries between sub-systems (Vince and Saleem, 
2004).  This study suggests an additional emotional ‘key word’. Disappointment is 
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neither only failure of the self nor failure of the other.  It is an integration of both, 
one that can help organisational members to engage with apparent contradictions of 
organisational experience and to hold the tension between fantasy and reality.  
 
Disappointment and organisational theory 
 
There are two ways in which the insights from this initial research into 
disappointment can contribute to organisational theory and practice. First, the study 
of disappointment can provide a necessary critique of the ‘positive turn’ in 
organisational scholarship (Cameron et al., 2003).  Such thinking serves the fantasy 
of a perpetual sunny side of organisational life where negative emotions can be 
conquered, eliminated, or worse, managed. As Fineman (2006b) points out: ‘positive 
scholars’ quest for positive change and learning is likely to be a truncated, single-
loop mission if the stress, anxiety, anger, pessimism and unhappiness of life and 
work are silenced or marginalised’ (2006b:281). Similarly, the cynical and blaming 
stance enjoyed in different ways by managers at all hierarchical levels of 
organisations is equally unlikely to facilitate the desired quiet life. It is in 
recognising the integrative work of emotion in organisations that the importance of 
disappointment lies.  
 
Second, this study of disappointment revealed a paradox: while disappointment is of 
little conscious concern to individuals, it still has a strong emotional impact. This 
paradox helps us to appreciate a shift in our understanding of the connection 
between emotion and politics (power relations) in organisations. Disappointment is 
of unconscious concern to organisation members because it is feared that such 
negative emotions would undermine stability and destroy positive feelings. In other 
words it is the strong impact of disappointment which means that it must not be 
allowed (much) expression in the organisation. To summarise the psychodynamics 
of disappointment in organisations: disappointment is constructed as problematic 
personal behaviour so as not to be a threat to organisational stability. It is then 
reconstructed as blame and withdrawal to make it more familiar and acceptable. It is 
deconstructed through positive feelings in order to cover up inevitable problems and 
failures in the organisation.  
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The paradox which I have identified concerning disappointment in organisations 
challenges existing perceptions and provides an initial framework for future thought 
and inquiry. This study connects with scholars from different theoretical 
backgrounds who are interested in the importance of disappointment to an 
understanding of managerial power relations (Chandler, 2010).  It also connects with 
the scholarship on emotion and management, whether this involves the role of 
emotion: in determining managers’ perceptions (Daniels, 2003), shaping 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Goss, 2008), influencing managers’ strategic choices 
(Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010) or their ability or inability to learn from experience 
(Vince, 2010). 
 
Disappointment and further research  
 
The work done so far raises some research questions for the future study of this topic. 
What I have learnt from the study of disappointment is that it is connected to the 
dynamics of blame in organisations in ways I had not previously imagined. 
Acknowledging the connection between disappointment and blame may allow us to 
transform organisational members’ experience of ‘blame cultures’. One reason why 
the expression ‘blame culture’ is a description of widespread organisational 
experience is to do with an impulse to protect oneself (or the members of a group) by 
projecting failure onto others; another is the inability to integrate failure within the 
organisation. The idealisation of the organisation as a stable and coherent entity with 
a clear mission and positive perspective on the future, means that failure has to be 
located within individuals or groups. Failed organisations seem to be so only 
retrospectively; the result of bad leadership, poor decisions or the inability of senior 
managers to mobilise change. However, failure as much as success is an everyday 
experience of organising at all levels. Taking risks, making something different 
happen and leading change all imply the possibility of both success and failure, often 
at the same time. Future study of these dynamics will need to investigate in more 
detail why some emotions in organisations seem to be widely expressed (e.g., blame), 
while others (e.g., disappointment) go largely unnoticed.  
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A second area for future research arises from this. As yet, I have only studied the 
perceptions of individuals within one organisation. There is not yet a body of 
research on diverse organisational contexts within which the collective dynamics of 
disappointment are enacted. In taking this research forward, we need to ask how this 
theory can be applied at group level within different organisational contexts. I 
suspect that an analysis of group level behaviour in relation to disappointment can 
provide results that will make a stronger contribution to management practice than I 
have been able to make based on this initial study. 
 
The study of disappointment will be disruptive.  As this study demonstrates, 
disappointment is a powerful emotion that contests core theories on how emotion is 
understood and managed in organisations.  Future research into disappointment will 
need to walk a fine line between opening up an area of interest and risking the 
potential destruction of a set of ideas around which emotion theory is organised.  
Existing literature on emotion, for the most part, subscribes to the idea that there are 
positive and negative emotions.  The study of disappointment refutes that 
perspective and offers an alternative view in which emotion is neither one nor the 
other but potentially both or potentially neither.  The study of disappointment calls 
for a re-examination of the foundations on which emotion theories are based.  This 
will have implications for the way in which emotion in organisations is understood 
and managed.   
 
As for the related area of leadership and management training, the utility of this 
theory will be contingent on leaders being empowered to integrate it into 
organisational systems.  In order for that to happen, traditional ideas of success and 
failure will need to be reimagined and reconceptualised in business and management 
training.  Traditional approaches to learning in which students and teachers collude 
to perpetuate particular versions of power relations will need to be challenged (Vince, 
2010).  At present, the creative and transformative potential of disappointment does 
not appear to have a voice in management literature or training.  In order for that to 
change, the excluded middle will need to occupy some space alongside the various 
polarised concepts outlined in this study.  
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Finally, while organisational members fear the possible damage of failure, they are 
also likely to be changed by loss.  This research repositions disappointment in 
organisations as a manifestation of loss as distinct from failure. Engagement with 
disappointment can ‘unsettle’ assumptions and practices (Cunliffe, 2009) and 
thereby promote reflexive engagement with the limits of stability and control. This 
means viewing disappointment as a process with the potential to learn and to change. 
Disappointment as failure sustains a fantasy of a stable and satisfying object. 
Disappointment as loss challenges this idea and asks us to rethink both our need for 
stability and the satisfaction that may be achievable. At the point at which we 
experience disappointment, we have already begun the process of testing reality, and 
this suggests that disappointment is the beginning, not the end, of a process of 
learning and discovery.  The relationship between disappointment and learning will 
be an important area for further research. It may be the case that part of the learning 
inherent in disappointment is the recognition of limitations (Craib, 1994) both 
individual and organisational. Disappointment confronts us with the inevitability that 
our desires may be unrealistic and that our task may be to ‘find the new ways of 
wanting that keep wanting alive’ (Phillips, 2006:19).  A reimagined relationship with 
disappointment would mean that experiences may not be satisfying; they may just be 
real, and some types of satisfaction may have to remain imaginary. Such a 
perspective will help organisational members to tolerate disappointment and  support 
organisations in engaging with systemic failures and imperfections.  
 
Disappointment matters.  It helps us to understand the political life of organisations 
and assists us in decoding the ‘way we do things’ as well as the ‘rules’ of 
engagement. It gives us an understanding of why organisation members do what they 
do.   Disappointment is an unsettling emotion.  It surfaces inconsistencies and 
complicities and challenges organisational structures, cultures and climates. ‘For all 
these reasons the systematic study of the patterning of disappointment… as a process 
of unsettling the self is potentially important’ (Chandler, 2010:608). 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarised the key ideas outlined in the thesis.  In particular, I 
highlighted the ‘excluded middle’, the territory of disappointment in which hope is 
tested against the realities of organisational life.  I highlighted two implications for 
organisation theory from the study of disappointment: it offers a critique of the 
‘positive turn’ in organisational theory (Cameron et al., 2003) and reveals a paradox 
at the heart of organising.  Disappointment is considered to be of little conscious 
concern to individuals, yet it has a strong emotional impact.  It is constructed as 
problematic personal behaviour, reconstructed as blame and withdrawal and 
deconstructed through positive feelings as a way of covering up organisational 
anxiety about its destructive potential.  I then made suggestions for further research, 
in particular into the relationship between disappointment and the dynamics of blame 
as well as into more diverse organisational contexts.  I concluded by reiterating the 
powerful emotions associated with disappointment and suggested that future 
research could be disruptive if it challenged existing theories of emotion, particularly 
those subscribing to the positive/negative dichotomy.  I also suggested that different 
kinds of leaders would need to emerge from management schools empowered to 
make disappointment part of the ordinary activity of organisational life. 
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10 Review of study 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the limitations of the study and a reflection 
on research and methodological issues including knowledge management and 
saturation.  I start by interpreting my interpretation (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009) 
and proceed to critiquing Grounded Theory in practice. I conclude by judging the 
theory, The organisation of disappointment, using Glaser’s (1998:17) criteria of fit, 
relevance, workability and modifiability.   
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The theory, The organisation of disappointment, represents a new way of theorising 
a subject that so far, has been under-researched in management literature.  The 
theory reveals the participants’ latent pattern of behaviour (the organisation of 
disappointment) in the service of relieving anxiety about their core concern 
(maintaining stability and protecting the future).  However, the study should be 
considered in the context of the following issues. 
 
Reflections on the research process 
 
The theory cannot aim to present the definitive interpretation of disappointment in 
organisations.  Any attempt to do this would be inconsistent with the epistemological 
position adopted for the study. My design was an attempt to provide a convincing 
account of how disappointment is understood in organisational settings, but I did not 
set out to generate ‘universal explanations of social behavior’ (Suddaby, 2006:633).  
As previously discussed, another researcher with a different theoretical sensitivity, 
asking alternative questions in contrasting environments would quite likely arrive at 
a different theoretical framework and an alternative interpretation of data.   
 
My subjectivity, interest and previous background clearly influenced the choice of 
topic and the selection of participants.  In my thinking I tried, where possible, to 
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keep an awareness of these issues to the fore particularly in the generation of 
categories and analysis of data.  The systematic use of Grounded Theory guidelines, 
utilisation of reflective spaces, checking and cross-checking of categories, discussion 
of the emerging theory with respondents and the use of existing literature all 
contributed to the theory-building and allowed a context in which subjectivity was 
constantly in focus.  However, if I am to be congruent with my epistemological 
positioning, I must also address the following issues.   
 
I began this study with a curiosity about disappointment and what it represented in 
the lives of people I worked with.  That conscious curiosity must be considered in 
tandem with my unconscious fantasies and assumptions about the topic as well as the 
research process, which I address earlier in this study.  I employed a variety of 
methods to explore and harness my unconscious processes, but I will never know for 
certain how much of that has, in fact, been useful.  One interpretation of this entire 
study is that I generated an academic project in order to explore my unconscious 
relationship with disappointment.  I can confirm that I have done considerable work 
on that subject over the course of the research process. I also believe that my 
willingness to explore the sometimes painful and distressing aspects of my 
relationship with disappointment has enriched my capacity to engage with data.  It 
has made me a better researcher, and I believe this to have helped the theory-
building process. 
 
Reflections on methodological issues 
 
From a methodological perspective this study supports Glaser’s version of Grounded 
Theory as an appropriate and useful methodology in management research.  Later in 
this chapter, I will critique the process of using Grounded Theory but, for now, it is 
fair to say that the methodology helped me to ‘discover’ The organisation of 
disappointment.  This study, and the methodology employed, also contributed to the 
development of knowledge within STL.  More particularly, the principals’ interest in 
participating and learning from their experiences in the study assisted them in their 
deliberations about the future of the company.  In this respect, the study of 
disappointment has earned its relevance as a research topic.  Relevance, from a 
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Grounded Theory perspective, emerges from respondents’ concerns and their 
attempts to resolve those concerns (Glaser, 1978).  It does not emerge from an 
objective reading of literature, the identification of gaps and the generation of 
hypotheses.  The theory has emerged from the life stories of respondents, filtered 
through my analytical lens as researcher.  In this sense, the theory has demonstrable 
relevance as a useful management tool (Glaser, 1978).   
 
However, the participants in this study were purposively sampled from contacts I 
had both personal and professional.  As indicated in chapter 5, this clearly had an 
impact on the respondents’ desire to participate.  Nobody declined the invitation and 
each respondent participated fully in the research process.  There is a question as to 
whether respondents’ participation might be biased in favour of wanting to be 
satisfying rather than disappointing contributors.   
 
This study presents a particular perspective on disappointment, and all of the 
respondents were chosen because of their interest in, or capacity to reflect on the 
topic.  As has been discussed earlier, emotion is a contested and controlled subject in 
organisations.  It is arguable that had I chosen research participants who were more 
acclimatised to organisations as rational-only environments, the results would have 
been different.  I suspect that I would have worked more closely with the unspoken 
and unconscious interpretations of respondents’ words rather than the stories they 
actually told.  
 
Most of the stories recounted by respondents were retrospective.  In my interviews, I 
had attempted to keep the subject of disappointment in the ‘here and now’ as it 
occurred present as a way of interrogating my own emotional perspective and 
parallel process.  On one level, it is possible to imagine that the stories told by 
respondents relied on recollection and rememberance. However, the processing of 
my countertransference and awareness of parallel process ensured that their anxieties 
about being ‘good enough’ respondents and my fear of being a 
disappointing/disappointed researcher were never far away as useful data.  Two 
issues stayed with me: the level of emotion displayed by some respondents during 
phases one and two; and the request from the principals of STL in phase three to 
help them work through their emotional response to the core disappointment.  These 
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issues assured me that the stories presented were contemporary as well as historic 
representations of disappointment. 
 
The study should be considered culturally specific in that the members of STL were 
Irish and twenty-four of the twenty-six individual respondents were Irish (of the 
other two, one was American and one English) and all had English as their first 
language.  Over the course of the research project, I presented aspects of the study at 
meetings and conferences in Ireland and the USA and, for the most part, the 
emerging theory resonated and was considered useful.  One striking difference 
between Ireland and the USA was in regard to an understanding of the word 
‘politics’.  At several meetings in the USA, I discovered that ‘politics’ was a term 
associated with the formal ‘political’ process rather than power relations as described 
in this study. 
 
The capacity to reflect upon the importance of disappointment, in fact the 
willingness to acknowledge its existence, requires a particular kind of leadership.  
The principals of STL were willing to be curious about disappointment and to 
engage actively with their personal and organisational experiences of the subject. 
Adam gave permission for organisation members to feel disappointed and 
disappointing.  He was willing to talk about and explore his emotional experiences, 
and authorised an exploration of those feelings with a view to learning from the 
experience.  This was an act of enlightened leadership.  It is questionable how useful 
this theory will be to organisations without that kind of enlightened leadership 
demonstrated by Adam in STL.   
 
Reflections on knowledge management 
 
Grounded Theory researchers must wade through conflicting accounts of what to do 
with what they already know and how to work with existing knowledge as 
represented in literature.   This, then, is contrasted with the dictum ‘all is data’ 
(Glaser, 2001:145) in which increasing amounts of knowledge can be amassed in a 
very short time.  The latter emerged as a very real issue for me in my transfer 
examination.  I had embarked on a literature preview to situate the research and had 
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immersed myself in data collection and analysis.  The ‘absence’ of ‘relevant’ 
literature was remarked upon by the examiners, and I left the exam a disappointed 
and disappointing researcher feeling as though I had failed to approach the research 
in the ‘correct’ way.  Having now completed this study, I believe that academics are 
asking the wrong questions about the role of literature in a Grounded Theory study.  
The question is one of epistemology.  We can never ‘not know’ what we consciously 
know.  Therefore the question is not, ‘do I or don’t I read existing literature?’ The 
question becomes, ‘how do I reflect on what I know (or don’t) and how does it 
impact on the research project?’  Instead of finding the ‘right’ way to work with 
existing knowledge I found the ‘right way for me’ (in the context of this study) to 
use existing research and data generated through other means.  That ‘right way’ 
foregrounded the importance of reflexivity as a method of challenging assumptions 
and fantasies and led me to conduct a literature preview at the outset of the research 
project to situate the topic as well as a literature review on the basis of the emerging 
theory and its categories.   
 
Various reflective and reflexive processes also allowed me to question the 
assumption that it was possible to ‘know’ anything.  This is of particular relevance to 
a study that is framed in a psychodynamic context.  What is known and what appears 
to be the ‘truth’, are always veiling the hidden and unknown.  This may be the 
strength of psychoanalysis, but it can also be considered a weakness of interpretivist 
approaches that assume the possibility (or fantasy) of transparency.  Critics of 
reflexivity in particular are quick to point out that it can be a form of inappropriate 
psychoanalysis or a form of self-indulgence that promotes the authority of the 
researcher (Finlay, 2002, Seale, 1999). 
 
Reflections on saturation 
 
Grounded Theory is concerned with theoretical saturation, the point at which new 
descriptions and codes do not add substantially to the categories generated.  
Grounded Theory is not concerned with data saturation (or sample size).  The 
research project should be concluded when sufficient data has been collected to 
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conceptualise the core concern and the core category31. Making a determination with 
regard to theoretical saturation (and the processes by which data are generated to 
reach it) is an iterative process and a situated judgment.   It also comprises an ‘active 
process of reflection’ (Leech, 2005) in which the researcher’s analytic lens is 
employed to compare, contrast, reflect, choose and act on the basis of data, context 
and content.  Existing literature offers little in the way of methodological certainty.  
Charmaz for example, suggests that saturation can be reached very quickly in a study 
with ‘modest claims’ (2006:114); a researcher’s expertise in the area of study can 
reduce the sample size required (Jette et al., 2003) as can using more than one 
method of data collection or longitudinal approaches (Lee et al., 2002). Guest, Bunce 
and Johnson found only ‘seven sources that provided guidelines for actual sample 
sizes’ (Guest et al., 2006:61).  In summary (and adapted from (Mason, 2010), they 
are: 
 
Ethnographic studies  
Bernard (2000:178) suggests a sample size of thirty to sixty interviews; Morse 
(1994:225) recommends between thirty and firty interviews. 
 
Grounded Theory 
Morse (1994:225) recommends thirty to fifty interviews; Creswell (1998:64) 
recommends 20-30. 
 
Phenomenology 
Morse (1994:225) recommends at least six interviews; Creswell (1998:64) between 
five and twenty-five and for qualitative research in general Bertaux (1981:35) 
suggests a minimum of fifteen interviews.   
 
Getting to the root of what constitutes an appropriate sample size in order to generate 
theoretical saturation therefore remains challenging (Bowen, 2008).  But, perhaps, 
tells us that data saturation cannot be equated with theoretical saturation and that 
                                                
31 Grounded Theory is not alone in privileging theoretical saturation.  The term and concept arises 
frequently and is considered the ‘gold standard by which purposive sample sizes are determined in 
health science research’ (Guest et al., 2006:60). 
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interviews may constitute only one element of data.  Mason concludes that, although 
PhD researchers fall within the guidelines established by previous researchers, there 
is no ‘real pattern as to how far PhD researchers are adhering to the guidelines for 
saturation’ (2010:44).  While numbers are important, it is the quality of data 
ultimately that determines its usefulness (Mason, 2010), and this is linked to the skill 
of the interviewer (Morse, 1994).  Ultimately, the question becomes whether 
theoretical saturation was reached, and if so, how could that be demonstrated in the 
study to the satisfaction of readers?  I have attempted to address these questions by 
giving practical examples in chapter 5, and I reiterate some of those points here.  
From a quantitative perspective, I conducted twenty-six individual interviews 
(totalling forty recorded hours) and then spent one hundred hours in one organisation 
where I embarked on a range of data collection methods. At that point, I was seeing 
a recurring pattern in the stories recounted by participants and did not think that 
continuing the process would add more to the process of analysis.  I also generated 
data from reflective and reflexive processes.  From this perspective, my sample size 
falls within those suggested by Creswell (1998) and Morse (1994).  However, 
theoretical saturation can only be considered in the context of the specific research 
project in which it is employed.  To declare that I did reach theoretical saturation is a 
judgement on this study into the organisation of disappointment and on the core 
concern and core category. I have reached one interpretation of a phenomenon only 
and have no doubt that there are alternative and compelling narratives of 
disappointment that have yet to be documented and researched. 
 
Grounded Theory: a disappointing methodology? 
 
Grounded Theory has been criticised and critiqued by scholars for a variety of 
failings and limitations (see chapter 4).  In this section, I will critique the 
methodology from the perspective of having used it to generate theory.  In other 
words, this is a personal reflection on using the method. 
 
Grounded Theory offered the flexibility I wanted at the outset to incorporate 
different types of data and to use my theoretical sensitivity to psychodynamic theory.  
Grounded Theory’s stated intention to discover the latent pattern of behaviour of 
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respondents seemed to fit well with psychodynamic theories of unconscious 
behaviour and would accommodate the kind of personal reflection I wanted to 
engage in as a data collection method.  On reflection, Grounded Theory did help me 
do what I set out to do which was to understand an area of behaviour in which I had 
an interest but not a specific research question. Grounded Theory was useful because 
it emphasised multiple realities and the mutually interactive relationship between 
researcher and research topic.  
However, adhering to classic Grounded Theory was both confusing and rewarding.  
As outlined in chapter 5, it happened several times that I wanted to abandon the 
method and find something that would ease the process of theory development. I felt 
at times as though I was drowning in data, each element of which seemed to be of 
equal importance.  Grounded Theory is a disappointing methodology. I would like to 
address some of the failings and losses I encountered en route to the development of 
this theory. 
 
The theoretical processes of coding, memoing, constant comparison and theoretical 
sampling appear on the surface to offer a road map through data but, in fact, they 
seemed occasionally to be crudely superimposed on the process.  In other words, 
there is a significant gap between understanding the data one has collected and 
embarking on the process of coding it. Emboldened by Glaser to commence coding 
immediately (Glaser, 1998), I generated over 150 codes in quick succession.  As it 
turned out, these codes weren’t helpful in progressing my thinking and it wasn’t until 
much later that I realised the mistakes I had made in generating this long list.  My 
remedy was to read and reread several interview transcripts to get a ‘feel’ for the 
stories that were emerging before I embarked on a second round of coding.  In this 
way, I felt I was sensitised to the content and tone of respondents’ stories and better 
able to see patterns of behaviour that ultimately helped me to develop categories. 
There is the secondary issue of whether the data is a code, a category, a property of a 
category, the right code for this interpretation or a cul-de-sac in the process of data 
analysis. 
 
The process of coding and comparing also had a positivist feel and sometimes sat 
uncomfortably with the interpretative process of understanding data and creating 
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categories and properties.  This wasn’t helped by Glaser’s insistence on there being 
only one way of doing Grounded Theory (Glaser, 1992).  I realised quickly that my 
previous flirtation with Grounded Theory during the preparation of my MSc 
dissertation, was not going to be helpful.  As a novice Grounded Theory researcher, I 
sometimes felt I spent more time trying to understand the research method rather 
than the stories of respondents.  This echoes Strauss and Corbin’s concern that 
Grounded Theory should be undertaken by trained and sensitised researchers 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
I was constantly aware of a tension between Glaser’s view of Grounded Theory and 
my attempts to apply it in practice.  I questioned the validity of my theoretical 
sensitivity when psychodynamic theory seemed to offer insights that coding and 
constant comparison did not.  This tension crystallised when I realised that I had to 
use Grounded Theory as a method and not as an interpretive tool.  My experience, 
interest, theoretical sensitivity and experience were the factors that influenced how I 
conceptualised the emerging theory.  It took me a long time to understand this, but 
once I did, I relinquished my attachment to terminology and engaged more creatively 
with the data.  For example, an early draft of the thesis incorporated Grounded 
Theory terminology (such as core concerns, codes, categories, sub core categories, 
properties of the sub core) which rendered the material ‘technically’ correct but 
ultimately illegible and boring for the reader. 
 
As has been established, Grounded Theory is a contested methodology (see chapter 
4).  An interesting piece of advice I received at a Grounded Theory workshop at the 
British Academy of Management was: ‘never use the term Grounded Theory in the 
title of a paper or thesis unless you want Grounded Theory to be the focus of 
reviewer interest’.  This is a revealing insight from an experienced academic, and it 
certainly echoed my experience when trying to explain my methodology to other 
research students. An early submission of a paper to a journal returned serious 
criticism of ‘the Grounded Theory’ and gave suggestions for how the section on 
‘Grounded Theory’ should be augmented to make the paper more robust.  In 
retrospect it seemed as though the BAM academic’s advice might in fact, be true. 
The ‘problem’ with Grounded Theory may be its name; renamed as Grounded 
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Methodology, it might have a better chance of being understood for what it is, a 
methodology rather than a theory.   
 
It is also regretful that much of the material generated by Glaser is difficult to read as 
it is overwritten, repetitive and defensive in tone particularly when replying to 
academic criticism or describing the methodology (see Glaser, 2002b).  Grounded 
Theory as presented by Glaser looks rather ‘home-made’ and unprofessional as the 
material quality of the publications (published mainly by Sociology Press) is basic, 
especially when seen alongside material produced by other theorists and in other 
fields.  This shouldn’t really matter, of course, as it is the quality of the method that 
counts, yet I couldn’t ignore this aspect. 
 
Grounded Theory does disappoint, though how could it not?  After I finished 
wrestling with its failings and processing the fantasy that a simple methodology 
would assist in ‘revealing’ a theory I got on with the task of applying the method 
aware of its strengths and weaknesses.  Ultimately Grounded Theory served me well 
in the generation of this particular theory and it is only now that I have completed a 
thesis that I feel I could tackle Grounded Theory with some understanding of the 
technique. 
 
Trustworthiness and qualitative research 
 
Establishing what is trustworthy and rigorous in qualitative research is a contested 
subject on which little consensus exists (Rolfe, 2006, Sandelowski and Barroso, 
2002). There is a considerable body of literature in qualitative research dedicated to 
establishing what constitutes ‘good’ research (Lincoln and Guba, 1999, Seale, 1999, 
Silverman, 2003).  Lincoln and Guba suggest that qualitative researchers need to 
concern themselves with issues of trustworthiness, for example, ‘how can an inquirer 
persuade his or her audiences (including self) that the findings of an inquiry are 
worth paying attention to, worth taking account of?’ (1999:398).  They outline a 
number of procedures that qualitative researchers should employ to ensure the rigor 
of their study including, opening up the study to an ‘audit trail’ and demonstrating 
‘referential adequacy’ which means that a sufficient range of data has been 
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accommodated.  They add these to their original criteria of credibility, dependability, 
transferability and conformability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  Glaser is critical of 
Lincoln and Guba’s criteria for trustworthiness and concerned to differentiate 
Grounded Theory from qualitative data analysis: ‘their barrage of detail on detail 
indicate no ability on their part to see a summarizing latent pattern under their 
criteria for research by which to evaluate its process or product’ (Glaser, 2003:147).  
Grounded Theory, according to Glaser, is concerned with conceptualisation of data, 
whereas qualitative data analysis is concerned with descriptive detail. 
 
There is a wide range of views as to what criteria should be employed to determine 
trustworthiness.  The views range from the adoption of measures used in quantitative 
research to the identification of specific criteria for qualitative research and the 
abandonment of criteria for qualitative research altogether (Rolfe, 2006).  The wide 
range of views on trustworthiness does little to answer researcher questions on the 
subject. Yet, an important element in evaluating research is to judge it against 
established criteria in terms of methodological rigor and contribution to knowledge.   
 
Judging the organisation of disappointment 
 
I decided to employ Glaser’s (1978, 1998) criteria of workability, relevance, fit and 
modifiability in this study.  In his words ‘does the theory work to explain relevant 
behavior in the substantive area of the research? Does it have relevance to the people 
in the substantive field? Does the theory fit the substantive area? Is it readily 
modifiable as new data emerge?’ (Glaser, 1998:17). 
 
Workability 
 
A theory is judged to work when it accounts for the way in which the main concern 
of respondents is continually resolved.   ‘Does the theory explain relevant behavior 
in the substantive area, predict what will happen and interpret what is happening in 
the area of inquiry?’ (Glaser, 1978:4). I believe that The organisation of 
disappointment does offer an interpretation of the behaviour of respondents as they 
manage their core concern of maintaining stability and protecting the future.  In my 
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opinion, the theory contributes to an understanding of how particular types of 
emotional behaviour are perceived to be ‘personal’ even when generated in a 
systemic context; how one type of emotion (disappointment) can be a cover story for 
others (failure and loss); and how the fear of destruction is transformed by being 
located in discrete parts of the organisation system.  
 
Relevance 
 
If theory is useful to those working in the field, it is relevant.  Glaser suggests that a 
Grounded Theory should give people theoretical control of the phenomenon and 
generate insight into the substantive area (Glaser, 1998).  In order to explore the 
relevance of the theory, I adopted three strategies: (1) I returned to some of the 
respondents who contributed to the study; (2) as indicated in chapter 5, I also 
frequently returned to transcripts of interviews and asked myself whether I could 
recognise respondents’ stories in the emerging data; (3) I employed the theory in my 
work as a consultant.  In presenting the theory to respondents who contributed to the 
research I was aware that I might simply be feeding back what I had heard rather 
than providing an analysis and conceptualisation of data.  This fear emerged from 
my initial experience of hearing so many stories of disappointment from those 
people with whom I spoke.  The feedback from respondents was interesting indeed.  
The organisation of disappointment was a recognisable model to all of those I had 
consulted and, for some, the relationship between disappointment and loss proved to 
be a ‘missing link’ in their own experiences of the phenomenon.  Respondents could 
recognise themselves and their stories in the theory.  In several cases, respondents 
revisited their original stories and reframed them through the lens of loss which 
seemed to add significant meaning and explanation to the depth of emotion 
experienced.  Consultants to whom I spoke could all see the value of processing 
disappointment as loss of the ideal as a useful addition to the way in which they 
work with clients around change and failure.  For my own part, I began to name 
more frequently and tenderly the issues of loss and idealisation in work with 
coaching and consulting clients, and I have found this a useful way to dissolve the 
transferences associated with blame in order to move forward.    
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I consider the theory The organisation of disappointment to be relevant in four ways: 
(1) The subject of disappointment has been under-researched in management 
literature and this theory offers a new way of theorising the subject that adds to 
existing literature; (2) For organisations, the theory offers a new and more optimistic 
way of understanding the politics of blame, which have heretofore been associated 
with failure and negativity; (3) The theory repositions disappointment as a 
manifestation of loss as distinct from failure. Individuals and organisations are 
damaged by failure but may be transformed by loss.  The organisation of 
disappointment creates a way of thinking about loss that may help transcend the 
overwhelming anxiety of destruction; (4) Since commencing this study, the world 
has undergone a major transformation.  Economic recession, unemployment, anxiety 
over oil reserves, unresolved conflicts in the Middle East and the constant fear of 
terrorist attacks all vie for attention.  Positions 1 and 2 of the organisation of 
disappointment have become common strategies for the appointment of blame and 
the redistribution of anxiety.  The study of disappointment offers a different way of 
reimagining the future at a time when creative solutions are urgently required. 
 
Modifiability 
 
Grounded Theory does not generate findings; its purpose is to generate a set of 
integrated hypotheses about the substantive area under study (Glaser, 1992).  Glaser 
also suggests that a theory is never right or wrong but may always be modified by 
new and emerging data (Glaser, 1998).  To this extent the theory, The organisation 
of disappointment fulfills the criteria of modifiability as I am sure that different 
questions, epistemological positions and respondents might generate data that would 
modify the existing theory.  This is congruent with my epistemological position as 
researcher. Reality, according to this view, can only be partly known and is 
constantly evolving consciously and unconsciously.   
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Fit 
 
According to Glaser, fit refers to the congruent link between data, categories and 
their properties.  The question is whether the theory emerges from the data and the 
concerns of respondents or whether it is superimposed by the researcher (Glaser, 
1998).  Adhering to the application of Grounded Theory is no guarantee of ‘fit’ 
according to Glaser because these processes have to be deployed appropriately, and 
this is difficult to demonstrate.  I certainly attempted to deploy the methodology 
appropriately and coded and recoded data as new ideas emerged.  I also endeavoured 
to reference the various reflective and reflexive processes I employed to consider  
my involvement in the study.  I wrote memos at various stages of the process, 
theoretically sampled on the basis of categories and their properties and analysed my 
own relationship with the emotions associated with disappointment as well as with 
the task of researching the subject.  I attempted to make sure that my emotional 
responses to the project were supported by and in data as distinct from being (only) a 
way of organising my own anxiety. Each of these processes helped me identify my 
conscious and unconscious assumptions and kept me from wandering too much into 
the realms of conjecture (Glaser, 1998). 
 
In Glaser’s view, if the process of Grounded Theory is employed appropriately by a 
rigorous researcher and if it conforms to the criteria of workability, relevance, 
modifiability and fit, people should feel better able to understand their environment 
(Glaser, 1998).  In summary I believe that The organisation of disappointment 
conforms to Glaser’s criteria and offers a new way of understanding the importance 
of disappointment (Chandler, 2010, Craib, 1994) in organisations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the limitations of the study and continued with a reflection on 
methodological issues such as knowledge management and saturation.  I then 
critiqued Grounded Theory from the perspective of having used the methodology in 
practice.  The organisation of disappointment was then judged using Glaser’s criteria 
of fit, relevance, workability and modifiability (1998).  According to Glaser, if a 
theory adheres to these criteria and the researcher has been diligent in applying the 
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methodology, the theory should equip people with a better understanding of their 
world.  The reader will judge whether The organisation of disappointment performs 
the task of assisting people in understanding more fully their relationship with 
disappointment in organisations. 
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Appendix 1 Purposive sampling respondents 
 
 
Respondent Age and Gender Occupation 
1 45 year old man Training and development manager at a university 
2 43 year old man Self-employed business consultant 
3  55 year old man Self-employed psychotherapist and organisational 
consultant 
4 44 year old man Actor 
5 37 year old 
woman 
University lecturer 
6 55 year old man Chief executive officer of an equality organisation  
7 50 year old 
woman 
Self-employed marketing and communications 
consultant 
8 60 year old 
woman 
Psychologist 
9 37 year old 
woman 
Director of human resources  
10 40 year old 
woman 
Curator at a national cultural organisation 
11 37 year old man Joint artistic director of a theatre company 
12 37 year old man Joint artistic director of a theatre company 
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Appendix 2 Theoretical sampling respondents 
 
Respondent Age and Gender Occupation 
13 52 year old man County manager, local authority 
14 25 year old man Clerical officer, local authority 
15 24 year old 
woman 
Clerical officer, local authority 
16 49 year old man Executive officer, local authority 
17 37 year old 
woman 
Executive officer, local authority 
18 55 year old man Psychoanalyst and author  
19 50 year old man Journalist 
20 50 year old man Director of a consulting organisation 
21 40 year old 
woman 
Actor  
22 40 year old 
woman 
Theatre director 
23 55 year old man Politician 
24 49 year old man Director of a charity 
25 35 year old 
woman 
Director of a social care service 
26 50 year old 
woman 
Case worker in a social care company 
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Appendix 3 Information sheet for individuals interviewed 
 	  
	  	  
	  
Research	   into	   disappointment	   in	  
organisations	  	  
Telephone:	  (086)	  ……….	  
Email:	  ideas@inter-­‐actions.biz	  	  	  
 
1 Purpose of this document 
This document has been prepared for you as an invitation to participate in a research 
project to explore disappointment in organisations.  This study is the main 
component of my PhD research at the University of Bath (School of Management).  I 
outline in the document the nature of the research, the project methodology and how 
I plan to manage the project. 
 
2 Why research disappointment? 
My research interest is in emotion in organisations.  My view is that organisations 
are emotional (as well as rational) places.  Disappointment, as one of those emotions, 
has been under-researched in management literature. I am interested in studying how 
disappointment is generated, managed and experienced in organisations. 
 
3 Methods 
As disappointment is a topic that has not been adequately researched so far I am 
heading into unknown territory.  I don’t have a central question I want to find the 
answer to: I am more interested in gathering stories and lived experiences of 
disappointment.  There is no ‘right’ or ‘one’ way to gather this information so my 
focus will be on how you interpret the experience.  My intention is to use a 
combination of one-to-one interviews, organisational observation and small group 
discussion as the primary methods for gathering data. 
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4 Your involvement 
My main research interest is your experience of the research topic.  I would like to 
interview you at a time and place that is convenient for you.  Please see the 
following sections about how I plan to manage the process and manage the data. 
 
5 Data collection 
My preference, where possible, is to record interviews for the purposes of analysis 
afterwards.  If you prefer not to have our discussions recorded then I will happy to 
respect that.  Please see section 6 below for further information on what will happen 
with the information I collect. 
 
One-to-one interviews 
The purpose of the one-to-one interview will be to gather your experience of the 
research topic and the focus of the interview will be on disappointment as it relates 
to the work environment. 
 
6 What will happen to the information I gather? 
The information gathered will be used in my PhD thesis.  I may draw on the findings 
of my research to publish other work (e.g., journal papers) or to present at 
conferences.  I may refer to or quote information imparted by you to me but I will 
ensure that it is not directly attributed to you.  I will not name you or any individual 
who contributes to the research unless you specifically give me permission to do so. 
 
7 What if you wish to withdraw? 
There is no obligation on you to participate in the study.  If you wish to withdraw 
you may do so at any time.  You may also request that I turn off the recorder or ask 
that an interview be concluded at any time.   If at any stage you wish to withdraw 
from the study then I reserve the right to use the information already imparted by 
you to me and I guarantee that your identity will be kept strictly confidential. 
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8 My commitment to you 
During and after the completion of my research I will: 
 
• Maintain confidentiality on any element of your organisation’s business 
(and your role in that business) that you discuss in our interview; 
• Maintain confidentiality on all information imparted by you to me; 
• Report all findings anonymously: I will not refer to you or named 
individuals mentioned in our interview in any published material. 
 
9 Conclusion 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research please don’t hesitate to 
contact me. My telephone number and email address are included at the top of this 
document and I am available to answer any questions you may have before, during 
or after the interview and the research study. 
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Appendix 4 Information sheet for STL organisation 
members 
 
 
 
 
 
The organisation of disappointment 
 
Annette Clancy 
Telephone: (086) …….. 
Email: ideas@inter-actions.biz 
 
 
 
Title of the study: The organisation of disappointment 
 
1 Purpose of this document 
This document has been prepared for STL as an invitation to participate in a research 
project to explore disappointment in organisations.  This study is the main 
component of my PhD research at the University of Bath (School of Management).  I 
outline in the document the nature of the research, the project methodology and how 
I plan to manage the project. 
 
2 Why research disappointment? 
My research interest is in emotion in organisations.  My view is that organisations 
are emotional (as well as rational) places.  Disappointment, as one of those emotions, 
has been under-researched in management literature. I am interested in studying how 
disappointment is generated, managed and experienced in STL. 
 
3 Methods 
As disappointment is a topic that has not been adequately researched so far I am 
heading into unknown territory.  I don’t have a central question I want to find the 
answer to: I am more interested in gathering stories and lived experiences of 
disappointment.  There is no ‘right’ or ‘one’ way to gather this information so my 
focus will be on how you individually and collectively interpret the experience.  My 
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intention is to use a combination of one-to-one interviews, organisational 
observation and small group discussion as the primary methods for gathering data. 
 
4 Management of the study 
I anticipate gathering data in STL over a period to be negotiated with you.  It will be 
essential that this data gathering process not inhibit or interfere with the daily work 
of the organisation so I will negotiate with you around the best way of being present 
without inhibiting your work.   
 
5 Your involvement 
My main research interest is your experience of the research topic and of 
participating in this study.  I outline in the next sections the way in which I anticipate 
gathering data in STL. 
 
6 Data Collection 
My preference, where possible, is to record interviews for the purposes of analysis 
afterwards.  If you prefer not to have our discussions recorded then I will happy to 
respect that.  Please see section 7 below for further information on what will happen 
with the information I collect. 
 
6.1 One-to-One Interviews 
The purpose of the one-to-one interview will be to gather your experience of the 
research topic and the focus of the interview will be on disappointment as it relates 
to the work environment. 
 
6.2 Organisational Observation 
It would be helpful for me if I could observe the organisation at work to get a better 
idea of how the component parts are linked and to help me understand the 
complexity of the work you do.  My intention is not to impose on the actual work of 
the organisation but to watch the way it works from an outsider’s perspective.  I will, 
of course, respect the confidentiality of you, your work and the clients with whom 
you interact. 
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7 What will happen to the information I gather in STL? 
The information gathered will be used in my PhD thesis.  I may draw on the findings 
of my research to publish other work (e.g., journal papers) or to present at 
conferences.  I may refer to or quote information imparted by you to me but I will 
ensure that it is not directly attributed to you.  I will not name STL or any individual 
who contributes to the research unless you specifically give me permission to do so 
or unless it becomes advantageous for STL to have its name associated with any 
published work I may undertake in the future.   
 
8 What if you wish to withdraw? 
There is no obligation on you or any organisation member to participate in the study.  
If you wish to withdraw you may do so at any time.  You may also request that I turn 
off the recorder or ask that an interview be concluded at any time.   If at any stage 
you wish to withdraw from the study then I reserve the right to use the information 
already imparted by you to me and I guarantee that your identity will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
 
9 My commitment to STL 
During and after the completion of my research I will:  
 
• Maintain confidentiality on the business of STL;  
• Maintain confidentiality on all information imparted by individuals to 
me; 
• Report all findings anonymously: I will not refer to STL or named 
individuals within the organisation in any published material; 
• Ensure that my research does not detract from the business of STL; 
• Explicitly negotiate any change to my contact with STL. 
 
10 Conclusion 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research please don’t hesitate to 
contact me. My telephone number and email address are included at the top of this 
document and I am available to answer any questions you may have before, during 
or after the research study. 
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Appendix 5 Consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant consent form 
 
Annette Clancy 
Doctoral Research 
 
Research Title: The organisation of 
disappointment 
 
 
Name………………………………………………………………………………… 
Address………………………………..……………………………………………… 
........................................................................................................................................ 
I give consent to be a participant in this study and to have interviews audio recorded.  
I understand that the recordings and transcripts will be destroyed once the research 
project has been completed.  I also understand that the recordings and transcripts 
may be seen by the researcher’s supervisor and external examiner to support the 
research data contained in the thesis.   
 
I have been assured that any information imparted by me to the researcher may be 
referred to and/or quoted but not attributed to me directly.  I also understand that the 
researcher may use material imparted, but not attributed directly to me, in published 
work. 
 
I have received information about this study and had all my questions answered and 
understand that I can withdraw from this study at any time.  In the event that I decide 
to withdraw I understand that information already imparted by me to the researcher 
can be used as part of the study but I have been assured that my identity will be kept 
confidential unless explicitly agreed to by me. 
 
 
Date…………..               Signed…………………………………………………….. 
Participant 
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Appendix 6 Interview guide  
 
 
1. What is your experience of disappointment at work? 
 
2. Could you give me some examples? 
 
3. How is disappointment discussed/managed in your organisation/practice? 
 
4. What feelings are associated with disappointment? 
 
5. What are the ‘feeling rules’ in your organisation? 
 
 
a. What feelings are publicly expressed in your organisation? 
b. What feelings are not publicly expressed in your organisation? 
 
 
6. Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you would like to add? 
 
7. Is there anything you would like to ask me? 
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Appendix 7 Post interview memo 
 
Respondent 13, public sector worker 
 
The interview was infused with a sense of loss.  Lost opportunities, loss of vision, a 
sense that opportunities were being missed or obscured by the complexity of the 
ways in which the public service works and the desire of the public for it to be black 
or white.  Doing things differently seemed to be unimaginable and those who have 
been in the system for some time had ‘given up’ and were ‘biding their time’.  
Newer employees were hopeful that things would change internally and externally 
but were equally seduced by the security of a ‘permanent job’.  The higher up the 
building the more people were charged with dreaming the bigger dream (the 
Manger’s office is on the top floor, public access is on the ground floor).  My 
experience of the organisation through this interview is of one where something has 
already been lost.  The loss hasn’t been metabolised, spoken about or processed and 
lingers in the air.  Another way of thinking about it is that the organisation is 
depressed because it hasn’t grieved? I’m not sure about this but it seems important.  
The emotional tone of this interview lingered with me long afterwards.  I couldn’t 
shake the feeling of heaviness and sadness.  I needed to do physical exercise later in 
the evening just to ‘move’ the ‘stuckness’ I felt had accumulated in my body. 
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Appendix 8 Reflective memo 
 
I’ve embarked on this research project about disappointment and I don’t know why.  
I have several stories I tell myself about the project.  They are all very rational and 
reasonable but they don’t answer the central question about this topic. Why this 
topic? Why now? And why is it so difficult to articulate how I feel about it? 
 
The absence of ‘feelings’ or a rationale that makes emotional sense to me about this 
project is probably some indicator of resistance on my part. Is it possible that my 
experience of disappointment is so painful that I don’t want to reveal its foundation?  
Is it possible that disappointment is a much more significant experience than I 
imagine? I’m thinking about the two interviews I did this week in which both 
respondents described disappointment in quite ordinary and un-emotive language.   I 
was surprised by that.  Why? 
 
My preference is to ‘think’ about disappointment rather than ‘feel’ disappointment.  
G asked me what I might be disappointed about… I didn’t want to answer the 
question, even though I had several answers.  I know that on a personal level there 
are so many disappointments and if I began to open them up I might drown in the 
stories.   It’s easier not to go there, to keep disappointment manageable and 
organised as an intellectual research project rather than an emotional one.  I’m 
clearly trying to work something out: I just don’t know what yet. 
 
If I’m to truly explore my disappointments then I’ll have to rethink who I am and 
what I want; the choices I’ve made to get here and those I must make to move on.  
That feels like a huge project.  An unravelling of a life in the service of what?  I 
realise I’m afraid.   
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Appendix 9 Mind map 
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Appendix 10 Open codes 
 
Abandonment Fantasy Prejudice 
Ability Fear Preparation 
Acceptance Feedback Pressure 
Ambiguity Flexibility Private 
Ambition Frustration Process 
Ambivalence Gender Projection 
Amnesia Generosity Psychic damage 
Anger Gentleness Rationalise 
Anticlimax Getting what you want Reality 
Apology Good enough Recognition 
Approval Gratitude 
Recollecting & 
forgetting 
Authority Guilt Reflection 
Avoidance History Regret 
Balance Hope Rejection 
Blame Humanity Business relationships 
Boundaries Humiliation Personal relationships 
Care Hurt Relief 
Casualties Identity Reparation 
Characteristics 
Impact of witnessing 
disappointment Resentment 
Choice Imperfection Resignation 
Communication Influence Resistance 
Competition Informality Resolution 
Complacency Intelligence Risk 
Complexity Internal dialogue Sadness 
Compromise Intimacy Sado-masochism 
Confidence Justice Safety 
Conflict Kindness Security 
Consensus Leadership Self-awareness 
Containment Learning Self-esteem 
Creativity Listening Self-worth 
Culture Litigation Subjective 
Curiosity Loss Success 
Cynicism Management of Symbolic 
Defense Maturity Systemic 
Denial Modification Task 
Descriptions Moving On Tolerance 
Difference Naïveté Transference 
Disappointedness Narcissism Transformation 
Disappointment to 
others Negotiation Transitional space 
Disappointment to self Non verbal Transparency 
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Discontentment Obligation Triangulation 
Disenchantment Opportunity Triumph 
Disillusionment Parents' disappointment Trust 
Emotion Performance Unplanedness 
Empathy Permission 
Value of 
disappointment 
Ending Persecution 
Value of not talking 
about  
disappointment 
Escalation Persistence Victimhood 
Examples Personal Vision 
Expectation Petulance Vulnerability 
Fairness Politics Weakness 
Faith Power Winning 
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Appendix 11 Grounded Theory, categories and properties 
 
Core category 
The organisation of disappointment 
 
Core concern 
Maintaining stability and protecting the future 
 
Subcore 
category 
Subcategories  Properties 
An unwanted 
feeling  
I am disappointing 
 
 
 
 
 
I am disappointed 
 
 
 
 
I disappoint 
Shame, guilt, persecution, resignation 
Failure of self 
Living out the projection of the other 
Splitting 
 
Failure of others 
Blame, rage, attack 
Living with the rejection of my projection 
Splitting 
 
Disappointment as loss 
Risk, challenge, acceptance, learning 
Returning the projection 
Integration 
The 
appointment of 
blame 
Appointing a 
vision 
 
 
 
 
 
Appointing blame 
 
Redressing previous work disappointments 
Compensation for the lack of internal and 
external markers of success and the lack of 
felt occupational worth in previous work 
settings 
Mobilising vision into action 
 
Marshalling disappointment 
Transforming negativity 
Retreating from the past, advancing towards 
the future 
Reimagining 
the future 
Ordinary 
disappointments 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
disappointment 
 
 
 
Integrated and contained within the 
organisational system 
Organisation stability remains unthreatened 
 
Splitting is used as a mechanism to organise 
uncontainable feelings 
Threatens to disrupt the stability of the 
organisation 
 
Relinquishing attachment to the organisation 
ideal, experiencing the loss associated 
Reorienting towards a reimagined 
organisation 
 
